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Blackstone's Criminal Practice 2013

June 2013 update

Updates to Blackstone's Criminal Practice 2013 are produced by Michael Hirst, Professor of Criminal Justice, Leicester De Montfort Law School, and Laurence Eastham, Editorial Co-ordinator, Blackstone’s Criminal Practice. This update primarily considers developments reported in May 2013.


Part A: General Principles of Criminal Law

A3 General Defences

A3.64 Self-defence: The Degree of Force Permitted

The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (Commencement No. 8) Order 2012 (SI 2013 No. 1127) brought s. 148 of the Act (reasonable force for the purposes of self-defence) into force on 14 May 2013.

A5 Inchoate Offences

A5.63 Conspiracy to Defraud: Sentence

In Kallakis [2013] EWCA Crim 709 the Court of Appeal considered (i) whether, and to what extent, the Definitive Sentencing Guideline on fraud was relevant to very serious cases of conspiracy to defraud, (ii) whether the absence of actual loss mitigated the seriousness of the offence and (iii) the appropriate use of the power to impose consecutive sentences for substantive offences of fraud and of conspiracy to defraud.
As to (i), although the Guideline specifically does not govern such cases (or cases of cheating the public revenue), it is of some value; and conspiracy to defraud carries the same maximum penalty as substantive offences of fraud.
As to (ii), since ‘harm’ was always a factor to be weighed in sentencing, the absence of loss was clearly relevant.
As to (iii), and after reviewing cases concerning conspiracy to defraud, the Court considered that the effect of concurrent sentences was ‘to give the impression that the offenders have entirely escaped the consequences of a serious fraud in which substantial loss has resulted’ and that a consecutive sentence for the offence was required, subject to the principle of totality.


Part B: Offences

B2 Non-fatal offences

B2.147 Ill-treatment or Neglect of Persons who Lack Capacity

The concept of ‘wilful’ neglect in the context of the offence under the Mental Capacity Act 2005, s. 44, was considered by the Court of Appeal in Patel [2013] EWCA Crim 965, in which D, a nurse, had improperly failed to provide CPR to an elderly patient who had stopped breathing while in her care. The Court noted that, in contrast to the offence under the CYPA 1933, as considered in Sheppard [1981] AC 394, the s. 44 offence does not include the qualifying words ‘in a manner likely to cause unnecessary suffering or injury to health’. It was therefore no defence to show that the patient would have died even if the proper treatment had been provided.

B3 Sexual Offences

B3.31 Conclusive Presumptions about Consent

Jheeta [2007] 2 Cr App R 477 was considered and Devonald [2008] EWCA Crim 527 was doubted in B [2013] EWCA Crim 823, in which D had assumed false Facebook identities and tricked his girlfriend into performing sexual acts online. But, in contrast to Devonald, where the complainant had been misled as to the offender’s true purpose, there was no real deception as to purpose in B. Hallett LJ said:

19. There is no definition of the word purpose in the [Sexual Offences] Act. It is a perfectly ordinary English word and one might have hoped it would not be necessary to provide a definition. … Those engaging in a sexual act may have a number of reasons or objectives and each party may have a different objective or reason. The Act does not specify whose purpose is under consideration. There is, therefore, a great danger in attempting any definition of the word purpose and in defining it too widely. A wide definition could bring within the remit of section 76 situations never contemplated by Parliament.
20. We shall, therefore, simply apply the normal rules of statutory construction and echo what was said in Jheeta. Where, as here, a statutory provision effectively removes from an accused his only line of defence to a serious criminal charge it must be strictly construed. We respectfully adopt the approach of the court in Jheeta. If there is any conflict between the decisions in Jheeta and Devonald, we would unhesitatingly follow Jheeta. Thus, it will be a rare case in which section 76 should be applied.

B4 Theft, Handling Stolen Goods and Related Offences

B4.5 Sentencing Guidelines: Offences of Theft Generally

The Penalties for Disorderly Behaviour (Amount of Penalty) (Amendment) Order 2013 (SI 2013 No. 1165) amends the principal Order of 2002 (SI 2002 No. 1837), with effect from 1 July 2013, inter alia so as to increase the amount payable in respect of an offence of theft when it is treated as a penalty offence from £80 to £90.

B5 Fraud, Blackmail and Deception

B5.7 Sentencing Guidelines for Fraud Offences Generally

See Kallakis [2013] EWCA Crim 709, which is considered in this update at A5.63.

