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Blackstone's Criminal Practice 2013

March 2013 update

Updates to Blackstone's Criminal Practice 2013 are produced by Michael Hirst, Professor of Criminal Justice, Leicester De Montfort Law School, and Laurence Eastham, Editorial Co-ordinator, Blackstone’s Criminal Practice. This update primarily considers developments reported in February 2013.


Part A: General Principles of Criminal Law

A3 Defences

A3.17 Intoxication: Specific and Basic Intent

The interplay between the law relating to voluntary intoxication and the law relating to insanity or (non-insane) automatismwas considered by the court of Appeal in Coley [2013] EWCA Crim 223.

A3.30 Insanity: General Principles: the M’Naghten Rules

The relationship between intoxication, self-induced automatism and M’Naghten insanity was considered by the Court of Appeal in Coley [2013] EWCA Crim 223.

A5 Inchoate Offences

A5.46 Statutory Conspiracy: Agreement   

Griffiths [1966] 1 QB 589 was considered in Shillam [2013] EWCA Crim 160, in which convictions for conspiracy to supply cocaine were quashed because, although a single multiparty conspiracy was alleged, the case had been left to the jury in such a way as to invite them to convict even if not sure that the defendants were all guilty of the same conspiracy. See also Mehta [2012] EWCA Crim 2824.

The Court of Appeal in Shillam concluded with this warning:

The moral of the case is that the prosecution should always think carefully, before making use of the law of conspiracy, how to formulate the conspiracy charge or charges and whether a substantive offence or offences would be more appropriate


Part B: Offences

B1 Homicide and Related Offences

B1.54 Loss of Control

Dowds [2012] 1 Cr App R 455 was considered in Asmelash [2013] EWCA Crim 157, in which the Court of Appeal confirmed that those who become voluntarily intoxicated have no better chance of succeeding with a plea of loss of control that they would have done under the old defence of provocation. In considering the question under the CAJA 2009, s. 54(1)(c) of whether ‘a person of D’s sex and age, with a normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint and in the circumstances of D, might have reacted in the same or similar way to D’, the fact that the accused had voluntarily consumed alcohol was not to be included in D’s circumstances.

This does not mean that a self-intoxicated defendant cannot ever succeed with that defence, but only that his intoxication cannot be prayed in aid of it. As Lord Judge CJ explained:

If a sober individual in the defendant’s circumstances, with normal levels of tolerance and self-restraint, might have behaved in the same way as the defendant confronted by the relevant qualifying trigger, he would not be deprived of the loss of control defence, just because he was not sober.

B1.76 Constructive Manslaughter

In Meeking[2012] 1 WLR 3349, the Court of Appeal upheld a conviction for constructive manslaughter in which the ‘base offence’ was an act contrary to the RTA 1988, s. 22A(1)(b) (causing danger to road users: see C3.56 in the main work). In the course of a quarrel she had deliberately applied the handbrake whilst her husband was driving their car at 60 mph, resulting in an accident which caused his death.

All the elements of unlawful act manslaughter were clearly present in this case, but it is unusual for a manslaughter charge to be constructed on an offence such as the one under s. 22A which is potentially (but was not in this case) an offence of mere negligence. By the same logic, a motorist or cyclist who deliberately runs a red traffic light or ignores a ‘no entry’ sign and thereby causes a fatal accident must equally be guilty of manslaughter. Andrews [1937] AC 576 arguably precludes such a conviction only where the base offence is not proved to have been committed intentionally.

B2 Non-fatal Offences Against the Person

B2.10 Assault and Battery: Lawful and Unlawful Force

If a person told another that he or she refused to be touched or struck in a particular way and the other carried on and did it, the fact that he had been motivated by misdirected affection would not save it from being an assault. On the facts, the forcible taking of the finger to make the victim eat the mixture had been the clearest possible assault. See Braham [2013] EWCA Crim 3.

