Independent Agencies in the United States
Law, Structure, and Politics
Professor Marshall J. Breger and Professor Gary J. Edles
Reviews and Awards
"Independent Agencies in the United States: Law, Structure, and Politics fills a major gap in administrative law scholarship. Setting the stage with a historical pageant, sweeping from the 19th Century British origins of America's basic regulatory model through its metamorphosis into the multiple types of agencies that exist today, the book provides an intellectually vigorous analysis of the real-world influences on agency decision making. It ranges from such current issues as agency use of private contractors to long-standing issues such as Presidential and Congressional techniques for seeking to direct independent agency activities. The authors' unparalleled experience shines through this outstanding book!" - Betty Jo Christian, Partner, Steptoe & Johnson LLP Washington, D.C.
"Independent Agencies in the United States is truly a prodigious feat of scholarship that should be read by anyone with a serious interest in issues of governmental structure and function. Professors Breger and Edles examine not only the agencies generally referred to as 'independent,' like the SEC, but also innumerable other hybrid entities including government corporations and government sponsored enterprises, as well as the increasing trend to privatization of governmental functions. Their balanced treatment of issues that often provoke intense battles of theory and politics insures that this book will be one of the most highly regarded in recent administrative law scholarship." - William V. Luneburg, Professor Emeritus University of Pittsburgh School of Law, Former Chair, ABA Section of Administrative Law & Regulatory Practice
"Independent Agencies in the United States is an enormously ambitious effort that succeeds magnificently. It explains both the meaning of independence and the numerous reasons for seeking it, including both history and theory, and gets down to the nitty-gritty of how independence plays out in its many different ramifications in the real world of administrative law. On top of that, the book includes appendices that spell out for each independent entity those features of independence that it has and does not have, as well as numerous examples of how the many attributes of independence have different manifestations in different settings. In short, this is a book that scholars, practitioners, agency officials, congressional staff, and even students will find of great use." - Alan Morrison, Associate Dean, George Washington Law School, and long-time administrative law practitioner and teacher
"Breger and Edles enormously advance the understanding of the critical independent agency sector by treating the differences between executive and independent agencies as a continuum between executive controllability of agency decisions and the lack thereof. They rely on many legal, political, cultural, and historical factors, and supply fascinating data on how multi-member agencies function as well as comparative material on independent agencies in other legal systems. This rich and nuanced treatment of agency independence will be extremely helpful to scholars of government and to policymakers who are structuring new agencies to address the problems of the future." -Michael Asimow, Visiting Professor, Stanford Law School
"Marshall Breger and Gary Edles have done the unusual. As significant thinkers in the area of administrative law they have written a scholarly work that is also a practical tool for those who deal with the 'independent agencies' of the federal government. Independent Agencies in the United States reads well, is clear, is thoughtful, and a must for those who either study or interact with the federal government. The authors have made a real contribution to both the scholarship and the practical understanding of the federal legal system, and their extensive background in government enriches the text." -Senior Judge Loren A. Smith, United States Court of Federal Claims, and Distinguished Adjunct Professor, George Mason University School of Law