Preface and Acknowledgments
Chapter 1: Introduction
Part I: Criminal Law and the Morality of Ascribing Responsibility
Chapter 2: The General Structure of Criminal Law in Terms of Ascriptive Moral Principles
Part II: The Criminal Law's Suppositions About the Psychology of Persons
Chapter 3: Human Actions at the Root of Moral Wrongdoing and Criminal Law's Actus Reus
Chapter 4: Intention and Belief at the Root of Moral Culpability and Mens Rea
Chapter 5: Further Questions About the Basic Distinction Between Intention and Belief
Chapter 6: The Royal Road to the Criminal Law's Concept of the Psychology of Persons: The Insanity Defense
Part III: The Challenges to Criminal Law by Neuroscience
Chapter 7: The Challenging Data of Neuroscience and the Challenges Mounted From that Data
Part IV: The Hard Determinist Challenge
Chapter 8: The Libertarian, Fictionalist, and Compatibilist Responses to Hard Determinism
Chapter 9: Rescuing the Volitional Excuses from Compatibilism (The Overshoot Problem for Compatibilism)
PART V: The Epiphenomenalist Challenge
Chapter 10: The Initiation of the Epiphenomenalist Challenge in the Work of Benjamin Libet
Chapter 11: The Limited Compatibilism of Epiphenomenalism with Responsibility
PART VI: The Reductionist Challenge
Chapter 12: "Nothing But a Pack of Neurons"
Part VII: Neuroscience as the Helper rather than the Challenger of the Criminal Law
Chapter 13: The Potential Contributions of Neuroscience to our Understanding of Addiction