U.S. Attorneys, Political Control, and Career Ambition

Banks Miller and Brett Curry

The first in-depth study of United States Attorneys in more than 40 years
Investigates how much control national political actors exert over the prosecutorial decisions of United States Attorneys
Develops and advances a set of hypotheses about control by the President and Congress
Offers case studies and empirical analyses within federal judicial districts and five legal issue areas: immigration, narcotics, terrorism, weapons, and white-collar crime

U.S. Attorneys, Political Control, and Career Ambition

Banks Miller and Brett Curry

Description

United States Attorneys (USAs), the chief federal prosecutors in each judicial district, are key in determining how the federal government uses coercive force against its citizens. How much control do national political actors exert over the prosecutorial decisions of USAs? This book investigates this question using a unique dataset of federal criminal prosecutions between 1986 and 2015 that captures both decisions by USAs to file cases as well as the sentences that result. Utilizing intuitions from principal-agent theory, work on the career ambition of bureaucrats and politicians, and selected case-studies, the authors develop and advance a set of hypotheses about control by the President and Congress. Harnessing variation across time, federal judicial districts, and five legal issue areas - immigration, narcotics, terrorism, weapons, and white-collar crime - Miller and Curry find that USAs are subject to considerable executive influence in their decision making, supporting findings about the increase of presidential power over the last three decades. In addition, they show that the ability of the President to appoint USAs to higher-level positions within the executive branch or to federal judgeships is an important mechanism of that control. This investigation sheds light on how the need to be responsive to popularly-elected principals channels the enormous prosecutorial discretion of USAs.

U.S. Attorneys, Political Control, and Career Ambition

Banks Miller and Brett Curry

List of Figures and Tables
List of Abbreviations
1. Introduction
2. Three Case Studies in Political Control
3. Principal-Agent Theory, Career Prospects, and United States Attorneys
4. Describing the Data and Issue Areas
5. Political Responsiveness and Case Filings
6. Political Responsiveness and Sentence Length
7. Political Responsiveness and Career Prospects
8. Concluding Thoughts and Implications
Methodological Appendix
References
Index

U.S. Attorneys, Political Control, and Career Ambition

Banks Miller and Brett Curry

Author Information

Banks Miller, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Texas at Dallas, and Brett Curry, Associate Professor of Political Science and Associate Director of the Justice Studies Program, Georgia Southern University

Banks Miller is Associate Professor of Political Science & Public Policy at the University of Texas at Dallas. He has research interests in judicial politics, judicial decision making, and the role of attorneys in politics. Previous research has appeared in Law & Society Review, the Journal of Law & Courts, and Political Research Quarterly. Brett Curry is Professor of Political Science at Georgia Southern University. His research centers on aspects of judicial politics and decision making. His scholarship has been published in a number of journals including the Journal of Politics, Law & Society Review, Law & Social Inquiry, American Politics Research, and Justice System Journal. He also coauthored the book, Decision Making by the Modern Supreme Court (2011).

U.S. Attorneys, Political Control, and Career Ambition

Banks Miller and Brett Curry

Reviews and Awards

"United States Attorneys" - whose offices play pivotal roles in deciding how federal criminal statutes get used and against whom

"This is an important work demonstrating that presidents secure significant influence through the implementation of their appointment power. In a comprehensive study, employing principal" - agent theory, case studies, and data spanning three decades of district-level activity by U.S. Attorneys over multiple issue areas, the authors also provide insights on the influence of Congress and court decisions. As such, this is a must read book for students and researchers who seek to understand the dynamics of our separation of powers system. It also provides new evidence on the motivations and career objectives of U.S. Attorneys. A solid contribution to the literature." -Richard W. Waterman, Professor of Political Science, University of Kentucky

"In U.S. Attorneys, Political Control, and Career Ambition, Miller and Curry provide an intriguing account of these important and highly understudied government actors. They address theoretically interesting dynamics regarding the office that involve fundamental themes of political science scholarship. Professors teaching graduate and undergraduate classes on law and courts should incorporate materials such as this as part of their required readings." -Jeffrey L. Yates, Professor of Political Science, Binghamton University"