Out of Afghanistan

The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal

Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison

Out of Afghanistan

The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal

Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison

Description

When the Soviet Union pulled its forces out of Afghanistan, the American media had a simple explanation: Soviet troops had been hounded out of the mountains by U.S.-armed guerrillas--the skies cleared of Soviet aircraft by Stinger missiles--until the Kremlin was forced to cry uncle. But Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison shatter this image. Out of Afghanistan shows that the Red Army was securely entrenched when the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw: American weaponry and Afghan bravery raised the costs for Moscow, but it was six years of skillful diplomacy that gave the Russians a way out.

Cordovez and Harrison provide the definitive account of the Soviet blunders that led up to the invasion and the bitter struggles over the withdrawal that raged in the Soviet and Afghan Communist parties and the Reagan Administration. The authors are particularly well-suited to their task: Cordovez was the United Nations mediator who negotiated the Soviet pullout, and Harrison is a leading South Asia expert with four decades of experience in covering Afghanistan. Their story of the U.N. negotiations is interwoven with a gripping chronicle of the war years, complete with palace shootouts in Kabul, turf warfare between rival Soviet intelligence agencies, and the CIA role in building up Islamic fundamentalist guerrilla leaders at the expense of Afghan moderates. Cordovez opens up his diaries to take us behind the scenes in his negotiations, and Harrison draws on interviews with Mikhail Gorbachev, former Secretary of State George Shultz, and other key actors. The result is a book full of surprises. For example, the authors demonstrate that the Soviets intervened not out of a desire to drive to the Indian Ocean, but out of a fear of a U.S.-supported Afghan Tito. Rebuffs by hardline "bleeders" in the Reagan Administration undermined efforts by Yuri Andropov to secure a settlement before his death in 1983. Even more startling, Gorbachev resumed the search for a negotiated withdrawal more than a year before the first American-supplied Stinger missiles were deployed in the war.

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was one of the pivotal events of recent history. Out of Afghanistan destroys many of the myths surrounding the Afghan war and will have a profound impact on the emerging debate over how and why the Cold War ended.

Out of Afghanistan

The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal

Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison

Author Information

Undersecretary-General for Special Political Affairs of the United Nations from 1981 to 1988, Diego Cordovez was nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize for his role in negotiating the Geneva Accords. Selig S. Harrison, a former Washington Post foreign correspondent and the author of five books about Asia, is a Senior Associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Out of Afghanistan

The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal

Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison

Reviews and Awards

"The detailed account by Cordovez and harrison, both veteran participants in behind the scenes discussions of the war...details the factionalism in Moscow--and in Washington, between the 'bleeders' and the 'dealers' in the Reagan administration."--The New Republic

"Contrary to conventional wisdom propagated by the Western media...Cordovez and Harrison tell us that the Red Army was on the ground in Afghanistan when the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw. After endless blunders on both the Soviet and American sides, and after six years of excruciatingly ticklish diplomacy (authoritatively described here), negotiators found a way to secure a settlement. Cordovez's personal role in the dealings lends the book an inside perspective."--The Washington Post Book World

"This is probably the most comprehensive volume written about the events which might be considered a landmark in contemporary history."--International Relations

"The Harrison-Cordovez book represents a major contribution to our understanding of a crucial moment in the Cold War--the Soviet intervention and defeat in Afghanistan."--President Jimmy Carter

"This is a fascinating and important book, and for once a book that lives up to its title. With Diego Cordovez's key personal role, and Selig Harrison's background experience and research, this is "the inside story" of the intricate, multifaceted diplomatic drama behind the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, and it presents a well-grounded account of the Soviet decisions to intervene and later to pull out as well."--Raymond L. Garthoff, Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution and author of The Great Transition: American Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War