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Blackstone's Criminal Practice 2013

April 2013 update

Updates to Blackstone's Criminal Practice 2013 are produced by Michael Hirst, Professor of Criminal Justice, Leicester De Montfort Law School, and Laurence Eastham, Editorial Co-ordinator, Blackstone’s Criminal Practice. This update primarily considers developments reported in March 2013.


Part A: General Principles of Criminal Law

A1 Actus Reus

A1.25 Causation

Clarke [2013] EWCA Crim 162 emphasises that where causation is disputed (e.g., in homicide cases involving multiple injuries and pre-existing medical conditions) it must remain an issue for the jury, even if the expert evidence on this is ‘all one way’ in support of the prosecution case. In such a case the jury is still required to decide whether D inflicted unlawful injuries on V and, if so, whether those injuries were a substantial or significant cause of V’s death.

The position may be different where the expert evidence on causation all supports the defence case, because D may then have no case to answer.


Part B: Offences

B1 Homicide and Related Offences

B1.50 Loss of Control

Clinton [2012] 2 All ER 947 was applied in Dawes [2013] EWCA Crim 322, in which Lord Judge CJ said:

The circumstances in which the qualifying triggers will arise [under the new defence] [are] much more limited than the equivalent provisions in the former provocation defence. The result is that some of the more absurd trivia which nevertheless required the judge to leave the provocation defence to the jury will no longer fall within the ambit of the qualifying triggers defined in the new defence. This is unsurprising. For the individual with normal capacity of self-restraint and tolerance, unless the circumstances are extremely grave, normal irritation, and even serious anger do not often cross the threshold into loss of control.

The presence, or otherwise, of a qualifying trigger is not defined or decided by the defendant and any assertions he may make in evidence, or any account given in the investigative process. Section 55(3) directly engages the defendant’s fear of serious violence…. In this type of case s. 55(4) will almost inevitably arise for consideration. Unless the defendant has a sense of being seriously wronged s. 55(4) has no application. Even if it does, there are two distinctive further requirements. The circumstances must be extremely grave and the defendant’s sense of being seriously wronged by them must be justifiable. In our judgment these matters require objective assessment by the judge at the end of the evidence and, if the defence is left, by the jury considering their verdict. If it were otherwise it would mean that a qualifying trigger would be present if the defendant were to give an account to the effect that, “the circumstances were extremely grave to me and caused me to have what I believed was a justifiable sense that I had been seriously wronged”. If so, when it is clear that the availability of a defence based on the loss of control has been significantly narrowed, one would have to question the purpose of s. 55(3), (4) and (5).

B2 Non-fatal Offences against the Person

B2.4 Assault and Battery: Sentencing Guidelines (Racially or Religiously Aggravated Form of Offence)

In Isitt [2013] EWCA Crim 265 a sentence of 14 months' imprisonment on a guilty plea (taking a starting point in the region of 18 months) was upheld on appeal. But for the racial aggravation, the offence would have been a category 2 offence, with a starting point of a medium-level community order but, in addition to the very unpleasant and explicit element of racial aggravation, there were numerous other aggravating factors: the offence was totally unprovoked and was committed in a doctor's surgery in the presence of the victim’s young daughter, by an offender with an appalling record, and in breach of previous orders.

B2.166 Offence of Stalking

In Hayes v Willoughby [2013] UKSC 17, the Supreme Court held that the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, s. 1(3)(a) may be relied upon (in civil or criminal cases) both by law enforcement agencies and by private individuals, and whether or not D can prove that his behaviour was objectively reasonable. Their lordships meanwhile rejected (obiter) the Court of Appeal’s view that such a purpose must be D’s sole purpose; but as Lord Sumption explained:

Before an alleged harasser can be said to have had the purpose of preventing or detecting crime, he must have sufficiently applied his mind to the matter. He must have thought rationally about the material suggesting the possibility of criminality and formed the view that the conduct said to constitute harassment was appropriate for the purpose of preventing or detecting it.…

If, on the other hand, he has not engaged in these minimum mental processes necessary to acquire the relevant state of mind … two consequences will follow. The first is that the law will not regard him as having had the relevant purpose at all. He has simply not taken the necessary steps to form one. The second is that the causal connection which section 1(3)(a) posits between the purpose of the alleged harasser and the conduct constituting the harassment, will not exist.