B3 Sexual Offences

B3.23 Rape: Mens Rea

Beliefs in consent arising from conditions such as delusional psychotic or personality disorders had to be judged by objective standards of reasonableness and not by taking into account a mental disorder which induced a belief which could not reasonably have arisen without it. If an accused's delusional beliefs could have led him to believe that the complainant was consenting when she was not, such delusional beliefs could not in law render reasonable a belief that was otherwise completely unfounded. See Braham [2013] EWCA Crim 3.

B3.263 Trafficking People for Sexual Exploitation

The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (Commencement No. 5 and Saving and Transitional Provision) Order 2013 (SI 2013 No. 470) provides inter alia for s. 109 (trafficking people for sexual exploitation) to come into force on 6 April 2013.

B12 Offences Relating to Weapons

B12.127 Sentencing Guidelines for Firearms Offences

Boateng [2011] 2 Cr App R (S) 597 was consideredin Dixon [2013] All ER (D) 251 (Feb) and in Khan [2013] All ER (D) 253 (Feb).

In Dixon, D was found in possession of a bag containing a gun that a friend had left with her following a shooting incident. She pleaded guilty to possession of a prohibited firearm on the basis that she did not know the gun was in the bag.

The Court of Appeal refused to interfere with the imposition of a statutory minimum term of five years’ imprisonment. She had received a package from a man of violence, without enquiring as to the content of that package. These were not exceptional circumstances. To call them so would subvert the policy behind the minimum term.

In Khan, D1 had been involved in a feud with persons who had made violent threats against him and his family. In response to this threat he decided to acquire an arsenal of firearms, including a sub-machine gun with silencer, a pump action shotgun and a rifle with telescopic sight, all in working order with matching ammunition. D2 agreed to help collect them and was arrested with the weapons in his van. Both eventually pleaded guilty to firearms offences, including in D1’s case conspiracy to possess firearms with intent to endanger life and in D2’s case possession of a prohibited weapon

One of the issues was the extent to which the background of threats provided mitigation. The Court of Appeal felt that insufficient credit had been given at sentencing. Sentences of 12 years and three months for D1 and five years and three months for D2 (each reflecting a 12.5% discount for the plea) were reduced to 10 years and three months and five years respectively.

B14 Offences Against the Administration of Justice

B14.108 Forms of Contempt: Photography, Sketching, Tweeting and Mobile Telephones

In A-G v Scarth [2013] EWHC 194 (Admin), D, who was aged 87, was found in contempt in relation to the deliberate recording, both audio and visual, of the proceedings in a magistrates’ court. He was also in contempt for placing the recording on You Tube. He had previously been imprisoned (but released on health grounds on appeal) for similar acts of contempt in respect of proceedings in the Crown Court. He was defiant and clearly unwilling to cooperate with any form of medical disposal. The Divisional Court felt it had no alternative but to commit him on each of the two counts for 28 days, to run concurrently, but suspended for a period of 12 months.

B19 Offences Related to Drugs

B19.7 ‘Substances or Products’ Specified as Controlled Drugs in Class A, B or C

The Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (Amendment) Order 2013 (SI 2013 No. 239) amends the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, sch. 2, part 2 so as to control the following as Class B drugs with effect from 26 February 2013:

  • Synthetic cannabinoid receptor agonists (synthetic cannabinoids);
  • 2-(ethylamino)-2-(3-methoxyphenyl)cyclohexanone (commonly known as methoxetamine) and other compounds related to ketamine (Class C) and phencyclidine (Class A); and
  • 2-((dimethylamino)methyl)-1-(3-hydroxyphenyl)cyclohexanol (commonly known as “O-desmethyltramadol”, a metabolite of the prescription only medicine, tramadol).

B19.13 Regulations that Permit Actions with Respect to ‘Controlled Drugs’

The Misuse of Drugs (Designation) Order 2001 is further amended by the Misuse of Drugs (Designation) (Amendment) (England, Wales and Scotland) Order 2013 (SI 2013 No. 177).

B19.128 Sentencing Guidelines for Offences under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971

Qazi [2011] 2 Cr App R (S) 32 was considered in Hall [2013] EWCA Crim 82. See this update at E1.20.

