Preface to Volume II
I: SURVEYS AND PERSPECTIVES
Introduction
1. Information and Economic Analysis: A Perspective
2. Information and Competition
II: CAPITAL MARKETS
IIA: Information and Capital Markets
Introduction
3. Information and Capital Markets
4. Using Tax Policy to Curb Speculative Short-Term Trading
5. Ownership, Control and Efficient Markets: Some Paradoxes in the Theory of Capital Markets
6. The Informational Content of Initial Public Offerings, with I. Gale
7. A Simple Proof that Futures Markets are Almost Always Informationally Imperfect, with I. Gale
IIB: Credit and Equity Rationing
Introduction
8. Incentive Effects of Termination: Applications to the Credit and Labor Markets, with A. Weiss
9. Credit Rationing and Collateral, with A. Weiss
10. Credit and Equity Rationing in Markets with Adverse Selection, with T. Hellmann
IIC: Structure and Functioning of Capital Markets
Introduction
11. Information, Finance and Markets: The Architecture of Allocative Mechanisms, with B. Greenwald
12. Banks as Social Accountants and Screening Devices for the Allocation of Credit, with A. Weiss
13. Banks versus Markets as Mechanisms for Allocating and Coordinating Investment
14. Short-term Contracts as a Monitoring Device, with P. Rey
15. Pure Theory of Country Risk, with J. Eaton and M. Gersovitz
16. Discouraging Rivals: Managerial Rent-Seeking and Economic Inefficiencies, with A. Edlin
III: INFORMATION AND LABOR MARKETS AND THE GENERAL THEORY OF INCENTIVES
IIIA: Incentives
Introduction
17. A Survey of the Economics of Incentives
18. Incentives, Risk and Information: Notes Toward a Theory of Hierarchy
19. Prizes and Incentives: Toward a General Theory of Compensation and Competition, with B. Nalebuff
20. Design of Labor Contracts: Economics of Incentives and Risk-Sharing
IIIB: Efficiency Wages
Introduction
21. Alternative Theories of Wage Determination and Unemployment in L.D.C.'s: The Labor Turnover Model
22. Alternative Theories of Wage Determination and Unemployment: The Efficiency Wage Model
23. Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Screening Device, with B. Nalebuff and A. Rodriguez
IIIC: Wage Distributions, Search, and the Efficiency of Market Equilibrium
Introduction
24. Equilibrium Wage Distribution
25. Labor Turnover, Wage Structure & Moral Hazard: The Inefficiency of Competitive Markets, with R. Arnott
IV. THE PURE THEORY OF MORAL HAZARD AND INSURANCE
Introduction
26. Risk, Incentives and Insurance: The Pure Theory of Moral Hazard
27. Price Equilibrium, Efficiency, and Decentralizability in Insurance Markets, with R. Arnott
28. Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets, with Moral Hazard with R. Arnott
V. INFORMATION AND PRODUCT MARKETS
Introduction
29. Imperfect Information in Product Markets
30. The Theory of Sales: A Simple Model of Equilibrium Price Dispersion with Identical Agents, with S. Salop
31. Equilibrium in Product Markets with Imperfect Information
32. Competition and the Number of Firms in a Market: Are Duopolies More Competitive Than Atomistic Markets?