B2.190 Slavery, Servitude and Forced or Compulsory Labour: Sentence

In Connors [2013] EWCA Crim 324 the Court of Appeal declined to increase sentences of imprisonment passed on offenders from a traveller family who had kept vulnerable men as virtual slaves and prisoners. The offenders were each convicted of conspiracy to require a person to perform forced or compulsory labour and received sentences ranging from three to six and a half years. Some of those sentences were considered to be lenient, but not so lenient as to require interference.

B3 Sexual Offences

B3.340  Outraging Public Decency: Sentencing

Ferguson [2009] 2 Cr App R (S) 39 and Cosco [2005] 2 Cr App R (S) 405 were considered in Vaiciulevicius [2013] EWCA Crim 185, where D’s offence involved engaging in drunken sexual intercourse in a public park during the day. He had a poor criminal record, but in contrast to Ferguson and Cosco his previous convictions were for entirely different kinds of offence.

He appealed against a sentence of six months’ imprisonment following a prompt plea of guilty, arguing that an immediate custodial sentence was wrong in principle. The Court of Appeal disagreed, especially since young children had not been far away at the time. D’s intoxication was an aggravating factor as was his criminal record. But the judge’s starting point of nine months’ imprisonment was too high. The maximum penalty for the summary (s. 71) offence of sexual activity in a public lavatory was only six months. D’s sentence was reduced to one of three months.

B7 Company, Commercial and Insolvency Offences

B7.24  Offences under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000

The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) Order 2013 (SI 2013 No. 655) amends the principal Order of 2001 (SI 2001 No. 544) with effect from 2 April 2013 so as to specify the setting of benchmarks as a new regulated activity for the purposes of the Act.

B13 Offences Affecting Enjoyment of Premises

B13.47 Aggravated Trespass

Peppersharp v DPP [2012] EWHC 474 (Admin) was considered in Bauer v DPP [2013] EWHC 634 (Admin), in which it was held that a mass demonstration in the course of which the defendants targeted and forced their way into a famous department store could properly be regarded as an act distinct from the act of trespass for the purposes of the CJPOA 1994, s. 68(1)(3). Moreover, although some protesters were identified as committing further acts inside the store and some were not, all were principal offenders as far as the offence of aggravated trespass was concerned.

B19 Offences Related to Drugs

B19.13 Regulations that Permit Actions with Respect to Controlled Drugs

The Misuse of Drugs (Designation) (Amendment No. 2) (England, Wales and Scotland) Order 2013 (SI 2013 No. 624) further amends the principal Order of 2001 (SI 2001 No. 3997) so as to add Sativex (a cannabis-based medicine) to part II of the schedule and to exclude it from part I thereof. The Order has effect from 10 April 2013.

The Misuse of Drugs (Amendment No. 2) (England, Wales and Scotland) Regulations 2013 (SI 2013 No. 625) amend the principal Regulations of 2001 (SI 2001 No. 3998) principally so as to add Sativex to sch. 4, part I and to exclude it from sch. 1. The Regulations have effect from 10 April 2013.

B19.16 Extracts from the 2001 Regulations, as amended

The Misuse of Drugs (Amendment No. 2) (England, Wales and Scotland) Regulations 2013 (SI 2013 No. 625) amend the principal Regulations of 2001 (SI 2001 No. 3998) principally so as to add Sativex (a cannabis-based medicine) to sch. 4, part I and to exclude it from sch. 1. The Regulations have effect from 10 April 2013.