B6 Falsification, Forgery and Counterfeiting

B6.110 Unfair Commercial Practices, Misleading Advertisements etc.

The definition of a ‘commercial practice’ for the purposes of the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations was considered by the Court of Appeal in X Ltd [2013] EWCA Crim 818, where it was held that an unfair commercial practice could take the form of an isolated act and was not confined to courses of repeated malpractice. 'A commercial practice' said Leveson LJ, 'can be derived from a single incident. It will depend on the circumstances.' Moreover, there need be no actual sale or transaction, as the words, 'if any' make clear. If there has been such a transaction the unfair practice may come later, as where a trader misleads a customer as to his rights or duties under that transaction.

B8 Damage to Property

B8.42 Sentencing Guidelines (Basic Offence)

The Penalties for Disorderly Behaviour (Amount of Penalty) (Amendment) Order 2013 (SI 2013 No. 1165) amends the principal Order of 2002 (SI 2002 No. 1837), with effect from 1 July 2013, inter alia so as to increase the amount payable in respect of a basic offence of criminal damage when it is treated as a penalty offence from £80 to £90.

B11 Offences Affecting Public Order

B11.72 Sentencing Guidelines (Basic Offence)

The Penalties for Disorderly Behaviour (Amount of Penalty) (Amendment) Order 2013 (SI 2013 No. 1165) amends the principal Order of 2002 (SI 2002 No. 1837), with effect from 1 July 2013, inter alia so as to increase the amount payable in respect of a basic offence of causing harassment, alarm or distress when it is treated as a penalty offence from £80 to £90.

B11.101 False Alarm of Fire

The Penalties for Disorderly Behaviour (Amount of Penalty) (Amendment) Order 2013 (SI 2013 No. 1165) amends the principal Order of 2002 (SI 2002 No. 1837), with effect from 1 July 2013, inter alia so as to increase the amount payable in respect of an offence of giving a false alarm of fire when it is treated as a penalty offence from £80 to £90.

B11.200 Drunk and Disorderly

The Penalties for Disorderly Behaviour (Amount of Penalty) (Amendment) Order 2013 (SI 2013 No. 1165) amends the principal Order of 2002 (SI 2002 No. 1837), with effect from 1 July 2013, inter alia so as to increase the amount payable in respect of an offence of being drunk and disorderly when it is treated as a penalty offence from £80 to £90.

B12 Offences in Relation to Weapons

B12.53 Possessing or Distributing Prohibited Weapons or Ammunition

Flack v Baldry [1988] 1 WLR 393 was considered in Hurley [2013] EWCA Crim 1008, where the weapon in question was a stun gun of a design capable of discharging 50,000 volts. Even if the stun gun found in D’s possession had not been working properly at the time of the alleged offence, it was a prohibited weapon for the purposes of the 1968 Act.

B12.229 Fireworks Offences

The Penalties for Disorderly Behaviour (Amount of Penalty) (Amendment) Order 2013 (SI 2013 No. 1165) amends the principal Order of 2002 (SI 2002 No. 1837), with effect from 1 July 2013, inter alia so as to increase the amount payable in respect of an offence under the Fireworks Act 2003, s. 11 when it is treated as a penalty offence from £80 to £90.

B13 Offences Affecting Enjoyment of Premises

B13.90 Trespassing on a Railway

The Penalties for Disorderly Behaviour (Amount of Penalty) (Amendment) Order 2013 (SI 2013 No. 1165) amends the principal Order of 2002 (SI 2002 No. 1837), with effect from 1 July 2013, inter alia so as to increase the amount payable in respect of an offence under the British Transport Commission Act 1949, s. 55 when it is treated as a penalty offence from £50 to £60.

B14 Offences Against the Administration of Justice

B14.77 Wasting Police Time

The Penalties for Disorderly Behaviour (Amount of Penalty) (Amendment) Order 2013 (SI 2013 No. 1165) amends the principal Order of 2002 (SI 2002 No. 1837), with effect from 1 July 2013, inter alia so as to increase the amount payable in respect of an offence of wasting police time when it is treated as a penalty offence from £80 to £90.

