"An interesting account of how the indiscriminability of sensory qualities fixes their place in a "quality space," an abstract structure specifying particular sensory qualities in terms of the kinds of ways in which they can discriminably differ."--Times Literary Supplement

"Besides offering us the most useful account of sensory qualities to have yet appeared, Clark shows himself to be a clear and sure-footed expositor of the empirical and theoretical apparatus he employs....will appeal particularly to veterans of the qualia wars who hunger and thirst after real data, worked-out examples, and minimal hand-waving."--Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

"The presentation is informative and well argued, providing the best philosophical explication that I have seen of the conceptual structure of standard psychophysical explanation. Furthermore, Clark makes excellent use of another important work largely neglected in the qualia literature, Nelson Goodman's The Structure of Appearance....Sensory Qualities is thus an important and much-needed contribution to the philosophy of psychology, one that subsequent discussions of qualia cannot afford to ignore."--The Philosophical Review