B22 Immigration Offences

B22.7 Defences: Article 31 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees

Asfaw [2008] 3 All ER 775 and the defence under the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, s. 31 were considered in SXH v CPS [2013] EWHC 71 (QB. The issue in that case was whether a decision to prosecute the claimant, a young Somali refugee, who entered the country using a stolen passport but was eventually found to have a defence under s. 31, amounted to a violation of her right to respect for privacy etc. under the ECHR, Article 8.

Irwin J found that Article 8 had not even been engaged. In presenting the false passport on arrival in England, the claimant had not been engaged in an activity which was even arguably a part of her private life. It was self-evidently a matter affecting the business of the state.


Part D: Procedure

D2 The Decision to Prosecute and Diversion

D2.32 Conditional Cautions

The following instruments have effect for 8 April 2013. All relate to the implementation of the changes to the conditional caution regime made by the LASPO 2012, ss. 135 to 139.

  • The Police and Justice Act 2006 (Commencement No. 16) Order 2013 (SI 2013 No. 592) brings into force s. 17(1) to (4) of the Act. Section 17(3) is in force only insofar as it inserts s. 22(3A)(a) into the CJA 2003.
  • The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (Youth Conditional Cautions: Financial Penalties) Order 2013 (SI 2013 No. 608) revokes the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (Youth Conditional Cautions: Financial Penalties) Order 2009 (SI 2009 No. 2781) and prescribes the offences in respect of which a financial penalty may be applied as a condition of a youth caution. It also sets the maximum penalties applicable as follows:
    • offender aged 14 or over but under 18: summary offence £30, either-way offence £50, indictable-only offence £75;
    • offender aged 10 or over but under 14: summary offence £15, either-way offence £25, indictable-only offence £35.
  • The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (Youth Conditional Cautions: Code of Practice) Order 2013 (SI 2013 No. 613) brings into force a revised code of practice for youth conditional cautions.
  • The Criminal Justice Act 2003 (Conditional Cautions: Financial Penalties) Order 2013 (SI 2013 No. 615) revokes the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (Conditional Cautions: Financial Penalties) Order 2009 (SI 2009 No. 2773) and prescribes the offences in respect of which a financial penalty may be applied as a condition of a conditional caution. It also sets the maximum penalties applicable as follows:
    • summary offence £50;
    • either-way offence £100;
    • indictable-only offence £150.
  • The Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (Commencement No. 15) Order 2013 (SI 2013 No. 616) brings into force the following provisions of the Act: sch. 9, para. 3, sch. 26, paras. 60 and 62 and the repeals in sch. 28, part 4 relating to the CJA 2003, s. 23A.

D3 Courts, Parties and Abuse of Process

D3.88 Abuse of Process: Failing to Obtain, Losing or Destroying Evidence

R (Ebrahim) v Feltham Magistrates’ Court [2001] 1 WLR 1293 was considered in DPP v Fell [2013] EWHC 562 (Admin), in which the accidental deletion of potential CCTV evidence (for which the police and prosecution were not to blame) was not considered to be so prejudicial to the accused as to justify a stay on grounds of abuse of process.

D3.125 Freedom of the Media to Report Court Proceedings

In R (A) v Lowestoft Magistrates’ Court [2013] EWHC 659 (Admin), the claimant (an elected councillor and well known in the local community) pleaded guilty to being drunk in a public place, while in charge of her daughter, aged 2½ years old. An issue arose as to whether the magistrates’ court ought to have made an order under the CYPA 1933, s. 39, restricting reporting for the sake of the child. See this update at D24.76.

