Banks Miller is Associate Professor of Political Science & Public Policy at the University of Texas at Dallas. He has research interests in judicial politics, judicial decision making, and the role of attorneys in politics. Previous research has appeared in Law & Society Review, the Journal of Law & Courts, and Political Research Quarterly.

Brett Curry is Professor of Political Science at Georgia Southern University. His research centers on aspects of judicial politics and decision making. His scholarship has been published in a number of journals including the Journal of Politics, Law & Society Review, Law & Social Inquiry, American Politics Research, and Justice System Journal. He also coauthored the book, Decision Making by the Modern Supreme Court (2011).

"United States Attorneys--whose offices play pivotal roles in deciding how federal criminal statutes get used and against whom--are politically accountable to the president but operationally embedded in their districts. They also have their own preferences and political ambitions. How do all these factors affect their enforcement priorities? Banks Miller and Brett Curry's terrific book goes beyond vague speculation and dives into the data with a rigor and nuance that will make this book mandatory reading for law and political science scholars, indeed anyone seeking to understand variation within the federal criminal justice system. Whether one celebrates U.S. Attorney offices as bastions of independence or worries about the management challenge they present to political leaders in Washington, the timeliness of this insightful book cannot be denied." -Daniel Richman, Paul J. Kellner Professor of Law, Columbia Law School

"This is an important work demonstrating that presidents secure significant influence through the implementation of their appointment power. In a comprehensive study, employing principal--agent theory, case studies, and data spanning three decades of district-level activity by U.S. Attorneys over multiple issue areas, the authors also provide insights on the influence of Congress and court decisions. As such, this is a must read book for students and researchers who seek to understand the dynamics of our separation of powers system. It also provides new evidence on the motivations and career objectives of U.S. Attorneys. A solid contribution to the literature." -Richard W. Waterman, Professor of Political Science, University of Kentucky

"In U.S. Attorneys, Political Control, and Career Ambition, Miller and Curry provide an intriguing account of these important and highly understudied government actors. They address theoretically interesting dynamics regarding the office that involve fundamental themes of political science scholarship. Professors teaching graduate and undergraduate classes on law and courts should incorporate materials such as this as part of their required readings." -Jeffrey L. Yates, Professor of Political Science, Binghamton University