B18 Offences Involving Writing, Speech or Publication

B18.29 Improper Use of Public Electronic Communications Network

The Penalties for Disorderly Behaviour (Amount of Penalty) (Amendment) Order 2013 (SI 2013 No. 1165) amends the principal Order of 2002 (SI 2002 No. 1837), with effect from 1 July 2013, inter alia so as to increase the amount payable in respect of an offence under the Communications Act 2003, s. 127 when it is treated as a penalty offence from £80 to £90.


Part C: Road Traffic Offences

C3 Offences Relating to Driving Triable on Indictment

C3.32 Causing Death by Careless, or Inconsiderate, Driving: Sentencing

In Rahman [2013] EWCA Crim 887, the Court of Appeal dismissed D’s appeal against his sentence of 15 months’ imprisonment after pleading guilty to causing the death of a motorcyclist by driving his taxi at about 30 mph through a red light at a busy junction in London at night. He was of previous good character, but his offence was described as falling on the borderline between careless and dangerous driving. The deceased must himself have crossed lights showing red and amber, but no great significance seems to have been attached to this.


Part D: Procedure

D2 The Decision to Prosecute and Diversion

D2.46 Fixed Penalty Notices under the CJPA 2001

The Penalties for Disorderly Behaviour (Amount of Penalty) (Amendment) Order 2013 (SI 2013 No. 1165) amends the principal Order of 2002 (SI 2002 No. 1837), with effect from 1 July 2013, inter alia so as to increase the amount of penalty for offences listed in part 1 of the schedule from £80 to £90 and so as to increase the amount of penalty for offences listed in part 2 of the schedule from £50 to £60.

D3 Courts, Parties and Abuse of Process

D3.137 Reporting and Access Restrictions

In ITN News v R [2013] EWCA Crim 773, various media organisations challenged an order made under the YJCEA 1999, s. 46, which prohibited the publication of photographs of a witness in a high profile manslaughter trial (that of Michael and Mairead Philpott) and which also prohibited the publication of photos of any of her five children. The witness had been given the benefit of a special measures direction under that Act, permitting her to testify from behind a screen, but this did not give her anonymity because she had already been identified in publications and television programmes as the mother of some of Michael Philpott’s children and her name was widely known. It was argued on behalf of the media organisations that this made the witness ineligible for protection under the YJCEA 1999, s. 46. The order was nevertheless upheld on appeal. Lord Judge CJ said:

In the overwhelming majority of cases the identity of every witness is known. If the jurisdiction to make an s.46 order were restricted in the way suggested, the ‘eligibility’ test would be virtually confined to the rare case of the anonymous witness. Anonymity, however, is an entirely distinct and extreme form of special measure for which a separate statutory system is in place. Without repeating s. 46(7) it seems clear that it extends beyond the bare naming, that is the identifying, of the witness. Thus a still or moving picture of the witness may be prohibited if the ‘eligibility’ test is satisfied, whether or not the name and identity of the witness is otherwise known.

D6 Classification of Offences and Determining Mode of Trial

D6.15 Statutory Provisions on Mode of Trial as Amended by the Criminal Justice Act 2003

The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (Commencement No. 13) Order 2013 (SI 2013 No. 1104) brings sch. 17, para. 4 into force on 28 May 2013, which amends the MCA 1980, s. 19 in relation to the treatment of convictions in other EU Member States.

D8 Assets Recovery

D8.4 Civil Recovery Orders and Taxation

Perry v Serious Organised Crime Agency [2013] 1 AC 182 was considered by the civil division of the Court of Appeal in Serious Organised Crime Agency v O'Docherty [2013] EWCA Civ 518.
Although the Supreme Court in Perry had held (overruling or reversing previous authority) that a civil recovery order (CRO) could be made only in respect of property within the jurisdiction, that ruling did not undermine the finality of cases already decided. It therefore did not enable the subject of a CRO, previously made in respect of overseas property, to challenge the legality of that order, or to dispute an order of committal for contempt made when he had previously failed to comply with a property freezing order in respect of some of the property in question.

D10 Sending Cases from the Magistrates’ Court to the Crown Court

D10.1 Introduction

The Criminal Justice Act 2003 (Commencement No. 31 and Saving Provisions) Order 2013 (SI 2013 No. 1103) brings into force, on 28 May 2013, sch. 3 to the Act, subject to certain excepted provisions specified in the Order. This completes the abolition of committals in those local justice areas where the abolition was not already in effect.