D8 Assets Recovery

D8.4 Civil Recovery Orders and Taxation

Perry v SOCA [2012] UKSC 35, [2012] 4 All ER 795 was considered in SOCA v Azam [2013] EWHC 627 (QB), in which a property freezing order under the POCA 2002, s. 245A had been made, ordering that the balance of funds held in a Luxembourg bank (allegedly the proceeds of drug dealing) be brought within the jurisdiction. The funds had duly been remitted to England and were currently held in a bank account in the name of D’s solicitor, but subject to the court's control. Following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Perry, it was now clear that the order ought not to have been made but, after considering Cadder v HM Advocate [2010] 1 WLR 2601, Sir Raymond Jack ruled that Perry should not be applied retrospectively. In some respects, D’s case was on-going, but the matter of the Luxembourg funds had been concluded by their transfer and there were no grounds for returning those funds to Luxembourg.

A second issue that arose in Azam was whether, following Perry, a disclosure order made for the purpose of a civil recovery investigation could be used to obtain evidence to build a criminal case against the respondent. After considering (inter alia) SOCA v Gale [2011] 1 WLR 2760, Sir Raymond Jack answered that question in the affirmative.

D12 Arraignment and Pleas

D12.5 Unfitness to Plead

Robertson (1968) 52 Cr App R 690 and Berry (1978) 66 Cr App R 156were considered by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Taitt v Trinidad and Tobago [2013] UKPC 12.

D12.60 Judicial Indications of Sentence

Turner [1970] 2 QB 321 and Goodyear [2005] 1 WLR 2532 were considered by the Court-Martial Appeals Court in Nightingale (No. 2) (2013) The Times, 26 March 2013, In which D’s conviction for firearms offences was quashed because the judge-advocate at his court-martial had given an unsolicited warning to the effect that a conviction following a not-guilty plea would result in a much longer sentence than conviction on a plea of guilty. This had placed undue pressure on D to plead guilty. Lord Judge CJ referred to observations made in Turner and Goodyear as towhen it may be proper for judges to comment on possible sentence outcomes, but added:

15. The observations do not … mean that in a case where imprisonment is inevitable it is permissible for the judge on his own initiative, uninvited, to give an indication to the defendant that a very long sentence of imprisonment will be the consequence of conviction by the jury or by the Court Martial, and a relatively short one will follow if the defendant decides to plead guilty.

16. In the final analysis, the question is not whether the Judge Advocate here contravened the principles which govern the giving of sentence indications. Of itself that would not be decisive. The question is whether the uninvited indication given by the judge, and its consequent impact on the defendant after considering the advice given to him by his legal advisers on the basis of their professional understanding of the effect of what the judge has said, had created inappropriate additional pressures on the defendant and narrowed the proper ambit of his freedom of choice.

D15 Trial on Indictment: General Matters and Pre-trial Procedure

D15.104 Witness Familiarisation

Momodou (Practice Note) [2005] 1 WLR 3442 was considered in Sarwar [2013] EWCA Crim 83, in which an accomplice witness for the prosecution was re-interviewed before the trial at the request of the prosecution in order to address certain inconsistencies in his original witness statements. The Court of Appeal did not regard this as witness coaching or rehearsal in the Momodou sense, but still found much to disapprove of. Hughes LJ said:

The time to test his evidence and his general credibility was in the witness box by the ordinary process of cross-examination. It was wrong to prime him, even to a strictly limited extent, with inconsistencies which might be put to him.

D16 Trial on Indictment: The Prosecution Case

D16.77 Appeals by the Prosecution Against Adverse Rulings

M (or Mian) [2012] EWCA Crim 792 was distinguished in F [2013] EWCA Crim 424, in which it was held that the prosecution is under no obligation to give notice of intent to appeal against a terminating ruling until that ruling is given formally in court. An informal e-mail from the judge giving advance notice of a forthcoming ruling triggers no such obligation. The Court of Appeal in F warned against the use of informal procedures such as e-mail notifications. As Treacy LJ explained:

There was in this case an undesirable degree of informality surrounding what happened. It is easy to envisage various practical problems arising if an email of this sort were to suffice. These provisions under the terminating ruling legislation are strict, and an informal procedure is wholly inconsistent with them.

