Social Ontology

Collective Intentionality and Group Agents

Raimo Tuomela

Develops the central we-mode and comparable I-mode notions, viz., concepts and theses based on full-blown collective intentionality, that are needed for an adequate understanding and explaining of the social world
Compares we-mode notions with the individualistic I-mode notions that current social science prevalently employs
Such topics as cooperation, social institutions, we-thinking and acting, and group solidarity are systematically studied
Relevant not only to researchers of the conceptual and metaphysical foundations of the social world (e.g., social activities and structures) but also for those studying normative activities (such as those involved in morality and politics) from a philosophical or other theoretical point of view

Social Ontology

Collective Intentionality and Group Agents

Raimo Tuomela

Description

Social ontology, in its broadest sense, is the study of the nature of social reality, including collective intentions and agency. The starting point of Tuomela's account of collective intentionality is the distinction between thinking and acting as a private person ("I-mode") versus as a "we-thinking" group member ("we-mode"). The we-mode approach is based on social groups consisting of persons, which may range from simple task groups consisting of a few persons to corporations and even to political states. Tuomela extends the we-mode notion to cover groups controlled by external authority. Thus, for instance, cooperation and attitude formation are studied in cases where the participants are governed "from above" as in many corporations.

The volume goes on to present a systematic philosophical theory related to the collectivism-versus-individualism debate in the social sciences. A weak version of collectivism (the "we-mode" approach) depends on group-based collective intentionality. We-mode collective intentionality is not individualistically reducible and is needed to complement individualistic accounts in social scientific theorizing. The we-mode approach is used in the book to account for collective intention and action, cooperation, group attitudes, and social practices and institutions, as well as group solidarity. Tuomela establishes the first complete theory of group reasons (in the sense of members' reasons for participation in group activities). The book argues in terms of game-theoretical group-reasoning that the kind of weak collectivism that the we-mode approach involves is both conceptually and rational-functionally different from what an individualistic approach ("pro-group I-mode" approach) entails.

Social Ontology

Collective Intentionality and Group Agents

Raimo Tuomela

Preface
Table of Contents
Chapter 1: Introduction
Chapter 2: Groups and We-Thinking
Chapter 3: Collective Intentions
Chapter 4: Acting for Social Reasons
Chapter 5: Collective Acceptance and the Formation of Group Attitudes
Chapter 6: Cooperation and Authority
Chapter 7: We-Reasoning in Game-Theoretic Context
Chapter 8: Institutional Facts and Institutions
Chapter 9: Group Solidarity: All for One and One for All
References
Index

Social Ontology

Collective Intentionality and Group Agents

Raimo Tuomela

Author Information

Raimo Tuomela, Professor Emeritus of Social and Moral Philosophy, University of Helsinki

Raimo Tuomela is Professor Emeritus of Social and Moral Philosophy at the University of Helsinki and permanent visiting professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Munich. He holds Ph.D. degrees in philosophy from the University of Helsinki and Stanford University. His previous works include The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View (OUP 2007), The Philosophy of Social Practices (2002), Cooperation: A Philosophical Study (2000), and The Importance of Us (1995). Currently Tuomela functions as the president of the International Social Ontology Society.