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Blackstone's Criminal Practice 2013

February 2013 update

Updates to Blackstone's Criminal Practice 2013 are produced by Michael Hirst, Professor of Criminal Justice, Leicester De Montfort Law School, and Laurence Eastham, Editorial Co-ordinator, Blackstone’s Criminal Practice. This update primarily considers developments reported in January 2013.


Part A General Principles of Criminal Law

A4 Parties to Offences

A4.1 Liability of Principals and Accessories Generally

The DPP has published guidance on how charging decisions are to be made in cases involving two or more alleged participants in what is known as ‘joint enterprise’.  See www.cps.gov.uk/legal/h_to_k/joint_enterprise/


Part B Offences

B2 Non-fatal Offences Against the Person

B2.2 Assault and Battery Procedure

The Criminal Law Act 1967, s. 6(3A) was considered in Nelson [2013] EWCA Crim 30. The Court of Appeal ruled that, where a count for assault by beating is included in an indictment in the circumstances prescribed by the CJA 1988, s. 40, s. 6(3A) does not enable a jury to return an alternative verdict of common assault on that count. Such a verdict is possible on a charge of assault occasioning actual bodily harm; and if the jury concludes that D threw a punch that missed, a verdict of attempted battery may be returned on a charge of assault by beating; but common assault is not, said the Court, a permissible alternative on a charge of battery, because a battery can be inflicted on a victim who never saw the blow coming. The ingredients of the offence of common assault are not therefore necessarily included in the ingredients of an offence of assault by beating.

There is, with respect, much to dispute here. The Court erred in its obiter suggestion that attempted battery is an offence known to law and there is also a major problem with its attempt to distinguish between cases in which the count in question is one of assault occasioning actual bodily harm and cases in which the count is one of assault by beating. According to the House of Lords in Metropolitan Police Commissioner v Wilson [1984] AC 242, which was not referred to in Nelson, an allegation of the ‘alternative offence’ is impliedly included in a given count where commission of the offence alleged in that count may involve commission of the alternative offence, even if it is possible for the one to be committed without the other. See the main work at D19.48. An assault will ordinarily be committed both in the course of a battery and in the course of an assault occasioning actual bodily harm, even though it need not necessarily be committed in the course of either of those offences. It follows that Nelson must be seen as a decision per incuriam

B2.39 Assault on Constable in Execution of Duty

Donnelly v Jackman [1970] 1 All ER 987 and Collins v Wilcock [1984] 3 All ER 374 were considered in Elkington v DPP [2012] EWHC 3398 (Admin), [2013] All ER (D) 198 (Jan).

B2.174 Putting People in Fear of Violence: Sentencing

In Rumbelow [2012] EWCA Crim 2888, [2013] All ER (D) 57 (Jan), D, a young woman who had conducted a campaign of stalking including threats of violence against an actress, appealed against her sentence of two and a half years' imprisonment, made up of 12 months for harassment under the Protection from Harassment Act, s. 4, 18 months consecutive for breach of an interim restraining order, and six months concurrent for another breach of the same order. She had served 11 months of that sentence.

D was of previous good character but suffered from Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and Asperger's Syndrome, which at least partially explained her bizarre pattern of offending. She was not charged with stalking under s. 4A (see main text at B2.180) as that offence was not then in force.

With a view to supporting her rehabilitation, the Court of Appeal substituted a community order together with a supervision requirement for 12 months and a mental health treatment requirement for 12 months. An indefinite restraining order that was made at the time of sentence would remain in force in the same terms.

B2.182 Offence of Stalking Involving Fear of Violence or Serious Alarm or Distress: Sentencing

See Rumbelow [2012] EWCA Crim 2888, [2013] All ER (D) 57 (Jan) as noted in this update at B2.174.

B4 Theft, Handling Stolen Goods and Related Offences

B4.130 Aggravated Vehicle-taking: Sentence

In Bratu [2013] All ER (D) 105 (Jan) D pleaded guilty to aggravated vehicle-taking after taking his partner’s car without her consent and was sentenced to eight months’ imprisonment, which was upheld on appeal. There were many aggravating features to this offence, including the fact that he was found to be two and a half times over the legal alcohol limit, had been driving dangerously at speed, had run a red light and had made off instead of stopping at once when ordered to do so by the police.

