Implicit Bias and Philosophy, Volumes 1 and 2

Metaphysics and Epistemology; Moral Responsibility, Structural Injustice, and Ethics

Edited by Michael Brownstein and Jennifer Saul

New work on an important and pressing topic
Written by an international team of leading experts
Offers the reader multiple viewpoints on key questions
Draws together insights from philosophy, psychology, sociology, and law

Implicit Bias and Philosophy, Volumes 1 and 2

Metaphysics and Epistemology; Moral Responsibility, Structural Injustice, and Ethics

Edited by Michael Brownstein and Jennifer Saul

Description

Implicit Bias and Philosophy brings the work of leading philosophers and psychologists together to explore core areas of psychological research on implicit (or unconscious) bias, as well as the ramifications of implicit bias for core areas of philosophy. Volume I: Metaphysics and Epistemology is comprised of two sections: 'The Nature of Implicit Attitudes, Implicit Bias, and Stereotype Threat,' and 'Skepticism, Social Knowledge, and Rationality.' The first section contains chapters examining the relationship between implicit attitudes and 'dual process' models of the mind; the role of affect in the formation and change of implicit associations; the unity (or disunity) of implicit attitudes; whether implicit biases are mental states at all; and whether performances on stereotype-relevant tasks are automatic and unconscious or intentional and strategic. The second section contains chapters examining implicit bias and skepticism; the effects of implicit bias on scientific research; the accessibility of social stereotypes in epistemic environments; the effects of implicit bias on the self-perception of members of stigmatized social groups as rational agents; the role of gender stereotypes in philosophy; and the role of heuristics in biased reasoning.

Volume 2: Moral Responsibility, Structural Injustice, and Ethics is comprised of three sections. 'Moral Responsibility for Implicit Bias' contains chapters examining the relationship of implicit biases to concepts that are central to moral responsibility, including control, awareness, reasons-responsiveness, and alienation. The chapters in the second section—'Structural Injustice'—explore the connections between the implicit biases held by individuals and the structural injustices of the societies in which they are situated. And finally, the third section—'The Ethics of Implicit Bias: Theory and Practice'—contains chapters examining strategies for implicit attitude change, the ramifications of research on implicit bias for philosophers working in ethics, and suggestions for combatting implicit biases in the fields of philosophy and law.

Implicit Bias and Philosophy, Volumes 1 and 2

Metaphysics and Epistemology; Moral Responsibility, Structural Injustice, and Ethics

Edited by Michael Brownstein and Jennifer Saul

Volume 1: Metaphysics and Epistemology
Introduction, Michael Brownstein and Jennifer Saul
Section One: The Nature of Implicit Attitudes, Implicit Bias, and Stereotype Threat
1.1:Playing Double: Implicit Bias, Dual Levels, and Self-Control, Keith Frankish
1.2:Implicit Bias, Reinforcement Learning, and Scaffolded Moral Cognition, Bryce Huebner
1.3:e Heterogeneity of Implicit Bias, Jules Holroyd and Joseph Sweetman
1.4:DeFreuding Implicit Attitudes, Edouard Machery
1.5:Stereotype Threat and Persons, Ron Mallon
Section Two: Skepticism, Social Knowledge, and Rationality
2.1:Bias: Friend or Foe? Reflections on Saulish Skepticism, Louise M. Antony
2.2:Virtue, Social Knowledge, and Implicit Bias, Alex Madva
2.3:Stereotype Threat, Epistemic Injustice, and Rationality, Stacey Goguen
2.4:The Status Quo Fallacy: Implicit Bias and Fallacies of Argumentation, Catherine E. Hundleby
2.5:Revisiting Current Causes of Women's Underrepresentation in Science, Carole J. Lee
2.6:Philosophers explicitly associate philosophy with maleness: an examination of implicit and explicit gender stereotypes in philosophy, Laura di Bella, Eleanor Miles and Jennifer Saul
Volume 2: Moral Responsibility, Structural Injustice, and Ethics
Introduction, Michael Brownstein and Jennifer Saul
Section One: Moral Responsibility for Implicit Bias
1.1:Whose Responsible for This? Moral Responsibility, Externalism, and Knowledge about Implicit Bias, Natalia Washington and Daniel Kelly
1.2:Alienation and Responsibility, Joshua Glasgow
1.3:Attributablity, Accountability, and Implicit Attitudes, Robin Zheng
1.4:Stereotypes and Prejudice: Whose Responsibility? Indirect Personal Responsibility for Implicit Bias, Maureen Sie and Nicole van Voorst Vader-Bours
1.5:Revisionism and Moral Responsibility, Luc Faucher
Section Two: Structural Injustice
2.1:The Too Minimal Political, Moral, and Civil Dimension of Claude Steele's 'Stereotype Threat' Paradigm, Lawrence Blum
2.2:Reducing Bias: Attitudinal and Institutional Change, Anne Jacobson
Section Three: The Ethics of Implicit Bias: Theory and Practice
3.1:A Virtue Ethics Response to Implicit Bias, Clea F. Rees
3.2:Implicit Bias, Context, and Character, Michael Brownstein
3.3:The Moral Status of Micro-Inequities: In Favour of Institutional Solutions, Samantha Brennan
3.4:Discrimination Law, Equity Law, and Implicit Bias, Katya Hosking and Roseanne Russell

