Ignorance of Law

A Philosophical Inquiry

Douglas Husak

Oxford Legal Philosophy

Argues that ignorance of law should usually be a complete excuse from criminal liability
Applies a theory of moral and criminal responsibility according to which blameworthiness consists in a defective response to one's moral reasoning
Assesses the real-world implication for the U.S. criminal justice system
Describes connections between the problem of ignorance of law and other topics in moral and legal theory

Ignorance of Law

A Philosophical Inquiry

Douglas Husak

Description

This book argues that ignorance of law should usually be a complete excuse from criminal liability. It defends this conclusion by invoking two presumptions: first, the content of criminal law should conform to morality; second, mistakes of fact and mistakes of law should be treated symmetrically. The author grounds his position in an underlying theory of moral and criminal responsibility according to which blameworthiness consists in a defective response to the moral reasons one has. Since persons cannot be faulted for failing to respond to reasons for criminal liability they do not believe they have, then ignorance should almost always excuse. But persons are somewhat responsible for their wrongs when their mistakes of law are reckless, that is, when they consciously disregard a substantial and unjustifiable risk that their conduct might be wrong. This book illustrates this with examples and critiques the arguments to the contrary offered by criminal theorists and moral philosophers. It assesses the real-world implications for the U.S. system of criminal justice. The author describes connections between the problem of ignorance of law and other topics in moral and legal theory.

Ignorance of Law

A Philosophical Inquiry

Douglas Husak

Oxford Legal Philosophy

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER ONE: METHODOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS: HOW TO APPROACH A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY INTO THE TOPIC OF IGNORANCE OF LAW
A. The Basic Question
B. Critical Morality and the Criminal Law
C. Intuitions and their Limitations
CHAPTER TWO: EXISTING LAW, SCHOLARLY COMMENTARY, AND WHAT TO LEARN FROM IT
A. Selected Cases and Commentary
B. Notice
C. Fact and Law
D. The Structure of Exculpatory Claims: Ignorance as a Denial of Mens rea
CHAPTER THREE: RESPONSIBILITY
A. The Capacity for Responsibility
B. Responsibility for Conduct
C. Culpable Ignorance and a Duty to Inquire
CHAPTER FOUR: REFINEMENTS, QUALIFICATIONS, COMPLEXITIES
A. Knowledge of Wrongdoing
B. Hard Cases and Possible Exceptions
C. The Doubly Problematic Case of Mala Prohibita
D. Negligent Mistakes of Law
CHAPTER FIVE: THE REAL WORLD
A. Implementation and Practical Realities
B. Consequences and Compromises
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INDEX

Ignorance of Law

A Philosophical Inquiry

Douglas Husak

Oxford Legal Philosophy

Author Information

Douglas Husak, Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, Rutgers University, Department of Philosophy

Douglas Husak is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University. He is the author of over one-hundred scholarly articles and six books, most notably: The Philosophy of Criminal Law (Oxford, 2010), Overcriminalization (Oxford, 2008), and Drugs and Rights (1992). He has been a Visiting Professor at several law schools and philosophy departments and specializes in philosophical issues involving criminal law. He is the current Editor-in-Chief of Criminal Law and Philosophy and a past Editor-in-Chief of Law and Philosophy.

Ignorance of Law

A Philosophical Inquiry

Douglas Husak

Oxford Legal Philosophy

Reviews and Awards

"Douglas Husak's Ignorance of Law poses a sustained and forceful challenge to conventional wisdom on the question of whether ignorance of the law provides an excuse for breaking the law. It is a rich, trenchant, innovative, and exciting book." - Michael J. Zimmerman, Criminal Law and Philosophy

"In Ignorance of Law: A Philosophical Inquiry, Douglas Husak's extraordinary mix of philosophical acumen, legal expertise, and modest common sense is on display. The book is certainly the most thorough and thoughtful treatment of the normative questions raised by the criminal law's grudging attitude towards defendants who commit crimes they did not know were crimes." - Gideon Yaffe, Criminal Law and Philosophy