D10.31 Accused No Longer Facing an Offence Sent for Trial

The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (Commencement No. 13) Order 2013 (SI 2013 No. 1104) brings sch. 17, para. 5 into force on 28 May 2013; para. 5 concerns the treatment of convictions in other EU Member States.

D13 Juries

D13.66 Misconduct by a Juror

The post-trial or post-conviction complaint of a seemingly dissatisfied or dissenting juror, unsupported by any other evidence of jury prejudice or misconduct, may not of itself suffice to justify overturning a verdict reached by the jury in question. See Lewis [2013] EWCA Crim 776.

D18 Trial on Indictment: Procedure between Close of Defence Evidence and Retirement of Jury

D18.44 Unanimity as to the Basis of a Guilty Verdict

Brown (1983) 79 Cr App R 115 was considered by the Court of Appeal in Hobson [2013] EWCA Crim 819. The problem in this case arose because D was charged with seven specimen counts of (historic) indecent assault on two children, in respect of a course of conduct that had allegedly gone on for some years, but the complainants had referred in their evidence to assaults on specific occasions that were not particularised in the indictment.
It was therefore incumbent on the trial judge to warn the jury that they could convict only if collectively sure that the criminal act in question had been committed on the same occasion, either in the course of the unspecified pattern of offending, or on one of the particular occasions identified in the evidence.
This had not been done in Hobson and his convictions were accordingly unsafe. Members of the jury could on the evidence have been satisfied about the course of conduct but not the specific occasion, or vice versa.


Part E: Sentencing

E1 Sentencing: General Provisions

E1.2 Purposes of Sentencing

The Court of Appeal’s warning in Wilkinson [2010] 1 Cr App R (S) 628 that, in cases of gun crime, protection of the public is the paramount consideration, was echoed (but this time in relation to knife-crime) in Odegbune [2013] EWCA Crim 711, where long custodial sentences were imposed and largely upheld in respect of a number of youths involved in a gang violence that culminated in the murder of a schoolboy in Victoria Station in 2010. Leveson LJ concluded by warning:

The account of this case should be told and repeated to young people everywhere: knives kill people and the effect of the madness of a few hours – or of a moment – will ripple out and destroy or devastate many lives. That is why the courts will and must always place punishment and deterrence at the forefront of any sentencing decision in cases such as these.

E15 Fines

E15.25 Surcharge

In Stone [2013] EWCA Crim 723 the Court of Appeal laid down the future approach to be taken when a challenge was made to the making of a victim surcharge order.
Any application for leave to appeal against sentence should be considered by the single judge on the papers in the usual way. If, however, the only ground upon which leave is given is the wrongful making of a victim surcharge order then, unless the application for leave is renewed on other grounds, the case should be listed as a non-counsel hearing at which the order, if found to be unlawful, can be quashed.
In this case, a victim surcharge order of £100 had been imposed but the convictions were covered by the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (Surcharge) Order 2007, under which the surcharge was due only if the sentence imposed included a fine; the offender’s sentence did not and the surcharge order was quashed.

E16 Compensation Orders

E16.15 Combining Compensation Orders with Other Sentences or Orders

See Jawad [2013] EWCA Crim 644 which is noted in this update at E19.60.

E19 Confiscation Orders

E19.23 Making of Confiscation Order: Stage Two — Determination of Benefit from Criminal Conduct

The Supreme Court’s ruling in Waya [2012] UKSC 51 (see the December 2012 update) was considered in Lee [2013] EWCA Crim 657, in which the Crown conceded that the mechanics of a mortgage advance meant that a borrower never obtained such a loan for himself. Such loans are paid directly to the vendor of the property being purchased. Confiscation orders against a husband a wife that had wrongly included the sum of a mortgage advance when quantifying their benefit from criminal conduct were reduced accordingly.

E19.60 Relationship with Other Orders

The Supreme Court’s ruling in Waya [2012] UKSC 51 (see the December 2012 update) was also considered in Jawad [2013] EWCA Crim 644. The Court of Appeal in Jawad rejected D’s submission that the mere making of a compensation order in favour of the victim required that any confiscation order must be reduced by the equivalent amount. If there was any doubt as to whether the victim would in fact be repaid, a confiscation order which included the sum in question would not ordinarily be disproportionate.
In this case the court gave D 28 days to pay the compensation order, together with interest accrued, failing which his appeal against the confiscation order would be dismissed.