B20 Offences Relating to Dangerous Dogs and Animal Welfare

B20.12 Offences under the Animal Welfare Act 2006: Unnecessary Suffering

There is no justification for interpreting the terms of the Animal Welfare Act 2006, s. 4, by reference to cases decided under the 1911 Act that it replaced. The language of the 1911 Act, and authorities as to its construction, are irrelevant to the construction of the 2006 provision. The language of the provisions is significantly different. 

In a s. 4 case the prosecution must prove that D knew or ought reasonably to have known both that his act or failure would cause an animal to suffer and that the suffering was unnecessary.  D would commit no offence if he acted in the honest and reasonable, albeit mistaken, belief that he was doing what was necessary for the animal’s welfare. See R (Gray) v Aylesbury Crown Court [2013] EWHC 500 (Admin).

B20.23 The Welfare Offence

The Divisional Court in R (Gray) v Aylesbury Crown Court [2013] EWHC 500 (Admin) (see this update at B20.12) also considered the meaning of the phrase, ‘such steps as are reasonable in all the circumstances’ as used in s. 9 of the Act.

Section 9(1), said the Court, sets a purely objective standard of care which a person responsible for an animal is required to provide.

As to the potential overlap between the s. 4 and s. 9 offences, there should be no conviction and certainly no penalty imposed under s. 9 where the facts relied upon for that conviction are essentially the same as those that gave rise to a conviction under s. 4; but that may not be the case where (as in Gray itself) the s. 9 conviction relates to different incidents and/or different or additional animals.

B22.34 Trafficking People for Exploitation

The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (Commencement No. 5 and Saving and Transitional Provision) Order 2013 (SI 2013 No. 470) provides inter alia for s. 110 (trafficking people for labour and other exploitation) to come into force on 6 April 2013.

The Trafficking People for Exploitation Regulations 2013 (SI 2013 No. 554) implement Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, which replaces Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA. They lay down certain requirements to be observed by the police during the investigation of trafficking offences with a view to providing protection for complainants, and enhanced protection for child complainants. They also provide for amendments to the special measures regime under the YJCEA 1999; these have the effect of affording similar protection to complainants in trafficking offences to that afforded to victims of sexual offences. They have effect from 6 April 2013.


Part C: Road Traffic Offences

C1 Definitions and Basic Principles in Road Traffic Cases

C1.28 Road or Other Public Place

In Cowan v DPP[2013] EWHC 192 (Admin), the Divisional Court held that, in order to determine that an area within the Kingston University campus was a road or other public place for the purposes of the RTA 1988, there must be evidence that the public used the roadway in question as members of the public, i.e. without restriction. Students were not to be treated as members of the public because they had a right to occupy their rooms and make use of the facilities by virtue of their status as students; their visitors gained access only for the purposes of the occupiers of the site.

C3 Offences Relating to Driving Triable on Indictment

C3.15 Causing Death by Dangerous Driving: Causal Link to Fatality

Skelton [1995] Crim LR 635 was followed in Jenkins [2012] EWCA Crim 2909, in which a badly parked vehicle was the cause or partial cause of a fatal accident at a location where visibility was an issue. The Court of Appeal stressed in that case (which was one brought under the RTA 1988, s. 2B) that:

it is no part of the statutory definition that the driving must be coterminous with the impact resulting in the death. The offence is "causing the death ... by driving". It is not "causing the death while driving".

C3.29 Causing Death by Careless or Inconsiderate Driving

See Jenkins [2012] EWCA Crim 2909, which is noted in this update at C3.15.


Part D: Procedure

D7 Bail

D7.20 Risk of Absconding, Further Offences or Interference with Witnesses: Relevant Factors

In R (E) v Wood Green Crown Court [2012] EWHC 1869 (Admin) bail was refused in the Crown Court on the basis (inter alia) that apparent defects in the prosecution case (which, as Mitting J observed on an application for judicial review, ‘might be considered, even at this stage, not to be overwhelming’) were irrelevant to that decision. This, said Mitting J, was a stark and simple error, and nobody was able to explain how it had come to be made.

