Responsibility: The Epistemic Condition

Edited by Philip Robichaud and Jan Willem Wieland

Stimulates further research and a deeper understanding of when and why we are responsible
Original contributions representing the newest developments in the debate
Accessible for a wide range of scholars and students in ethics, epistemology, moral psychology, and the philosophy of law
Substantial interaction between contributors unifies the volume

Responsibility: The Epistemic Condition

Edited by Philip Robichaud and Jan Willem Wieland

Description

Philosophers have long agreed that moral responsibility might not only have a freedom condition, but also an epistemic condition. Moral responsibility and knowledge interact, but the question is exactly how. Ignorance might constitute an excuse, but the question is exactly when. Surprisingly enough, the epistemic condition has only recently attracted the attention of scholars. This volume sets the agenda. Sixteen new essays address the following central questions: Does the epistemic condition require akrasia? Why does blameless ignorance excuse? Does moral ignorance sustained by one's culture excuse? Does the epistemic condition involve knowledge of the wrongness or wrongmaking features of one's action? Is the epistemic condition an independent condition, or is it derivative from one's quality of will or intentions? Is the epistemic condition sensitive to degrees of difficulty? Are there different kinds of moral responsibility and thus multiple epistemic conditions? Is the epistemic condition revisionary? What is the basic structure of the epistemic condition?

Responsibility: The Epistemic Condition

Edited by Philip Robichaud and Jan Willem Wieland

Introduction: The Epistemic Condition, Jan Willem Wieland
1:Unwitting Wrongdoing, Reasonable Expectations, and Blameworthiness, William J. FitzPatrick
2:Akrasia, Awareness, and Blameworthiness, Matthew Talbert
3:When Ignorance is No Excuse, Maria Alvarez and Clayton Littlejohn
4:Vice, Blameworthiness, and Cultural Ignorance, Elinor Mason and Alan T. Wilson
5:Blame and Moral Ignorance, George Sher
6:When Is Failure to Realize Something Exculpatory?, Elizabeth Harman
7:On Knowing What's Right and Being Responsible For It, Paulina Sliwa
8:Explaining (Away) the Epistemic Condition of Moral Responsibility, Gunnar Björnsson
9:The Epistemic Condition on Moral Blameworthiness, A Theoretical Epiphenomenon, Peter A. Graham
10:Hard to Know, Gwen Bradford
11:Intellectual Difficulty and Moral Responsibility, Alexander A. Guerrero
12:Moral Responsibility and Quality of Will, Michael J. Zimmerman
13:Ignorance, Revision, and Commonsense, Randolph Clarke
14:Methodological Conservatism and the Epistemic Condition, Neil Levy
15:Tracing the Epistemic Condition, Matt King
16:Blame Transfer, Jan Willem Wieland and Philip Robichaud

Responsibility: The Epistemic Condition

Edited by Philip Robichaud and Jan Willem Wieland

Author Information

Edited by Philip Robichaud, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, and Jan Willem Wieland, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

Philip Robichaud received his PhD from Rice University in 2012 for a dissertation on the epistemic condition. From 2013-2016 he was a postdoc on the 'Enhancing Responsibility' project at Delft University of Technology, before taking up a tenure track position at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. His current research project entitled 'Nudging Responsibly: The impact of choice architecture on responsibility attributions' is funded by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research.

Jan Willem Wieland is a postdoc in the philosophy department at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. His interests lie between ethics and epistemology, and his current research centers on the epistemic condition. Previously, he wrote a dissertation on infinite regress arguments in philosophy, and he has long-term ambitions to promote analytical skills to the broader public. For his research, he received substantive grants from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research and the Research Foundation Flanders.

Contributors:

Maria Alvarez, King's College London
Gunnar Björnsson, Umeå University
Gwen Bradford, Rice University
Randolph Clarke, Florida State University
William J. FitzPatrick, University of Rochester
Peter A. Graham, University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Alexander A. Guerrero, University of Pennsylvania
Elizabeth Harman, Princeton University
Matt King, University of Alabama, Birmingham
Neil Levy, Macquarie University
Clayton Littlejohn, King's College London
Elinor Mason, University of Edinburgh
Philip Robichaud, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
George Sher, Rice University
Paulina Sliwa, University of Cambridge
Matthew Talbert. West Virginia University
Jan Willem Wieland, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Alan T. Wilson, University of Glasgow
Michael J. Zimmerman, University of North Carolina, Greensboro