D20 Trial on Indictment: Sentencing Procedure

D20.78 Legal Representation at the Sentencing Stage

The Divisional Court held that, while the PCC(S)A 2000, s. 83 does not refer to appeals by unrepresented defendants, Parliament cannot have intended to permit the Crown Court to impose a custodial sentence on an unrepresented defendant on the dismissal of an appeal against conviction in the magistrates' court, in circumstances where the magistrates’ court could not have imposed such a sentence as a result of s. 83: see R (Ebert) v Wood Green Crown Court [2013] All ER (D) 12 (Mar).

D20.79 Consequences of Breach  

Some aspects of the ruling in Birmingham Justices, ex p Wyatt [1975] 3 All ER 897 were doubted (obiter) in R (Ebert) v Wood Green Crown Court [2013] All ER (D) 12 (Mar).

D24 Trial of Juveniles

D24.76 Children and Young Persons Act 1933, s. 39

In R (A) v Lowestoft Magistrates’ Court [2013] EWHC 659 (Admin), the claimant (an elected councillor and well known in the local community)  pleaded guilty to being drunk in a public place, while in charge of her daughter, aged 2½ years old. The claimant had previously been cautioned for a similar offence. The issue was whether a s. 39 order ought to have been made, restricting the ability of the press to name her. The proceedings were held to be taken ‘in respect of’, and thus to ‘concern’, the child, so that s. 39 was engaged, even though no child was being tried. Also engaged were the ECHR, Articless 8 and 10; but, said the Divisional Court, rights under Articless 8 and 10 are qualified, and neither the best interests of the child nor the principle of open justice necessarily dictate the conclusion in any particular case, so that in many, cases a balance has to be struck between competing claims. In this case, the Court was wholly unimpressed by suggestions that the child (now aged three) would in any sense be harmed by the naming of her mother, so the principle of open justice prevailed.

D26 Appeal to the Court of Appeal Following Trial on Indictment

D26.18 Determination of Appeals against Conviction: the Safety Test

Pendleton [2002] 1 WLR 72 was considered by the Privy Council in Taylor v The Queen [2013] UKPC 8.

D31 Extradition

D31.30 Human Rights

In Lutsyuk v Government of Ukraine [2013] EWHC 189 (Admin) the Divisional Court recognised that, when deciding whether extradition should be refused by reference to likely ill-treatment amounting to a breach of the defendant’s rights under the ECHR, Article 3, a court should adopt a ‘relativist’ approach that recognises inter alia the existence of different standards of prison facilities etc. around the world.  Extradition would otherwise be refused in too many cases. But some sets of conditions will be so harsh as inevitably to involve Article 3 violations and in this particular case there were substantial grounds for believing that extradition to Ukraine would involve a real risk of such ill-treatment.

D32 Public Funding

D32.1 Restructuring of Legal Aid

The Criminal Legal Aid (Determinations by a Court and Choice of Representative) Regulations 2013 (SI 2013 No. 614) concern the determination of whether an individual is entitled to criminal legal aid and the right of a qualifying individual to choose a representative. They have effect from 1 April 2013.

The Legal Aid (Information about Financial Resources) Regulations 2013 (SI 2013 No. 628) concern requests for information which pertain to a person’s financial eligibility for legal aid. Inter alia, they permit requests for information from the Secretary of State and the Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs relating to an individual’s benefit status. They also have effect from 1 April 2013.

D33 Costs

D33.36 Award of Costs against Third Parties

In Applied Language Solutions Ltd [2013] EWCA Crim 326 the Court of Appeal issued detailed guidance as to the circumstances in which a court may exercise its power to make a third party costs order where a private contractor fails to discharge duties (in this case providing court interpreters) hitherto performed by the State.

An order against the defendant company in this case was quashed because the mix-up that resulted in an interpreter failing to attend at the right time was an isolated incident and could not be classified as serious misconduct. But a court would be entitled to view successive non-attendance of an individual interpreter or successive failures in systems as amounting to serious misconduct, thus rendering those responsible liable for the costs thereby incurred.