B5 Fraud, Blackmail and Deception

B5.45 Blackmail: Sentencing Guidelines

In Moynes [2013] All ER (D) 73 (Jan), the Court of Appeal declined to interfere with a sentence of six years’ imprisonment on a guilty plea. The sentence (based on a starting point of nine years without the guilty plea) was severe but there were several aggravating circumstances. A mother and child had been threatened in their own home by armed intruders who had kicked in the door, demanding money, car keys, phones and anything else of value. £400 was handed over. Had the police not shown up it might have become even worse. D was an absconder and was considered a high risk to the public.

It is not clear from the brief digest of this case why D was not charged with robbery or aggravated burglary. He was no doubt guilty of blackmail as charged but that appears to have been almost the least of his crimes. A full transcript of the judgment, when published, may perhaps shed some light on this.

B10 Terrorism, Piracy and Hijacking

B10.93 Dissemination of Terrorist Publication

In determining whether a given publication amounts to a terrorist publication within the meaning of the Terrorism Act 2006, s. 2(3), evidence of its possession by known terrorists is admissible, if at all, only for the ‘extremely limited purpose’ of demonstrating that such persons may be amongst those who read it. It cannot prove that they were encouraged by it to commit or instigate terrorist offences; but there is an obvious risk that a jury may be prejudiced into condemning the publication purely by reason of its association with known terrorists, and if such evidence is properly admitted at all there must be a clear warning to the jury as to what it can and cannot be used to prove. See Faraz [2012] EWCA Crim 2820, [2013] All ER (D) 11 (Jan).

B14 Offences Against the Administration of Justice

B14.35 Acts which May Amount to Perverting the Course of Justice

The elements of the offence of perverting the course of justice were reviewed by the Court of Appeal in Kenny [2013] EWCA Crim 1, [2013] All ER (D) 09 (Feb). Faced with the question whether a breach of a restraint order under the POCA 2002 (clearly amounting to contempt of court) could also amount to this offence, the Court said (at [35]-[36]):

For present purposes, the state of the law concerning the offence of perverting the course of justice may be summarised as follows:

  1. There is no closed list of acts which may give rise to the offence;
  2. That said, any expansion of the offence should only take place incrementally and with caution, reflecting both principles of common law reasoning and the requirements of Art 7, ECHR;
  3. So far as concerns the offence generally, neither authority nor principle supports confining the requisite acts to those giving rise to some other independent criminal wrongdoing;
  4. If there is no such limitation generally, then there is no basis for importing such a restriction – as a matter of law – into the elements of the offence where it arises in the context of a breach of a restraint order.

[But] in cases of breach of restraint orders, nothing we have said should encourage prosecutors to charge perverting the course of justice where it is unnecessary to do so; ordinarily the sanction of contempt of court will suffice.

In the instant case, prosecution for perverting the course of justice was not unreasonable. D’s actions formed part of a carefully orchestrated and planned series of measures, designed to frustrate the intended effect of the restraint order. It was determined and sophisticated criminal conduct. Condign punishment for contempt would undoubtedly have been available; but D could have no legitimate complaint that the Crown did not leave matters there and instead pursued the charge of perverting the course of justice.


Part C Road Traffic Offences

C3 Offences Relating to Driving Triable on Indictment

C3.19 Causing Death by Dangerous Driving: Sentencing

In Cole [2012] EWCA Crim 2964 D, aged 86, ran over and killed V, also 86, through appallingly incompetent driving. It was clear that D ought not to have been driving as he was no longer fit to do so. He had lied about his vision on his licence application.

The Court of Appeal held that, under normal circumstances, a substantial sentence of imprisonment would have been proper, notwithstanding D’s age, but there was now further evidence that he was suffering from Alzheimer’s disease and that following his imprisonment he did not know where he was or how long he had been there. A sentence of 51 weeks’ imprisonment, suspended for two years, with a 12-month supervision order, was substituted for the sentence of immediate imprisonment originally imposed

C3.32 Causing Death by Careless or Inconsiderate Driving: Sentencing (1)

In Singh [2013] EWCA Crim 62, [2013] All ER (D) 47 (Jan) D drove through a junction at 50 mph in the dark when the speed limit was 30 mph and where (although the lights were in his favour) the conditions were such that even 30 mph would not have been a safe or appropriate speed. Witnesses said that he was ‘driving like an idiot, a boy racer type’. He struck and killed a motorcyclist who was attempting to turn at the junction. He pleaded guilty to causing death by careless driving and had two other motoring convictions including one for failing to stop at a red light on a date after the fatal accident.