D14 Special Measures and Anonymity Orders

D14.5 Eligibility Categories: General

The Trafficking People for Exploitation Regulations 2013 (SI 2013 No. 554) implement Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, which replaces Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA. They include amendments to the special measures regime under the YJCEA 1999; these have the effect of affording similar protection to complainants in trafficking offences to that afforded to victims of sexual offences. They have effect from 6 April 2013.

D27 Procedure on Appeal to the Court of Appeal

D27.25 Receipt of Evidence by the Court of Appeal

In SV [2013] EWCA Crim 159, the Court of Appeal offered some observations about the procedure to be adopted for the purposes of appeals based, or essentially based, on alleged retractions after trial.

Allegations of post-trial retractions on the part of complainants or other prosecution witnesses must, said the Court, be treated with caution. Conway (1980) 70 Cr App R 4 (no longer cited in Blackstone’s Criminal Practice but still apparently cited in Archbold and in Cross and Tapper on Evidence),

…  is not to be regarded – if ever it was – as binding authority on the procedure required to be adopted in applications or appeals based on evidence of alleged retractions or inconsistent statements. … All must depend on the particular circumstances of the individual case in order to decide what is the best and fairest procedure to adopt.

D31 Extradition

D31.30 Human Rights

For a rare example of a case in which extradition was found to be disproportionate and contrary to the defendant’s rights under the ECHR, Article 8, see Fridenberga v Public Prosecutor, Prosecutor General Office for the Republic of Latvia [2013] EWHC 317 (Admin). In this case D’s extradition was sought in respect of a drugs offence for which she had already spent longer in custody than she would ever have had to serve if convicted and sentenced for the offence under English law.

D32 Public Funding

D32.1 Restructuring of Criminal Legal Aid

The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (Commencement No. 6) Order 2013 (SI 2013 No. 453) inter alia brings into force the new criminal legal aid regime with effect from 1 April 2013. The following new statutory instruments are among those underpinning the regime:

  • The Criminal Legal Aid (Remuneration) Regulations 2013 (SI 2013 No. 435) make provision for the funding and remuneration of advice, assistance and representation made available under the LASPO 2012, ss. 13, 15 and 16.
  • The Legal Aid (Disclosure of Information) Regulations 2013 (SI 2013 No. 457) make provision for providers of services under the LASPO 2012, Part 1 to disclose information notwithstanding the usual rules of privilege regarding the disclosure of client information. Provision is also made to prevent the disclosure of certain information for the purposes of the investigation and prosecution of offences.
  • The Criminal Legal Aid (Financial Resources) Regulations 2013 (SI 2013 No. 471) make provision in relation to the circumstances in which an individual’s financial resources are such that they are eligible for criminal legal aid. Part 2 makes provision in relation to the financial eligibility of an individual for advice and assistance provided under the LASPO 2012, s. 15 (advice and assistance for criminal proceedings). Part 3 makes provision in relation to the financial eligibility for representation provided under s. 16 (representation for criminal proceedings). Part 4 makes provision in relation to the enforcement of an obligation to make a payment imposed under s. 23.
  • The Criminal Legal Aid (Contribution Orders) Regulations 2013 (SI 2013 No. 483) make provision in relation to the liability of individuals who are in receipt of representation under the LASPO 2012, s 16 (representation for criminal proceedings) to make a payment in connection with the provision of such representation, based on an assessment of their financial resources.
  • The Criminal Legal Aid (Recovery of Defence Costs Orders) Regulations 2013 (SI 2013 No. 511) provide that where an individual receives legal aid for representation in relation to criminal proceedings before any court other than the magistrates’ court or the Crown Court, the court hearing the proceedings must, unless an exception applies, make a determination at the conclusion of the proceedings requiring the individual to pay some or all of the cost of their representation. Regulations 7 to 11 set out the circumstances in which a court may not make such a determination. Regulations 12 to 14 make provision for the assessment of financial resources and regs. 16 and 17 make provision in relation to the provision of information. Regulation 20 makes provision for the enforcement of an RDCO by the Lord Chancellor.
  • The Legal Aid (Financial Resources and Payment for Services) (Legal Persons) Regulations 2013 (SI 2013 No. 512) make provision for determining the financial eligibility of legal persons (i.e. non-individuals) for civil and criminal legal aid.
  • The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (Consequential, Transitional and Saving Provisions) Regulations 2013 (SI 2013 No. 534) make transitional and saving provisions and consequential amendments to secondary legislation. They make provision about the treatment of legal aid applications made before 1 April 2013.

