Minds, Brains, and Law
The Conceptual Foundations of Law and Neuroscience
Michael S. Pardo and Dennis Patterson
Reviews and Awards
"The subject of neuro-legal studies has developed rapidly in the wake of advances in cognitive neuroscience . Its relevance to and bearing upon the law and legal proceedings, and upon the admissibility of neurological evidence in criminal law are of the greatest importance. Professors Pardo and Patterson have written a most timely book that subjects neuro-legal studies to meticulous conceptual scrutiny. They bring to bear impressive knowledge of neuroscience and law, as well as first-rate philosophical acumen. They write lucidly and present their opponents' case fairly. Their critical arguments are powerful and convincing, and will profoundly affect the current perception of the relation between law and neuroscience. This book should be studied by all lawyers and judges concerned with the relevance of cognitive neuroscience to the law, and by all students of law." --P.M.S. Hacker, St. John's College, Oxford
"Not only is this book a masterful blending of highly knowledgeable law, neuroscience, and philosophy, but it also avoids both the excess claims and the excess skepticism that plague the literature on this increasingly important topic. The book will serve both as a valuable introduction to those who are new to neuroscience and law, and also as a set of distinctive positions that will engage those who are already involved with the subject." --Frederick Schauer, David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Virginia
"Pardo and Patterson have powerfully and sophisticatedly constructed the skeptical argument concerning the relevance of neuroscience to law. Minds, Brains and Law will justifiably provoke controversy and debate and it should be required reading for anyone interested in this field." --Stephen J. Morse, Professor of Law and Psychiatry, University of Pennsylvania
"Two conceptual difficulties bedevil neuroscience at present. One of these involves attributing psychological capacities to parts of the brain and not to the human being whose brain it is. The other involves on the one hand the claim that there are discrete regions of the association cortex that support particular psychological capacities; and on the other hand the claim that such capacities are discrete. These assumptions have profound implications for the interpretation of non-invasive brain images. This wonderful book sets out such caveats concerning the admissibility of neuroscience in courts of law." --Maxwell R. Bennett AO, Professor of Neuroscience, Adjunct Professor of Neuropsychiatry, Founding Director Brain and Mind Research Institute, University of Sydney
"The book's breadth, clarity, and generally on-point criticisms make it useful to a wide audience, worth reading for anyone working on what has come to be called 'neurolaw,' 'neuroethics,' or 'experimental philosophy,' but also of interest to moral and legal philosophers interested in developments in neuroscience (as arguably all moral and legal philosophers should be), and both academic and non-academic lawyers whose work engages neuroscientific evidence. There are also general lessons to be learned about how empirical evidence bears on philosophical claims, and Pardo and Patterson are generally good teachers." -Alexander Guerrero, University of Pennsylvania, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