The Court of Appeal rejected an appeal against a sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment:

In our view the judge was entirely correct to say that this was an instance of careless driving which fell within Level one…. The appellant was driving very substantially above the speed limit. He was not charged with dangerous driving. This must be treated as careless or inconsiderate driving but in our view it certainly is at the level stated by the judge, namely Level one.

C3.32 Causing Death by Careless or Inconsiderate Driving: Sentencing (2)

In Rigby [2013] EWCA Crim 34 D, a diabetic, pleaded guilty to causing death by careless driving after suffering a hypoglycemic episode at the wheel and was initially sentenced to 16 months' imprisonment and disqualified from driving for 10 years, the judge equating D’s behaviour with drink-driving, because he had been aware on the day that his blood sugar levels were unusually high and had treated that with a very high, but unbeknown to him inappropriate, dose of insulin, D successfully appealed against the sentence of imprisonment. The Court of Appeal said:

D’s culpability lay in not checking his blood sugar levels before leaving the hospital given his earlier condition. In other words, his culpability was because he chose to drive knowing that there was some risk of a hypoglycemic attack. As he accepted in his basis of plea, if he had checked he might, but only might, have been alerted to the possibility of a problem and taken precautionary measures. His wife had been in hospital. That led to the stress levels which on the medical evidence could have led to this hypoglycemic episode, an episode which came on without warning.

We underline that people with this condition have a duty to take care and to comply with the advice given by the DVLA. The judge in our view was correct in his assessment that the custodial threshold had been passed. However, given the exceptional circumstances of this case, the appropriate sentence in our view was a short custodial sentence. We have been informed that he has served the equivalent of some four months' imprisonment. In our view that would be the appropriate sentence in this case.


Part D Procedure

D2 The Decision to Prosecute and Diversion

D2.1 The Decision to Prosecute

A revised Code for Crown Prosecutors, the 7th edition, was published on 28 January 2013. It is available at http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/code_for_crown_prosecutors/index.html.

D3 Courts, Parties and Abuse of Process

D3.23 Structure of the Magistrates’ Courts System

The Local Justice Areas (No. 3) Order 2012 (SI 2012 No. 3128) amends the principal Order of 2005 (SI 2005 No. 554), so as to provide for the local justice areas of North West Wiltshire, South East Wiltshire, and Swindon to be combined to form a new area, County of Wiltshire, with effect from 1 July 2013.

D22 Summary Trial: The Course of the Trial

D22.16 Failure of an Accused to Appear: Adjournment Sought on Medical Grounds

Jones [2003] 1 AC 1 and Bolton Magistrates’ Court, ex parte Merna (1991) 155 JP 612 were amongst a number of cases considered in Killick v West London Magistrates' Court [2012] EWHC 3864 (Admin), in which the Divisional Court summarised the relevant principles as follows:

1. The overriding principle is that the court should not proceed to hear a case in the defendant's absence without satisfying itself that the claim for an adjournment may properly be rejected and that no unfairness will thereby be done (Evans v East Lancashire Magistrates' Court [2010] EWHC 2108 (Admin) at para 25).

2. The discretion to commence a trial in the absence of a defendant should be exercised with the utmost care and caution. Where a defendant to a criminal charge wishes to resist it and is shown by medical evidence to be unfit to attend court to do so, either as a result of involuntary illness or incapacity, it would be very rarely, if indeed ever, right for the court to exercise its discretion in favour of commencing the trial, or to proceed to hear the case in his absence, at any rate unless the defendant is represented and asks that the trial should begin (see R v Bolton Justices ex parte Merna and R v Richmond Justices ex parte Haines [1991] 155 JP 612, … and see too the opinion of Lord Bingham in Jones at para 13).

3. If a court asked for an adjournment on medical grounds, suspects the grounds to be spurious or believes them to be inadequate, the court should ordinarily express its doubts and thereby give the defendant an opportunity to resolve those doubts (see ex parte Merna).

4. A court considering an application to adjourn will need carefully to distinguish between genuine reasons for the defendant not being present and those reasons which are spuriously advanced or designed to frustrate the process. However, if the court comes to the conclusion that either of the latter is the case, it should say so. It cannot simply be inferred that a court has come to that conclusion unless that is clearly stated by the magistrates (see M v Burnley [2009] EWHC 2874 (Admin) at para 22).

5. If a conclusion is open to the court reasonably on the material before it either to the effect that an excuse given is spurious or there is a truly compelling and exceptional reason for proceeding notwithstanding a good excuse for non-attendance, the court has the power to do so. This however will be an exceptional case (see M v Burnley at para 24).