Implicit Bias and Philosophy, Volumes 1 and 2

Metaphysics and Epistemology; Moral Responsibility, Structural Injustice, and Ethics

Edited by Michael Brownstein and Jennifer Saul

Author Information

Edited by Michael Brownstein, John Jay College/City University of New York, and Jennifer Saul, University of Sheffield

Michael Brownstein is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at John Jay College/City University of New York. His research focuses on philosophy of psychology and cognitive science, with emphasis on the nature of the implicit mind. In 2014-2015 he was a Visiting Scholar at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, a Fellow of the American Council of Learned Societies, and visiting faculty at Deep Springs College. His published articles on automaticity, spontaneity, and implicit bias have appeared in journals such as Philosophical Studies, Mind and Language, and the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. These mark a small transition from his first publication, 'The Wonderful World of Tame Reptiles', in Reptile Hobbyist.

Jennifer Saul is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sheffield and Director of the Society for Women in Philosophy UK. Her research is primarily in philosophy of language, feminist philosophy, and philosophy of race. She is the author of Lying, Misleading, and What is Said (OUP, 2012); Simple Sentences, Substitution, and Intuitions (OUP, 2007); and Feminism: Issues and Arguments (OUP, 2003). She directed the Leverhulme International Network in Implicit Bias and Philosophy (2011-2013) that gave rise to these volumes. She has also served as a consultant on a zombie movie script.

Contributors:

Keith Frankish, The Open University
Bryce Huebner, Georgetown University
Jules Holroyd, The University of Nottingham
Joseph Sweetman, University of Exeter
Edouard Machery, University of Pittsburgh
Ron Mallon, Washington University in St. Louis
Louise Antony, University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Alex Madva, California State Polytechnic University, Pomona
Stacey Goguen, Boston University
Catherine E. Hundleby, University of Windsor
Carole J. Lee, University of Washington
Laura Di Bella, University of Kent
Eleanor Miles, University of Sussex
Jennifer Saul, University of Sheffield
Natalia Washington, Washington University in St. Louis
Daniel Kelly, Purdue University
Joshua Glasgow, Sonoma State University
Robin Zheng, Newnham College, Cambridge University
Maureen Sie, Erasmus University Rotterdam and Leiden University
Nicole van Voorst Vader-Bours, Erasmus University Rotterdam
Luc Faucher, Université du Québec à Montréal
Lawrence Blum, University of Massachusetts, Boston
Anne Jacobson, University of Houston
Clea F. Rees, Cardiff University
Michael Brownstein, John Jay College of Criminal Justice/CUNY
Samantha Brennan, Western University
Katya Hosking, Commences pupillage at Devereux Chambers October 2015
Roseanne Russell, Cardiff University