Part E: Sentencing

E1 Sentencing: General Provisions

E1.17 Increase in Sentences for Aggravation Related to Disability, Sexual Orientation or Transgender Identity

The CJA 2003, s. 146, does not apply to hostility which was based on a person's sexual practices or acts rather than on their actual or presumed sexual orientation: see B [2013] EWCA Crim 291.

E1.20 Personal Mitigation

Qazi [2011] 2 Cr App R (S) 32 was considered in Hall [2013] EWCA Crim 82, in which the offender’s sentence for importing cocaine was reduced on appeal from one of three years’ imprisonment to one of 18 months (as an exceptional application of mercy allowing for his immediate release) on account of his grave ill-health. His original sentence had already taken account of the fact that he suffered from a progressive, irreversible and incurable degeneration of the spinocerebellar tract and was not wrong in principle; but, shortly after his sentence began, the offender had to be transferred to a hospital as he had developed a degree of arterial fibrillation. Whilst in prison, his condition had worsened due to thyroid toxicosis and a secondary infection.

E22 Mentally Disordered Offenders

E22.8 Hospital Orders

In Ahmed [2013] EWCA Crim 99, the Court of Appeal provided guidance on the making of hospital orders in place of imprisonment in cases involving dangerous but mentally disordered offenders, and on the procedures to be followed where the sentencing judge was unable to make such an order because of inadequate medical evidence.


Part F: Evidence

F2 The Discretion to Exclude Evidence; Evidence Unlawfully, Improperly or Unfairly Obtained

F2.41 Undercover Operations after Commission of the Offence

Bailey [1993] 3 All ER 513 and Khan [1997] AC 558 were considered in Plunkett [2013] EWCA Crim 261, where the defendants had incriminated themselves in exchanges between them that were covertly recorded by police, the most damaging of which occurred during a staged delay in a police van, when they were essentially ‘getting their story straight’ before police interview. The question for the Court of Appeal was whether those recordings should have been excluded at trial under the PACE 1984, s. 78. It was alleged that they were unlawful and unfair, both because of alleged breaches of  the RIPA 2000 and because the engineered delay was allegedly in breach of the duty imposed by the PACE 1984, s.30(1A) (by which an arrested suspect must ordinarily be taken to a police station as soon as practicable after the arrest).

The appeals were dismissed. The trial judge had rightly held that there had been no misrepresentation, entrapment or other police misconduct; the police had simply afforded the opportunity to the defendants to talk together. There was nothing to suggest that what was said during the recorded conversations was anything other than true. The defence had every opportunity to test all the other evidence in the case and to provide an explanation of the conversations in the van. Even if there had been a breach of the RIPA 2000 or of the PACE 1984, s. 30(1A), the breaches would have been minor, given the immense seriousness of the crime and the need to protect the alleged victims.

See also King [2012] EWCA Crim 805.

F16 Exceptions to the Rule Against Hearsay (Excluding Confessions)

F16.33 Hearsay, Loss of Right to Cross-examine and Fair Trial Provisions

Horncastle [2010] 2 AC 373, Ibrahim [2012] EWCA 837 and Riat <[2012] EWCA Crim 1509 were considered in Adeojo [2013] EWCA Crim 41, in which E-D, a key witness to the murder with which D1 and D2 were charged, had made recorded statements to the police incriminating them, but proved hostile when called to testify. His unwillingness to answer key questions was eventually found to be linked to his fear for his family. At the trial, where D1 was convicted, and at D2’s retrial, recordings of E-D’s original statement were played to the court to fill in the gaps in his testimony.

