The Explainability of Experience
Realism and Subjectivity in Spinoza's Theory of the Human Mind
Ursula Renz
Table of Contents
Preface
Contents
Abbreviations
Introduction: The Explainability of Experience
Part I: The Basic Framework: The Ethics' Systematic Premises
Chapter 1: Dissociating the Concept of Substance from the Concept of Subject
Chapter 2: The Conception of Metaphysics in de Deo and its Implications
Chapter 3: The Concept of the Individual and its Scope
Part II: The Ontology of the Mental: On the Relationship between Being and Thought
Chapter 4: The Primacy of the Metaphysics over the Theory of the Mind
Chapter 5: The Concept of idea and Its Logic
Chapter 6: The Justification of a Realist Rationalism
Chapter 7: Body and Mind: What Spinoza's Theory of Identity Seeks to Achieve
Part III: Theory of the Subject: The Concept of the Human Mind and Its Premises
Chapter 8: The Problem of the Numerical Difference Between Subjects
Chapter 9: Finitude, or the Limited Knowability of Finite Things
Chapter 10: The Definition of the Human Mind in Its Derivation
Chapter 11: Panpsychism, or the Question "What is the Subject of Experience?
Part IV: Psychology and Epistemology: The Constitution, Experiential Quality, and Epistemic Value of Content
Chapter 12: The Constitution of Mental Content in the imaginatio
Chapter 13: Emotions, or How to Explain Qualities of Experience
Chapter 14: Epistemology: The Possibility of Producing Successful Explanations
Conclusion: Successful Explanation of Experience and Practical Philosophy
Bibliography
Index of Persons
Index of Concepts
Index of References to the Ethics