Motivational Internalism

Edited by Gunnar Björnsson, Fredrik Björklund, Caj Strandberg, John Eriksson, and Ragnar Francén Olinder

Oxford Moral Theory

The first volume focused on motivational internalism
Provides both overview and in-depth examination of wide-ranging but scattered debates
Distinguishes important threads and trends in contemporary metaethics

Motivational Internalism

Edited by Gunnar Björnsson, Fredrik Björklund, Caj Strandberg, John Eriksson, and Ragnar Francén Olinder

Description

Motivational internalism-the idea that there is an intrinsic or necessary connection between moral judgment and moral motivation-is a central thesis in a number of metaethical debates. In conjunction with a Humean picture of motivation, it provides a challenge for cognitivist theories that take moral judgments to concern objective aspects of reality. Versions of internalism have potential implications for moral absolutism, realism, non-naturalism, and rationalism. Being a constraint on more detailed conceptions of moral motivation and moral judgment, it is also directly relevant to wider issues in moral psychology. But internalism is a controversial thesis, and the apparent possibility of amoralists and the rejection of strong forms of internalism have also been seen as problems for non-cognitivists.

This volume's thirteen new essays and introduction are meant to help readers appreciate state-of-the-art of research on internalism, to identify connections between various aspects of the debate, and to deepen discussion of a number of central aspects of metaethics. The introductory chapter provides a structured overview of the debate with a focus on the last two decades, while the book's three main sections focus on what evidence there is for or against various versions of internalism, the relevance of versions of internalism for wider metaethical issues, and different ways of accommodating both internalist and externalist aspects of moral practice, respectively.

Motivational Internalism

Edited by Gunnar Björnsson, Fredrik Björklund, Caj Strandberg, John Eriksson, and Ragnar Francén Olinder

Oxford Moral Theory

Preface

Contributors

1 Motivational internalism: Contemporary debates
Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder, John Eriksson, Fredrik Björklund

I. Evidence
Introduction to Part I: Evidence for and against motivational internalism
2 Evaluative judgements, judgments about reasons, and motivations
Michael Smith
3 Motivational externalism: Formulation, methodology, rationality and indifference
Nick Zangwill
4 An empirical case for motivational internalism
Jesse Prinz
5 Unconditional motivational internalism and Hume's lesson
Daniel Eggers
6 What's required for motivation by principle?
Jeanette Kennett

II. Relevance
Introduction to Part II: The relevance of motivational internalism
7 Internalism: Cui bono?
Michael Ridge
8 Pure expressivism and motivational internalism
Teemu Toppinen
9 Can reasons fundamentalism answer the normative question?
James Dreier
10 Naturalistic Moral Realism and Motivational Internalism, From Negative to Positive
Jon Tresan

III. Bridging the gap
Introduction to part III: Bridging the gap between internalism and externalism
11 Detecting value with motivational responses
Sigrún Svavarsdóttir
12 Intuition and belief in moral motivation
Antti Kauppinen
13 Tempered internalism and the participatory stance
Kate Manne
14 Two functions of moral language: Rethinking the amoralist
John Thomas Mumm

Index

Motivational Internalism

Edited by Gunnar Björnsson, Fredrik Björklund, Caj Strandberg, John Eriksson, and Ragnar Francén Olinder

Oxford Moral Theory

Author Information

Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder, John Eriksson, and Fredrik Björklund have published widely on issues related to the volume published. Their papers have appeared in journals such as Mind, Ethics, Journal of Philosophy, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Noûs, Philosophical Studies, Journal of Ethics, and Australasian Journal of Philosophy.

Contributors:

Gunnar Björnsson is a professor of philosophy at Umeå University and research fellow at the University of Gothenburg.

Caj Strandberg is an associate professor at the University of Gothenburg.

Ragnar Francén Olinder is a research fellow at the University of Gothenburg.

John Eriksson is a research fellow at the University of Gothenburg.

Fredrik Björklund is a professor of psychology at Lund University.

James Dreier is a professor of philosophy at Brown University.

Daniel Eggers is a research fellow at the University of Cologne.

Antti Kauppinen is an assistant professor at Trinity College Dublin.

Jeanette Kennett is a professor of philosophy at Macquarie University.

Kate Manne is an assistant professor of philosophy at Cornell University.

John Thomas Mumm is a PhD from Fordham University.

Jesse Prinz is a Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York.

Michael Ridge is a professor of philosophy at the University of Edinburgh.

Michael Smith is McCosh Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University.

Sigrún Svavarsdóttir is an associate professor at Tufts University.

Teemu Toppinen is a postdoctoral fellow at the University of Helsinki.

Jon Tresan is a visiting assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Rochester.

Nick Zangwill is Ferens Chair of Philosophy at the University of Hull.

Motivational Internalism

Edited by Gunnar Björnsson, Fredrik Björklund, Caj Strandberg, John Eriksson, and Ragnar Francén Olinder

Oxford Moral Theory

Reviews and Awards

"...it will be interesting to those already engaged in, or making plans to wade into, that debate. The volume would also be suitable as a text for a graduate seminar focused on motivational internalism. The editors' lengthy introductory chapter and shorter introductions to the three sections do an admirable job of introducing less well-traveled readers to unfamiliar terrain." --Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews Online

"The editors of this collection have brought together an excellent set of philosophers to address the previous question. Roughly one half of the contributors are leading senior metaethicists who have already made important contributions to this debate, whereas the rest are younger scholars who were selected through an open call for abstracts. The editors have also provided a helpful overview article and arranged the articles of the volume clearly under three distinct headings...I can recommend this collection wholeheartedly to everyone who is interested in the judgement internalism debate. I can also recommend many individual articles to those metaethicists who are working on other important questions in metaethics and moral psychology." -- The Philosophical Quarterly

"I know of no better way of summarizing how good this collection is than to say that the essays within manage to say new and interesting things about motivational internalism." - Derek Baker, Australasian Journal of Philosophy