The Innocent Eye
Why Vision Is Not a Cognitive Process
Nico Orlandi
Reviews and Awards
"I am sympathetic to Orlandi's viewpoint. The Innocent Eye draws the attention of philosophers to research that they have mainly neglected, and challenges the computationalist consensus that has been mainly taken for granted since philosophers learned about Chomsky, Pylyshyn, and Marr." --Analysis Reviews
"Orlandi argues convincingly that philosophical theorizing about vision should highlight how the external environment molds visual activity. I think she would have done better to showcase the embedding environment in conjunction with the constructivist paradigm, not as the basis for a rival paradigm. Nevertheless, I found her discussion enjoyable and thought-provoking at every turn. All philosophers interested in perception should read this book." --Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
"Orlandi's book engages fundamental questions about the nature of the mind. She develops a novel way of thinking about mental representation, with an eye toward distinguishing it from some of the ways in which the brain's sensitivity to the environment embeds information. This book is a productive contribution to long-standing debates about the structure of vision, the nature of mental representation, and the role of representation in the mind." --Susanna Siegel, Harvard University
"Orlandi knows a lot about vision, and in this wonderfully clear and insightful book, she develops a novel theory of embedded vision. She argues convincingly that vision works not through inferential processes operating over representational states, but by taking advantage of built in biases that reflect features of the world without representing them. Her book belongs alongside those Dretske, Gibson, Marr, Noë, Pylyshyn, Rock and Siegel in the vision section of your library." --Larry Shapiro, University of Wisconsin, Madison
"Perhaps the greatest strength of the The Innocent Eye is that it functions as a sobering case study with which to focus recent debates over the role of representation in scientifically informed explanations. Regardless of one's philosophical allegiance, the book usefully draws out some of the stakes by centering in on the concrete issue of visual processing. In doing so, it provides a readable yet comprehensive contribution to one of the most important and hotly contested areas in current philosophy of cognitive science." --Philosophical Psychology