Part E: Sentencing

E1 Sentencing: General Provisions

E1.31 Victim Personal Statements

Nunn [1996] 2 Cr App R (S) 136 was applied in Perkins [2013] EWCA Crim 323.

E2 Custodial Sentences: General Provisions

E2.6 Restriction on Imposing Custodial Sentences on Persons Not Legally Represented

The PCC(S)A 2000, s. 83 does not refer to appeals by unrepresented defendants, but Parliament cannot have intended to permit the Crown Court to impose a custodial sentence on an unrepresented defendant on the dismissal of his appeal against conviction in the magistrates' court, in circumstances where the magistrates’ court could not have imposed such a sentence as a result of s. 83: see R (Ebert) v Wood Green Crown Court [2013] All ER (D) 12 (Mar).

E19 Confiscation Orders

E19.23 Making of Confiscation Order: Stage Two — Determination of Benefit from Criminal Conduct

The Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Waya [2012] UKSC 51 (see the December 2012 update) was considered along with several other authorities in Mahmood [2013] EWCA Crim 325.

E19.36 Making of Confiscation Order:  The Role of the Assumptions  

The POCA 2002, s. 10(4) was considered in Mahmood [2013] EWCA Crim 325. Cranston J explained:

[Section 10(4)] is an assumption about the source of expenditure, once it has been established that a defendant incurred it. What is required is evidence about the identity of the particular member of the conspiracy who actually incurred the expenditure. The section 10(4) assumption does not mean that, unless he can prove otherwise, each conspirator is treated as having incurred all of the expenditure. It may be that in the circumstances of a particular case the court can draw inferences that a particular member of the conspiracy met an expense of its operation. In other, and perhaps many cases, the natural inference will be that the conspirators will have contributed equally to such expenses.  But without a finding that the defendant in question spent something, the section 10(4) assumption is not triggered.


Part F: Evidence

F10 Opinion Evidence

F10.4 Competence of Expert Witnesses

In Clarke [2013] EWCA Crim 162, the Court of Appeal made some important observations on the competence of expert witnesses concerning the causes of death in homicide cases. Upholding the trial judge’s refusal to admit expert evidence from a defence witness (Professor F) as to the cause of the alleged victim’s death, Aikens LJ said:

We think that the judge was entitled to rule that Professor F did not have the expertise to give an opinion on the cause of death …. The professor is distinguished in the field of osteoarticular pathology. He specialises in the process of fracture and the generalised disorders of bone known as metabolic bone disease. But he has never conducted a post-mortem when there is a suspicion that the cause of death is murder. Such post-mortems are reserved to Home Office pathologists precisely because they have higher qualifications such as the Diploma of Medical Jurisprudence and the experience of assisting with the post-mortems in suspected murder cases. In this very case …the post-mortem had been carried out by Dr K, a Home Office pathologist. Professor F did not have the experience or expertise to consider all the possible causes of death apart from the fractures to the ribs in the way that Dr K could in order to come to his overall conclusion that the cause of death was best regarded as “multiple injuries”, where the likely mechanism for the multiple injuries was heavy punches or kicks.


New Legislation

Mobile Homes Act 2013

This Act amends the law relating to mobile homes, and (inter alia) amends criminal provisions in the Caravan Sites Act 1968 relating to protection of occupiers from eviction and harassment and the knowing or reckless provision by owners of protected sites of false information to occupiers. Section 12 of the 2013 Act, which makes these amendments, will come into force on 1 June 2013 (two months after Royal Assent).

The Act also prospectively increases certain maximum penalties under the Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960: those increases will come into force ‘on such day as the Secretary of State may by order made by statutory instrument appoint’.

Police and Justice Act 2006 (Commencement No. 16) Order 2013 (SI No. 592)

This Order brings into force, on 8 April 2013, s. 17(1) to (4) of the Act (conditional cautions). Section 17(3) is in force only insofar as it inserts s. 22(3A)(a) into the CJA 2003.

Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (Youth Conditional Cautions: Financial Penalties) Order 2013 (SI 2013 No. 608)

This Order revokes the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (Youth Conditional Cautions: Financial Penalties) Order 2009 (SI 2009 No. 2781) and prescribes the offences in respect of which a financial penalty may be applied as a condition of a youth caution. It also sets the maximum penalties applicable as follows:

  • offender aged 14 or over but under 18: summary offence £30, either-way offence £50, indictable-only offence £75;
  • offender aged 10 or over but under 14: summary offence £15, either-way offence £25, indictable-only offence £35.

The Order has effect from 8 April 2013.

Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (Youth Conditional Cautions: Code of Practice) Order 2013 (SI 2013 No. 613)

This Order brings into force a revised code of practice for youth conditional cautions on 8 April 2013. The code was revised to take account of the amendments to the caution regime arising from the LASPO 2012, ss. 136 to 138.

Criminal Legal Aid (Determinations by a Court and Choice of Representative) Regulations 2013 (SI 2013 No. 614)

These Regulations concern the determination of whether an individual is entitled to criminal legal aid and the right of a qualifying individual to choose a representative. They have effect from 1 April 2013.

Criminal Justice Act 2003 (Conditional Cautions: Financial Penalties) Order 2013 (SI 2013 No. 615)

This Order revokes the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (Conditional Cautions: Financial Penalties) Order 2009 (SI 2009 No. 2773) and prescribes the offences in respect of which a financial penalty may be applied as a condition of a conditional caution. It also sets the maximum penalties applicable as follows:

  • summary offence £50;
  • either-way offence £100;
  • indictable-only offence £150.

The Order has effect from 8 April 2013.

Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (Commencement No. 15) Order 2013 (SI 2013 No. 616)

This Order brings into force, on 8 April 2013, certain provisions of the Act which relate to conditional cautions, namely, sch. 9, para. 3, sch. 26, paras. 60 and 62 and repeals in sch. 28, part 4 relating to the CJA 2003, s. 23A.

Misuse of Drugs (Designation) (Amendment No. 2) (England, Wales and Scotland) Order 2013 (SI 2013 No. 624)

This Order amends the principal Order of 2001 (SI 2001 No. 3997) so as to add Sativex (a cannabis-based medicine) to part II of the schedule and to exclude it from part I thereof. The Order has effect from 10 April 2013.

Misuse of Drugs (Amendment No. 2) (England, Wales and Scotland) Regulations 2013 (SI 2013 No. 625)

These Regulations amend the principal Regulations of 2001 (SI 2001 No. 3998) principally so as to add Sativex (a cannabis-based medicine) to sch. 4, part I and to exclude it from sch. 1. The Regulations have effect from 10 April 2013.

Legal Aid (Information about Financial Resources) Regulations 2013 (SI 2013 No. 628)

These Regulations concern requests for information which pertain to a person’s financial eligibility for legal aid. Inter alia, they permit requests for information from the Secretary of State and the Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs relating to an individual’s benefit status. They have effect from 1 April 2013.

Financial Services Act 2012 (Misleading Statements and Impressions) Order 2013 (SI 20133 No. 637)

This Order specifies relevant agreements, investments and benchmarks for the purposes of part 7 of the 2012 Act. These are relevant to the offences created by part 7 relating to false or misleading statements and impressions. The Order has effect from 1 April 2013.

Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) Order 2013 (SI 2013 No. 655)

This Order amends the principal Order of 2001 (SI 2001 No. 544) with effect from 2 April 2013 so as to specify the setting of benchmarks as a new regulated activity for the purposes of the Act.

Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (Commencement No. 12) Order 2013 (SI 2013 No. 705)

This Order brings into force, on 22 April 2013, s. 117(4) to (8), which concerns independent custody visitors for persons detained under the Terrorism Act 2000.

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