D22.64 Guilty of a Lesser Offence

DPP v Gane (1991) 155 JP 846 was disapproved in R (Dyer) v Watford Magistrates Court [2013] All ER (D) 88 (Jan). In circumstances where both a simple and an aggravated charge are founded on the same facts, it is not open to a court to convict a defendant of both offences. He should not be convicted of two offences on the basis of a single act of wrongdoing.

D25 Civil Behaviour Orders: ASBOs, Closure Orders, SCPOs and VOOs

D25.29 Post-Conviction ASBOs: Terms

R (Cooke) v DPP [2008] EWHC 2703 (Admin) was applied in Pender v DPP [2013] All ER (D) 173 (Jan). The Divisional Court in Pender noted that, following Cooke, a court should not impose an ASBO under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s. 1C(2) when it is clear that the defendant is incapable (e.g., through addiction or mental disorder) of understanding and/or complying with it; and added that if uncontradicted medical evidence states that this is the case then a judge may disagree only if he has some basis for doing so and only if he explains the basis for that disagreement.

D27 Procedure on Appeal to the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)

D27.1 The Rules and the Guide

The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Appeals under Part 2) (Amendment) Order 2013 (SI 2013 No. 24) amends the principal Order (SI 2003 No. 82) as to a wide range of procedural matters. It has effect from 8 February 2013.

D31 Extradition

D31.12 Validity of Part 1 Warrant

In Zakrewski v Regional Court in Lodz, Poland [2013] UKSC 2, Z was arrested on a Polish EAW that referred to four offences of which he stood convicted in Poland. The warrant correctly identified both the offences and the sentences imposed. Z also faced charges in England. Following his arrest he successfully applied to the Polish courts to have his four sentences ‘aggregated’ so that he now faced a total of just 22 months ‘imprisonment in place of the 45 month total he had faced before. Having secured this reduction, he then sought to have the EAW declared invalid on the basis that it no longer correctly identified the sentences to be served. 

As Lord Sumption observed in giving the opinion of the UK Supreme Court, Z’s argument sought to exploit a purely technical loophole and was ‘hardly overburdened with merit’. It somehow succeeded in the High Court but was firmly rejected by the Supreme Court. Lord Sumption said:

The validity of the warrant depends on whether the prescribed particulars are to be found in it, and not on whether they are correct. It cannot be open to a defendant to challenge the validity of a warrant which contains the prescribed particulars by reference to extraneous evidence tending to show that those statements and information are wrong. If this is true of statements and information in a warrant which were wrong at the time of issue, it must necessarily be true of statements which were correct at the time of issue but ceased to be correct as a result of subsequent events

In exceptional cases, an EAW that appeared to be based on manifestly false material facts might be challenged as an abuse of process, but this was not such a case.

D32 Public Funding

D32.1 Restructuring of Legal Aid

The Criminal Legal Aid (General) Regulations 2013 (SI 2013 No. 9) make provision for determinations in relation to whether an individual qualifies for criminal legal aid under the LASPO 2012, part 1. The Regulations come into force on 1 April 2013.

  • Regulation 4 provides that the functions of the Lord Chancellor or the Director under the Regulations may be exercised by, or by an employee of, a person authorised for that purpose by the Lord Chancellor or Director.
  • Part 2 makes provision for the making of determinations in relation to individuals who are arrested and held in custody.
  • Part 3 makes provision about the proceedings which constitute criminal proceedings in addition to those already listed in s. 14 of the Act (criminal proceedings).
  • Part 4 makes provision about the making and withdrawal of determinations about advice and assistance for criminal proceedings.
  • Part 5 makes provision in relation to determinations about representation for criminal proceedings and for the withdrawal of such determinations. Part 5 also makes provision in relation to proceedings which are and which are not to be regarded as incidental to criminal proceedings (regs. 19 and 20). Regulation 21 makes provision about the circumstances in which the interests of justice test set out in s. 17 of the Act (qualifying for representation) is taken to be met. An individual may apply for a review of a determination by the Director that the interests of justice do not require representation to be made available (reg. 27). If the individual is dissatisfied with the review, then that individual may appeal (as set out in regs. 29 and 30).
  • Part 6 makes provision for the application of the Regulations to legal persons.

