The British Way in Counter-Insurgency, 1945-1967

David French

A seminal reassessment of the historical foundation of British counter doctrine and practice from award-winning historian, David French
Challenges existing interpretations of of British counter doctrine and practice, so encourages readers to re-think what they already know, or think they do
Includes in-depth research and numerous quotations from participants which bring the subject to life

The British Way in Counter-Insurgency, 1945-1967

David French

Description

The claim by the Ministry of Defence in 2001 that 'the experience of numerous small wars has provided the British Army with a unique insight into this demanding form of conflict' unravelled spectacularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. One important reason for that, David French suggests, was because contemporary British counter-insurgency doctrine was based upon a serious misreading of the past.

Until now, many observers believed that during the wars of decolonisation in the two decades after 1945, the British had discovered how western liberal notions of right and wrong could be made compatible with the imperatives of waging war amongst the people, that force could be used effectively but with care, and that a more just and prosperous society could emerge from these struggles. By using only the minimum necessary force, and doing so with the utmost discrimination, the British were able to win by securing the 'hearts and minds' of the people. But this was a serious distortion of actual British practice on the ground. David French's main contention is that the British hid their use of naked force behind a carefully constructed veneer of legality. In reality, they commonly used wholesale coercion, including cordon and search operations, mass detention without trial, forcible population resettlement, and the creation of free-fire zones to intimidate and lock-down the civilian population. The British waged their counter-insurgency campaigns by being nasty, not nice, to the people.

The British Way in Counter-Insurgency is a seminal reassessment of the historical foundation of British counter doctrine and practice.

The British Way in Counter-Insurgency, 1945-1967

David French

Acknowledgements
List of Abbreviations
Introduction
1. The Colonial State
2. Gangsters, Thugs, and Bandits: the Enemies of the Colonial State
3. The Legal Context and Counter-insurgency by Committee
4. Varieties of Coercion: Exemplary Force, Counter-terrorism, and Population Control
5. Britain's "Dirty Wars"?
6. Winning Hearts and Minds
7. Counter-insurgency and the Learning Curve
8. The Problems of Sustainability
Conclusion
Bibliography
Index

The British Way in Counter-Insurgency, 1945-1967

David French

Author Information

David French was at the University of York and the War Studies Department at King's College London. He spent 27 years at University College London before taking early retirement in 2008 to become a full-time writer. Professor French is the author of six previous books, and has been the recipient of the Arthur Goodzeit Prize of the New York Military Affairs Symposium. He is a three-time winner of the Templer Medal awarded by the Society for Army Historical Research. He is a Fellow of both the Royal Historical Society and the Historical Association, and a member of the editorial board of the Journal of Strategic Studies, and the Council of the Army Records Society.

The British Way in Counter-Insurgency, 1945-1967

David French

Reviews and Awards

"David French provides such a comprehensive study, covering the period 1945-1967, from the beginning of the Zionist insurgency in Palestine to the end of the emergency in South Arabia."--Journal of British Studies

"An incredibly insightful book."--Foreign Policy

"David French provides such a comprehensive study, covering the period 1945-1967, from the beginning of the Zionist insurgency in Palestine to campaigns in Suez, Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, Nyasaland, Oman, Borneo, and British Guiana."--Journal of British Studies