E21 Exclusions and Disqualifications

E21.28 Restraining Orders under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997

Smith [2012] EWCA Crim 2566 (see the December 2012 update) was applied in AJR (or AR) [2013] EWCA Crim 591, where the issue was whether D, a paranoid schizophrenic who had been found not guilty by reason of insanity of wounding and attempting to murder his infant daughter in front of family members and police officers in a bizarre and shocking incident in October 2011, had properly been made the subject of a five year restraining order under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, s. 5A. The order prohibited him from contacting his daughter, her mother or another named child.
The Court of Appeal rejected a submission that s. 5A could not apply in cases involving the special verdict of insanity, but held that it could not apply in this case, because as Toulson LJ had explained in Smith:

… the court has to be satisfied that that the defendant is likely to pursue a ‘course of conduct’ amounting to harassment within section 1 of the Act … there is no provision parallel to section 5(2) conferring a power to make an order to protect a victim from conduct which ‘will cause fear of violence’. The statutory prohibition under section 1 is in respect of ‘a course of conduct…which amounts to harassment….
In the present case, terrible though the events of 20 October 2011 were, there was no relevant ‘course of conduct’ in either sense. The incident was a single one and did not satisfy the requirements of the Act as explained by Toulson LJ. Further, the judge recognised in his sentencing remarks that the appellant was not suffering from the disability that pertained at the time of the attack on his daughter. It could not, therefore, be said that repetition, even of a single act (as opposed to a course of conduct) was ‘likely’. It might also be added that the judge appears to have invoked the jurisdiction ‘as an adjunct to the Mental Health Act’, but as explained in Smith, that is not the function of this statutory power.


Part F: Evidence

F2 The Discretion to Exclude Evidence; Evidence Unlawfully, Improperly or Unfairly Obtained

F2.12 Admissibility of Evidence Obtained Unlawfully, Improperly or Unfairly

Kuruma v The Queen [1955] AC 197, Sang [1980] AC 402, Fox v Chief Constable of Gwent [1986] AC 281, Soneji [2006] 1 AC 340 and Khan [1997] AC 558 were considered by the Supreme Court in Public Prosecution Service v McKee [2013] UKSC 32.
This was a Northern Ireland appeal concerning a provision requiring the Secretary of State’s approval of devices used for taking fingerprints electronically. A similar device-approval requirement was briefly enacted under English law by way of an amendment to the PACE 1984, s. 61, but was never brought into force and this requirement has subsequently been repealed even in Northern Ireland; but the Court addressed a point of more general importance as to the admissibility of improperly obtained evidence in cases where (as in this case) the legislation applicable says nothing about the consequences of failure to use an approved device.
The Supreme Court held that, in accordance with well-established common-law principles, such evidence remains admissible. Giving the judgment of the court, Lord Hughes contrasted the legislation under consideration with those contained in the prospective amendments to PACE (and its Northern Ireland equivalent) contained in part 1 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012:

If and when these provisions are commenced they will provide for the destruction of fingerprints and other data in certain defined circumstances and/or after prescribed periods. There is express provision in proposed new s. 63T(2) of PACE (and in proposed new article 63Q(2) of the Northern Ireland Order) making inadmissible (at least ‘against the person to whom the material relates’) fingerprints or other data which the police have come under a duty to destroy.
This proposed statutory scheme is consistent with the construction of the provisions we are considering in the present case. Where the intention is to make material inadmissible, express provision is made saying so…. Moreover, the proposed new scheme for destruction of biometric data is clearly founded on a view of individual rights which was considered to justify the consequence of inadmissibility if there is a duty to destroy the material. Such considerations do not apply to type approval for the machinery of taking fingerprints which there is no requirement to destroy.

F2.41 Undercover Operations after Commission of the Offence

The use of evidence obtained by intrusive covert surveillance was examined by the Court of Appeal in Turner [2013] EWCA Crim 642. The Court noted that there might be extreme cases in which the prosecuting authorities interfere so significantly with the legal privilege of a defendant that the very integrity of the administration of justice might be undermined. But this was not such a case. The only alleged unfairness that D could complain of was that had chosen to say the things that he had because he had not realised that they were being recorded by the police. The object of covert surveillance of the kind deployed in the present case was to discover the truth, and, the evidence of what he had said had been before the jury whilst anything containing even a whisper of conversations protected by legal privilege had been excluded. There was accordingly no unfairness in admitting the covertly recorded evidence.