Part E Sentencing

E15 Fines

E15.11 Enforcement of Fines

In R (Purnell) v South Western Magistrates' Court [2013] EWHC 64 (Admin), [2013] All ER (D) 200 (Jan) the Divisional Court made some important observations about the imposition and enforcement of fines, particularly on persistent offenders who may be of limited means. Sir John Thomas P said:

36. Confidence in the criminal justice system is very severely undermined if fines are imposed in amounts which cannot realistically be discharged; it is particularly damaging in the case of persistent offenders.

37. Given the present very difficult circumstances arising first from an obsolete computer system which appears to be no longer fit for purpose and second severe pressure on the staff and legal advisors in the magistrates' courts, it is not realistic to envisage matters being remedied through better provision of information about outstanding fines by HMCTS to the court.

38. The only practical remedy is to ask courts to enquire closely before imposing a fine at any enforcement hearing as to whether there are any other outstanding fines and make clear the serious consequences to the offender or defaulter in not providing accurate information. We appreciate the additional burden this will place on legal advisers, District Judges and magistrates, but we can see no realistic alternative.

39. However to help in that task, the means form provided to the offender/defaulter must be clear. The form with which we were provided does not makes it sufficiently clear that the amount in respect of which enforcement is sought is the total outstanding amount from all courts. As it is apparent that the court has, in current circumstances, to rely on the offender/defaulter providing the information that will enable other databases to be checked, the form should be re-examined. The template of 28 June 2006 makes clear that the legal advisor should establish details of the imposition of the fine and of the account history. The Justices' Clerks may wish to reconsider whether it requires any revision, as it was not designed to deal with the present position brought about by austerity and an outdated computer system.

E15.25 Surcharge

A Ministry of Justice Circular dated 18 January 2013, Approach to Ordering the Victim Surcharge, reminds judges and magistrates of their powers under the PCC(S)A 2000, s. 137, when an offender under 18 is ordered to pay the Victim Surcharge. In particular it reminds them that it may be unreasonable to make such an order payable by a parent or guardian who has in fact been the victim of the offence.

Whilst the Surcharge would still need to be ordered, the court could use its discretion in such a case to defer its payment until such as a time as it considers the child would be likely to be able to pay the Surcharge himself, for example, after turning 18.


Part F Evidence

F1 General Principles of Evidence in Criminal Cases

F1.11 Relevance

In determining whether a given publication amounts to a terrorist publication within the meaning of the Terrorism Act 2006, s. 2(3), evidence of its possession by known terrorists is admissible, if at all, only for the ‘extremely limited purpose’ of demonstrating that such persons may be amongst those who read it. It cannot prove that they were encouraged by it to commit or instigate terrorist offences; but there is an obvious risk that a jury may be prejudiced into condemning the publication purely by reason of its association with known terrorists, and if such evidence is admitted at all there must be a clear warning to the jury as to what it can and cannot be used to prove. See Faraz [2012] EWCA Crim 2820, [2013] All ER (D) 11 (Jan).

F10 Opinion Evidence

F10.4 Competence of Expert Witnesses

One of the issues discussed in Francis [2013] EWCA Crim 123, [2013] All ER (D) 104 (Jan) (a case of s. 18 wounding with intent) was the competence of a doctor who specialised in emergency medicine to provide an expert opinion on the cause of the wound, given that he was not and had never been a forensic pathologist. His evidence was that the wound was caused by a bladed instrument and could not have been caused (as D suggested) by an accident involving a safety pin.

His evidence was held to be admissible:

He had a wealth of experience through working as an accident and emergency doctor. He must … have dealt with many thousands of cases of lacerations and cuts during his years as a doctor in that department.

More surprisingly perhaps, he was allowed to give this evidence without having examined the alleged victim, but on the basis of reading the clinical notes and examining photographs of the scars taken three months later.

On the determination of expert competence, the Court of Appeal also rejected an argument that the trial judge ought to have ordered a voir dire in order to determine the issue of competence, even though the defence had not requested it:

If the defence wish the admissibility of a witness to be tested in a voir dire, the burden is on the defence to make such an application to the judge. Obviously if it appears to the judge that a voir dire may be helpful, the judge can canvass that point with counsel. However, in this case we are of the view that there was nothing in the material before the judge to suggest that a voir dire was appropriate.

