A Behavioral Approach

Kenneth C. Williams

Publication Date - June 2012

ISBN: 9780199837397

304 pages

Paperback

7-1/2 x 9-1/4 inches

In Stock

The most accessible, nontechnical introduction to game theory available

Ideal for social science courses in game theory and research methods, *Introduction to Game Theory: A Behavioral Approach* explains basic game theory concepts--up to and including Bayesian Nash equilibrium--using results from laboratory experiments that examine how real people behave in standard modeled games. Working from the premise that the crux of game theory lies in thinking logically about a problem and formulating research questions based on theory, author Kenneth C. Williams takes a nontechnical, behavioral approach that is accessible to students with minimal math skills.**Incorporating a wide range of experiments with diverse designs, ***Introduction to Game Theory*** is also enhanced by numerous pedagogical features:**

* Extensive problem sets,
in-class experiments, and sample exams

* Numerical examples for all of the exercises

* Key terms and concepts for behavioral game theory--which differ from those for standard game theory--and a glossary

* Supplemental lecture material and Internet resources--online games, videos, lectures, problems sets, exams, and experiments that students can participate in

"A refreshingly informal and insightful account of the key ideas of game theory."--Anna Bassi, *University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill*

1. Baseball stadium model example

2. Applied models vs. pure theory

3. Applied models and empirical testing using experiments

4. A simple and not very good experiment

5. Behavioral game theory and ultimatum bargaining

6. New technology used to disprove and improve old theories

1. Game theory as an interdisciplinary method

2. Game theory and equilibrium

3. A game in von Neumann's sense

4. Game theory and the importance of assumptions

5. Rationality and self-interest in a curved exam example

1. What is rationality?

2. Why is rationality needed?

1. Research methods of behavioral game theory

2. Historical developments in behavioral game theory

1. Cooperative vs. noncooperative games

2. Competitive vs. noncompetitive games

3. Normal form vs. extensive form games

4. Pure vs. mixed strategy games

5. Single-shot vs. repeated games

6. Complete and perfect information vs. incomplete and imperfect information

1. Ben Franklin's clothes experiment

2. The need for experiments and the growth of experiments

1. What is a laboratory and how does it differ from the field?

2. What is the definition of an experiment?

1. Randomization of subjects to treatments and experimental controls

2. Example of the importance of randomization of subjects to treatments

3. Experimental controls and confounding factors

4. Baseline comparisons and controlling confounding factors

1. Differences among between external, internal, and ecological validities

2. Artificial vs. natural environments

3. Problems with external validity

4. Problems with internal validity

5. Benefits of an artificial environment

1. Subject motivations

2. Deception

3. Experimental environment

4. Number of trials

5. Between-subject vs. within-subject design

6. Anonymity

7. How do you design a good experiment?

1. Utility

2. Graphical utility functions

1. Restrictions on choice

2. May's intransitive preferences experiment

3. Choice and time

4. Nonperverse selection rule and exhaustive set of alternatives

5. Ariely's

1. Modeling ideology

2. Single-peakedness and transitivity

1. Payoff charts

2. Spatial payoffs

1. Rationality and emotions

2. Rationality used to study other types of behavior via deviations

3. Social preferences defined

4. Example of a social utility function

1. Expected value and slot machines

2. The St. Petersburg paradox

1. Using cardinal values in a utility function

2. Preferences over lotteries vs. preferences over outcomes

3. Further restrictions on choice

4. Calculating expected utility

1. What is risk?

2. Modeling risk-averse vs. risk-acceptance behavior

1. Framing

2. Prospect theory

3. Regret theory

1. The Ellsberg paradox

2. Framing and reference points

3. Time inconsistency

1. Bounded rationality

2. The BPC model

1. Defining a Nash equilibrium

2. Nash equilibrium behavior in other examples

3. He-think-I-think regress

4. Pareto principle

5. Nash equilibrium in a zero-sum game

1. Tversky and Kahneman's dominant strategy experiment

2. Beauty contest

1. Repeated prisoner's dilemma game

2. Example of finite repeated game with reciprocity strategies

3. Axelrod's Tournament

4. Prisoner's dilemma as a route-choice game

1. Collective goods problem

2. Collective goods experiment

3. Volunteer dilemma

1. Chicken run

2. Brinkmanship and the Cuban missile crisis

3. Hawk-dove game

4. Acme-Bolt truck experiment

1. Classic story of the battle of the sexes

2. Coordination in a matching pennies game

3. Focal point equilibrium

1. The Rousseau game and risk-dominant equilibrium

2. Quorum-busting

3. Experiment on stag hunt game: Communication and trust

4. Coordination and elites

1. Spades-hearts game

2. Mixed strategy equilibrium for spades-hearts game

3. Why would a player use a mixed strategy?

4. Mixed strategy equilibrium for the battle of the sexes game

1. O'Neill's experiment

2. Ochs' experiment

1. Soccer players and mixed strategies

2. Tennis players and mixed strategies

1. Follow-the-leader game redux

2. Formal definition of extensive form game

3.

4. Three Stooges game

1. First mover's advantage and the chicken game

2. First mover's advantage and a collective good game

3. Second mover's advantage and RPS game

1. Race game

2. Race game and chess players

1. Subgames

2. Threat game

3. Strategy mappings and Rasmussen's computer disk game

4. Player 1 moves twice game

5. Kreps and Wilson's up-down game

1. How the centipede game is played

2. Centipede, reputations, and quantal response equilibrium

3. Centipede and chess players

1. Ultimatum bargaining and problems with subgame perfect equilibrium

2. Ultimatum bargaining and communication

3. Bargaining with social preferences turned off

4. Ultimatum bargaining and cultural effects

5. Physical attraction and ultimatum bargaining

1. Manufactured social preferences

2. Strategic ignorance

1. Infatuation and fickle games

2. Disney movies and incomplete and imperfect information

1. Matching pennies and information sets

2. Varied information sets in a guessing game

3. Restrictions placed on information sets

1. Establishment of beliefs and restrictions placed on beliefs

2. Deriving a sequential equilibrium

1. Truth-lying game

2. Truth-lying and games of conflict and common interest

3. Calculating a sequential equilibrium for the truth-lying game

1. What is learning?

2. Updating beliefs

3. Calculating Bayes' Theorem

1. Weak consistency of beliefs

2. Solving for a perfect Bayesian Equilibrium

3. Refinements to perfect Bayesian Equilibrium

Chapter Problem Sets

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