Prejudice

A Study in Non-Ideal Epistemology

Endre Begby

The first book-length study of the epistemology of prejudiced belief
Relates social epistemology to developments in social psychology and cognitive science
Informed by relevant, real-world case studies
Develops a unique, systematic, and rigorous platform for 'non-ideal epistemology', connecting knowledge with ethics

Prejudice

A Study in Non-Ideal Epistemology

Endre Begby

Description

Prejudiced beliefs may certainly seem like defective beliefs. But in what sense are they defective? Many will be false and harmful, but philosophers have further argued that prejudiced belief is defective also in the sense that it could only arise from distinctive kinds of epistemic irrationality: we could acquire or retain our prejudiced beliefs only by violating our epistemic responsibilities. It is also assumed that we are only morally responsible for the harms that prejudiced beliefs cause because, in forming these beliefs in the first place, we are violating our epistemic responsibilities. In Prejudice, Endre Begby argues that these common convictions are misguided. His discussion shows in detail that there are many epistemically justified pathways to prejudiced belief, and that it is a mistake to lean on the concept of epistemic responsibility to articulate our ethical responsibilities. Doing so unreasonably burdens victims of prejudice with having to show that their victimizers were in a position to know better. Accordingly, Begby provides an account of moral responsibility for harm which does not depend on finding grounds for epistemic blame. This view is supported by a number of examples and case studies at individual, collective, and institutional levels of decision making. Additionally, Begby develops a systematic platform for "non-ideal epistemology" which would apply to a wide range of other social and epistemic phenomena of current concern, such as fake news, conspiracy theories, science scepticism, and more.

Prejudice

A Study in Non-Ideal Epistemology

Endre Begby

Preface
1. Prejudice from an epistemological point of view
2. The psychology of stereotypes
3. From psychology to philosophy: the case for non-ideal epistemology
4. The epistemology of prejudice acquisition
5. The epistemology of prejudice maintenance
6. Evidential preemption
7. Common ground: the peculiar epistemology of culturally normal belief
8. Automated risk assessment in the criminal justice process: a case of algorithmic bias ?
9. Moral constraints on belief?
10. A better approach: moral responsibility despite epistemic blamelessness
References

Prejudice

A Study in Non-Ideal Epistemology

Endre Begby

Author Information

Endre Begby, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Simon Fraser University

Endre Begby received his MA degree from the University of Oslo and his Ph.D. from the University of Pittsburgh. He is currently an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Simon Fraser University. His areas of specialization include epistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, as well as social and political philosophy.

Prejudice

A Study in Non-Ideal Epistemology

Endre Begby

Reviews and Awards

"The author's prose is clear, and he works through a great deal of difficult material in short compass. Philosophers, policymakers, and students will all profit from reading this book." -- B. T. Hutchinson, CHOICE

"This is a well-written and thought-provoking book. It is both philosophically sophisticated and relatively accessible. Advanced students with some background in relevant areas should have no trouble following the broad outline of the argument. Researchers interested in the topics it covers (and it covers quite a few) will gain a lot from reading it. Some of them will find things to disagree with, but that is only to be expected. All told, this is a sophisticated and nuanced account of the epistemology and ethics of prejudice and prejudiced belief." -- Robin McKenna, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

"...this is what makes Begby's work so informative and such a landmark in non-ideal epistemology" -- Guy Lancaster, Marx & Philosophy Review of Books

"And this is what makes Begby's work so informative and such a landmark in non-ideal epistemology, for by demonstrating how prejudice accords with our normal cognitive operations, it centers the humanity of all involved, even those perpetrators of so much so-called "inhumanity." -- Guy Lancaster, Marx & Philosophy Review of Books