F18 Evidence of Identification

F18.27 DNA Evidence

Further guidance on the use of Low Template DNA evidence derived from  ‘mixed samples’ has been provided by the Court of Appeal in Dlugosz [2013] EWCA Crim 2. The Court in this case considered three conjoined appeals, each of which raised issues as to the value of low template and mixed profile DNA evidence, and as to the way in which such evidence should be presented in court. The Court rejected the argument that, unless statistical evidence of the relevant DNA match probability could be given, then evaluative opinion (‘this lends substantial support’ etc.) should not be admitted either.

Nor would the court accept an alternative argument, namely that an expert should be permitted to provide an evaluative opinion only if he is able to use a hierarchy or sliding scale of support (as in Atkins). Having considered and reaffirmed its earlier judgment in Thomas [2011] EWCA Crim 1295, the Court concluded:

Provided the conclusions from the analysis of a mixed profile are supported by detailed evidence in the form of a report of the experience relied on and the particular features of the mixed profile which make it possible to give an evaluative opinion in the circumstances of the particular case, such an opinion is, in principle, admissible, even though there is presently no statistical basis to provide a random match probability and the sliding scale cannot be used. 

F19 Inferences from Silence and the Non-production of Evidence

F19.24 Legal Advice to Remain Silent

The relationship between the CJPOA 1994, s. 34 and PACE Code C, para. 6.6 (right to legal advice) was considered in Karapetyan [2013] EWCA Crim 74, [2013] All ER (D) 138 (Jan).

F19.50 Failure of Accused to Testify

Murray v DPP [1994] 99 Cr App R 396 and Cowan [1996] QB 373 were considered in RS v DPP [2013] EWCA Crim 322, [2013] All ER (D) 160 (Jan).


Appendices

Appendix 3

A revised Code for Crown Prosecutors, the 7th. edition, was published on 28 January 2013. It is available at http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/code_for_crown_prosecutors/index.html.


New Legislation

Prevention of Social Housing Fraud Act 2013 (c 3)

This Act (inter alia) creates new criminal offences of unlawful sub-letting by secure and assured tenants of social housing. It also makes provision concerning the prosecution of these offences (including prosecution powers for local authorities) and provides for courts to make orders for the recovery from defendants of profits made from unlawful sub-letting, either following conviction or in separate civil proceedings.

It will be brought into force relation to England, on such day as the Secretary of State may by order appoint; and in relation to Wales, on such day as the Welsh Ministers may by order appoint.

 

Disabled Persons' Parking Badges Act 2013 (c 4)

This Act (inter alia) amends the Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act 1970, s. 21, by creating an offence of using a blue parking badge that is no longer valid. It will come into force on whatever day or days the Secretary of State appoints.

Local Justice Areas (No. 3) Order 2012 (SI 2012 No. 3128)

This Order amends the principal Order of 2005 (SI 2005 No. 554), so as to provide for the local justice areas of North West Wiltshire, South East Wiltshire and Swindon to be combined to form a new area, County of Wiltshire, with effect from 1 July 2013.

Criminal Legal Aid (General) Regulations 2013 (SI 2013 No. 9)

These Regulations make provision for determinations in relation to whether an individual qualifies for criminal legal aid under the LASPO 2012, part 1. The Regulations come into force on 1 April 2013.

  • Regulation 4 provides that the functions of the Lord Chancellor or the Director under the Regulations may be exercised by, or by an employee of, a person authorised for that purpose by the Lord Chancellor or Director.
  • Part 2 makes provision for the making of determinations in relation to individuals who are arrested and held in custody.
  • Part 3 makes provision about the proceedings which constitute criminal proceedings in addition to those already listed in s. 14 of the Act (criminal proceedings).
  • Part 4 makes provision about the making and withdrawal of determinations about advice and assistance for criminal proceedings.
  • Part 5 makes provision in relation to determinations about representation for criminal proceedings and for the withdrawal of such determinations. Part 5 also makes provision in relation to proceedings which are and which are not to be regarded as incidental to criminal proceedings (regs. 19 and 20). Regulation 21 makes provision about the circumstances in which the interests of justice test set out in s. 17 of the Act (qualifying for representation) is taken to be met. An individual may apply for a review of a determination by the Director that the interests of justice do not require representation to be made available (reg. 27). If the individual is dissatisfied with the review, then that individual may appeal (as set out in regs. 29 and 30).
  • Part 6 makes provision for the application of the Regulations to legal persons.

Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Appeals under Part 2) (Amendment) Order 2013 (SI 2013 No. 24)

This Order amends the principal Order (SI 2003 No. 82) with effect from 8 February 2013 as to a wide range of procedural matters.

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