F5 Corroboration and Care Warnings

F5.8 Accomplices Giving Evidence for the Prosecution and Complainants in Sexual Cases

Makanjuola [1995] 1 WLR 1348, [1995] 3 All ER 730 was considered in Laing v The Queen [2013] UKPC 14.

F12 Character Evidence: Evidence of Bad Character of Accused

F12.18 Powers of Exclusion

In Norris [2013] EWCA Crim 712, in which D appealed against his conviction in respect of the notorious Stephen Lawrence murder in 1993, the evidence on which he had been convicted included both DNA and clothing fibre matches and evidence of his racist and violent character, which took the form of a covertly recorded DVD video recording of D conversing with his friends in 1994.
On appeal, counsel for D submitted that the DVD evidence should have been excluded as unfairly prejudicial to D (either using the power under s.101(3) of the CJA 2003 or that under the PACE 1984, s. 78. The argument was that the risk of causing substantial prejudice outweighed any probative value because it was not proximate in time to the alleged offence and could only invite a negative assessment of D and his views.
His appeal was rejected. In respect of the video evidence, the trial judge had emphasised to the jury in a written ‘route to verdict’ document that the video could be relied upon only if they were already sure that there had been no contamination or accidental transfer of the DNA and fibre matching evidence, as alleged by the defence. He also gave written directions on bad character. There was no arguable basis for criticising his ruling or his written directions on bad character.

F16 Exceptions to the Rule Against Hearsay

F16.33 Hearsay, Loss of Right to Cross-examine and Fair Trial Provisions

Horncastle [2010] 2 AC 373 and Riat [2012] EWCA Crim 1509 were considered by the Court of Appeal in Pedersen [2013] EWCA Crim 464, in which the following propositions were extracted from the judgment in Riat:

1. There is no overarching rule that a piece of hearsay evidence will automatically be inadmissible by reason of its being the sole or decisive evidence on the issue in respect of which it is sought to be deployed.
2. It is not the law that hearsay evidence must be demonstrated to be accurate before it can be admitted.
3. The residual power now given by the CJA 2003, s. 114(1)(d) to admit hearsay evidence in the interests of justice must not be used to let in such evidence without proper scrutiny.
4. In deciding whether to admit the hearsay evidence the judge must make a careful assessment of: (a) the importance of the evidence to the case; (b) the risks of unreliability; and (c) whether the reliability of the absent witness can safely be tested and assessed.
5. The critical question is whether the hearsay evidence can safely be held to be reliable.

F18 Evidence of Identification

F18.9 The Turnbull Guidelines

The Turnbull guidelines were considered by the Court of Appeal in Dossett [2013] EWCA Crim 710.

F19 Inferences from Silence and the Non-production of Evidence

F19.49 Failure of Accused to Testify

Cowan [1996] QB 373was applied in Hobson [2013] EWCA Crim 819. For other aspects of that case, see this update at D18.44.


New Legislation

Criminal Justice Act 2003 (Commencement No. 31 and Saving Provisions) Order 2013 (SI 2013 No. 1103)
This Order brings into force, on 28 May 2013, sch. 3 to the Act, subject to certain excepted provisions specified in the Order. This completes the abolition of committals in those local justice areas where the abolition was not already in effect.
Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (Commencement No. 13) Order 2013 (SI 2013 No. 1104)
This Order brings sch. 17, paras. 4 and 5 into force on 28 May 2013. The implemented provisions concern the treatment of convictions in other EU Member States.
Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (Commencement No. 8) Order 2012 (SI 2013 No. 1127)
This Order brought s. 148 of the Act (reasonable force for the purposes of self-defence) into force on 14 May 2013.
Penalties for Disorderly Behaviour (Amount of Penalty) (Amendment) Order 2013 (SI 2013 No. 1165)
This Order amends the principal Order of 2002 (SI 2002 No. 1837), with effect from 1 July 2013, so as to increase the amount of penalty for offences listed in part 1 of the schedule from £80 to £90 and so as to increase the amount of penalty for offences listed in part 2 of the schedule from £50 to £60.
Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (Commencement No. 6) Order 2013 (SI 2013 No. 1180)
This Order brings into force on 17 June 2013, insofar as the provisions are not already in force, provisions of the Act concerning criminal record certificates, principally the following: ss. 79 and 83 and sch. 9, paras. 108 to 111, 113 and 118 to 128.

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