The Political Economy of Bank Regulation in Developing Countries: Risk and Reputation

Edited by Emily Jones

A unique volume that systematically analyses and compares the responses of low- and lower-middle income countries to international financial standards
The first volume to systematically explain regulatory interdependence between countries in the core and periphery
Features contributions from an exceptional group of scholars from the Global North and South with different disciplinary and theoretical backgrounds
Presents a single analytical framework and core argument, developed from eleven comparative case studies
An open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence

The Political Economy of Bank Regulation in Developing Countries: Risk and Reputation

Edited by Emily Jones

Description

This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations.

International banking standards are intended for the regulation of large, complex, risk-taking international banks with trillions of dollars in assets and operations across the globe. Yet they are being implemented in countries with nascent financial markets and small banks that have yet to venture into international markets. Why is this? This book develops a new framework to explain regulatory interdependence between countries in the core and the periphery of the global financial system. Drawing on in-depth analysis of eleven countries across Africa, Asia, and Latin America, it shows how financial globalisation generates strong reputational and competitive incentives for developing countries to converge on international standards. It explains how specific cross-border relations between regulators, politicians, and banks within developing countries, and international actors including investors, peer regulators, and international financial institutions, generate regulatory interdependence. It explains why some configurations of domestic politics and forms of integration into global finance generate convergence with international standards, while other configurations lead to divergence. This book contributes to our understanding of the ways in which governments and firms in the core of global finance powerfully shape regulatory decisions in the periphery, and the ways that governments and firms from peripheral developing countries manoeuvre within the constraints and opportunities created by financial globalisation.

The Political Economy of Bank Regulation in Developing Countries: Risk and Reputation

Edited by Emily Jones

Part I: Introduction, cross-country variation, and analytical argument
1. The puzzle: peripheral developing countries implementing international banking standards, Emily Jones
2. The challenges international banking standards pose for peripheral developing countries, Emily Jones
3. The politics of regulatory convergence and divergence, Emily Jones
Part II: Case studies
4. Pakistan: Politicians, regulations, and banks advocate Basel, Natalya Naqvi
5. Rwanda: Running without legs, Pritish Behuria
6. Ghana: Reformist politicians drive Basel implementation, Emily Jones
7. West African Economic and Monetary Union: Central bankers drive Basel under IMF pressure, Ousseni Illy and Seydou Ouedraogo
8. Tanzania: From institutional hiatus to the return of policy-based lending, Hazel Gray
9. Kenya: 'Dubai' in the Savannah, Radha Upadhyaya
10. Bolivia: Pulling in two directions - the developmental state and Basel standards, Peter Knaack
11. Nigeria: Catch 22 - navigating Basel standards in Nigeria's fragile banking sector, Florence Dafe
12. Angola: "For the English to see", Rebecca Engebretsen and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira
13. Vietnam: The dilemma of bringing global financial standards to a socialist market economy, Que-Giang Tran-Thi and Tu-Anh Vu Thanh
14. Ethiopia: Raising a vegetarian tiger?, Toni Weis
Part III: Conclusion
15. Conclusion: Key findings and policy recommendations, Emily Jones

The Political Economy of Bank Regulation in Developing Countries: Risk and Reputation

Edited by Emily Jones

Author Information

Emily Jones, Associate Professor in Public Policy, Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford

Emily Jones is an Associate Professor at the Blavatnik School of Government where she directs the Global Economic Governance Programme which fosters research and debate on how to make the global economy inclusive and sustainable. She is also a Fellow of University College. Emily's research examines the political economy of global trade and finance, focusing on the ways in which governments can exert influence in asymmetric negotiations. Emily teaches courses on international political economy and negotiation strategy and skills for public policy, specialising in international trade. She holds a DPhil in International Political Economy from the University of Oxford, and an MSc (distinction) in Development Economics from the School of African and Oriental Studies, University of London, and a first-class BA in Philosophy, Politics and Economics from the University of Oxford.

Contributors:

Pritish Behuria, Hallsworth Research Fellow, Global Development Institute, University of Manchester.
Florence Dafe, Fellow in International Political Economy at the Department of International Relations at the LSE.
Rebecca Engebretsen, postdoctoral researcher with the Development Economics Group at ETH Zurich.
Hazel Gray, Lecturer in African Studies and Development, Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh.
Ousseni Illy, Assistant Professor of Law, University Ouaga 2 Burkina Faso.
Emily Jones, Associate Professor in Public Policy, Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford.
Peter Knaack, Senior Research Associate at the Global Economic Governance Programme, University of Oxford.
Natalya Naqvi, Assistant Professor in International Political Economy, London School of Economics.
Seydou Ouedraogo, Assistant Professor of Economics, University Ouaga 2 Burkina Faso.
Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, Associate Professor in Comparative Politics (African Politics), Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford.
Tu-Anh Vu-Thanh, Director of Research, Fulbright School of Public Policy and Management, Fulbright University Vietnam.
Que-Giang Tran-Thi, Senior Lecturer in Finance, Fulbright School of Public Policy and Management, Fulbright University Vietnam.
Radha Upadhyaya, Research Fellow, Institute for Development Studies, University of Nairobi.
Toni Weis, Africa Program Officer, Center for International Private Enterprise and a visiting researcher at Johns Hopkins University (SAIS) in Washington DC.

The Political Economy of Bank Regulation in Developing Countries: Risk and Reputation

Edited by Emily Jones

Reviews and Awards

"Emily Jones' edited collection explores how the governments of poor countries encounter and respond to global regulatory regimes. The study thus probes the exuberance — often real but sometimes staged — with which eleven case study countries have adopted enhanced Basel standards, a regulatory framework prepared by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)." -- Juvaria Jafri, University of London, Journal forÂDevelopment Studies