The principal issue on appeal was whether the admission of this hearsay evidence undermined the fairness of the trial. The Court of Appeal was satisfied that it did not:

It was not suggested by any party to the trial that Essuman-Dadson was anything other than a victim and that his friend Akapalara had been murdered. It is noteworthy that the witness told the officer he could show him on YouTube the men he recognised; he did not claim to be able to identify all of the attackers. He did not claim to be able to identify the man who had shot Akapalara. In our view, the jury was armed with the information it needed to consider whether it was nevertheless possible that Essuman-Dadson was simply and falsely casting blame elsewhere. Second, important both to the issue of honesty and to the issue of reliability of the identification was the manner in which the account emerged during the course of Essuman-Dadson's interviews. This was far from a bare allegation. It was redolent with circumstantial detail which could be tested against other evidence. Third, there could be no challenge about the reliability of the making of the statement. It was recorded. The jury was able to consider not just the words recorded but the manner in which the witness responded to questions and provided the circumstantial detail to which we have referred. The jury could properly assess the account given against Essuman-Dadson's immediate circumstances, namely that he had himself been arrested following medical treatment for significant injuries when he had not, so far, identified his attackers. Fourth, as to the accuracy of the identification, there were several witnesses who could speak to the conditions in which the identification by Essuman-Dadson was made. The jury was directed to consider whether there was any support for the identification made by Essuman-Dadson and, equally important, whether there was evidence which was capable of undermining it.

The judge gave an unequivocal and detailed warning to the jury of the shortcomings of the evidence and the safeguards and counterbalancing measures were such that the jury could safely conclude that E’s evidence was reliable. 

F19 Inferences from Silence and the Non-production of Evidence

F19.50 Failure of Accused to Testify

Cowan [1996] QB 373 was applied in RS v DPP [2013] EWHC 322 (Admin), where the magistrates had justified their decision to draw an adverse inference from D’s failure to testify by stating that he ‘would have been able to describe events at the scene beyond what he had described in his interview'.

This was not an orthodox explanation for the drawing of such an inference, but the Divisional Court was satisfied that the underlying basis for it was sound. Swift J said:

The magistrates were fully entitled to conclude that [D] had chosen to remain silent because of a recognition that his evidence would not withstand close scrutiny by means of cross-examination. The magistrates did not express their conclusion in quite those terms. However, it is plain from the case stated that their attention was directed to the principles set out in Cowan and that they had implicitly rejected the defence submission that [D] might have chosen to remain silent for some reason other than that he had no answer to the prosecution case or none that would withstand cross-examination. Thus, although their reasoning could have been more clearly expressed, [D] could have been in little doubt as to the basis of their decision.


New Legislation

Scrap Metal Dealers Act 2013

This Act prospectively repeals the Scrap Metal Dealers Act 1964 (and linked legislation) together with Part 1 of Vehicles (Crime) Act 2001, creating a revised regulatory regime for the scrap metal recycling and vehicle dismantling industries.

The new statutory regime will be brought into effect on such day as the Secretary of State may appoint by order.

Mental Health (Discrimination) Act 2013

This Act includes amendments of the Juries Act 1974, s. 1 and sch. 1. The amendments have the effect that disqualification on mental health grounds is restricted to (i) a person for the time being liable to be detained under the Mental Health Act 1983 and (ii) a person for the time being resident in a hospital on account of mental disorder as defined by that Act. The amendments are to be brought into force on such day as the Secretary of State may by order appoint.

Statute Law (Repeals) Act 2013

Obsolete legislation repealed by this Act includes:

  • Sale of Offices Act 1551
  • Sale of Offices Act 1809
  • Forgery of Foreign Bills Act 1803
  • Common Informers Act 1951
  • Police Act 1969
  • Criminal Justice Act 1988, sch. 15, para. 111.

Misuse of Drugs (Designation) (Amendment) (England, Wales and Scotland) Order 2013 (SI 2013 No. 177)

This Order makes further amendments to the principal Order of 2001 (SI 2001 No. 3997).

Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (Amendment) Order 2013 (SI 2013 No. 239)

This Order amends the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, sch. 2, part 2 so as to control the following as Class B drugs with effect from 26 February 2013:

  • Synthetic cannabinoid receptor agonists (synthetic cannabinoids);
  • 2-(ethylamino)-2-(3-methoxyphenyl)cyclohexanone (commonly known as methoxetamine) and other compounds related to ketamine (Class C) and phencyclidine (Class A); and
  • 2-((dimethylamino)methyl)-1-(3-hydroxyphenyl)cyclohexanol (commonly known as “O-desmethyltramadol”, a metabolite of the rescription only medicine, tramadol).

The Criminal Legal Aid (Remuneration) Regulations 2013 (SI 2013 No. 435)

These Regulations make provisions for the funding and remuneration of advice, assistance and representation made available under the LASPO 2012, ss. 13, 15 and 16.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (Commencement No. 6) Order 2013 (SI 2013 No. 453)

The principal purpose of this Order is to bring into force the new criminal legal aid regime with effect from 1 April 2013.

The Legal Aid (Disclosure of Information) Regulations 2013 (SI 2013 No. 457)

These Regulations make provision for providers of services under the LASPO 2012, Part 1 to disclose information notwithstanding the usual rules of privilege regarding the disclosure of client information. Provision is also made to prevent the disclosure of certain information for the purposes of the investigation and prosecution of offences.

Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (Commencement No. 5 and Saving and Transitional Provision) Order 2013 (SI 2013 No. 470)

This Order provides inter alia for ss. 109 (trafficking people for sexual exploitation) and 110 (trafficking people for labour and other exploitation) to come into force on 6 April 2013.

The Criminal Legal Aid (Financial Resources) Regulations 2013 (SI 2013 No. 471)

These Regulations make provision in relation to the circumstances in which an individual’s financial resources are such that they are eligible for criminal legal aid. Part 2 makes provision in relation to the financial eligibility of an individual for advice and assistance provided under the LASPO 2012, s. 15 (advice and assistance for criminal proceedings). Part 3 makes provision in relation to the financial eligibility for representation provided under s. 16 (representation for criminal proceedings). Part 4 makes provision in relation to the enforcement of an obligation to make a payment imposed under s. 23.

The Criminal Legal Aid (Contribution Orders) Regulations 2013 (SI 2013 No. 483)

These Regulations make provision in relation to the liability of individuals who are in receipt of representation under the LASPO 2012, s 16 (representation for criminal proceedings) to make a payment in connection with the provision of such representation, based on an assessment of their financial resources.

The Criminal Legal Aid (Recovery of Defence Costs Orders) Regulations 2013 (SI 2013 No. 511)

These Regulations provide that where an individual receives legal aid for representation in relation to criminal proceedings before any court other than the magistrates’ court or the Crown Court, the court hearing the proceedings must, unless an exception applies, make a determination at the conclusion of the proceedings requiring the individual to pay some or all of the cost of their representation. Regulations 7 to 11 set out the circumstances in which a court may not make such a determination. Regulations 12 to 14 make provision for the assessment of financial resources and regs. 16 and 17 make provision in relation to the provision of information. Regulation 20 makes provision for the enforcement of an RDCO by the Lord Chancellor.

The Legal Aid (Financial Resources and Payment for Services) (Legal Persons) Regulations 2013 (SI 2013 No. 512)

These Regulations make provision for determining the financial eligibility of legal persons (i.e. non-individuals) for civil and criminal legal aid.

The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (Consequential, Transitional and Saving Provisions) Regulations 2013 (SI 2013 No. 534)

These Regulations make transitional and saving provisions and consequential amendments to secondary legislation. They make provision about the treatment of legal aid applications made before 1 April 2013.

Trafficking People for Exploitation Regulations 2013 (SI 2013 No. 554)

These Regulations implement Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, and replace Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA. They lay down certain requirements to be observed by the police during the investigation of trafficking offences with a view to providing protection for complainants, and enhanced protection for child complainants. They also provide for amendments to special measures regime under the YJCEA 1999; these have the effect of affording similar protection to complainants in trafficking offences to that afforded to victims of sexual offences. They have effect from 6 April 2013.

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