Donald Ainslie is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Toronto, where he also serves as Principal of University College. He is interested in all aspects of Hume's philosophy, as well as in early modern philosophy more broadly; he is the co-editor of the Cambridge Companion to Hume's Treatise. He also teaches and publishes in bioethics.

Winner of th 2016 Journal of the History of Philosophy prize for the best book in the history of philosophy!

"elebrated as the winner of the 2016 Journal of the History of Philosophy prize for best book of the year, Ainslie's volume plumbs the depth of Hume's skeptical philosophy in a way that few authors have done, and is deserving of the esteemed accolade." -- Donald C. Ainslie, Metapsychology

"Donald C. Ainslie's Hume's True Scepticism presents the first book-length treatHment of Book 1, Part 4 of the 1739 A Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume (1711-1776). In doing so, the volume represents an important accomplishment, and one can reasonably expect it to become required reading for those wishing to come to terms with Hume's skepticism." -- International Journal for the Study of Skepticism

"this is one of the very most thought-provoking books yet written on Hume. It challenges many conventional assumptions about Hume, and gives him a new look. It is a look so different from what one is used to that I fear I may have fallen prey to some illusions both in reading Ainslie and in responding to him. I expect many rewarding re-readings and trust that these will correct my errors. Ainslie's is an indispensable contribution to the literature on Hume and on the history of the philosophy of mind and epistemology." -- Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews Online

"One of the best books written on Hume in a long time...there's much to be learned...for anyone interested in the foundations of Hume's philosophical project. Indeed, Ainslie's book can also be read as developing a novel Humean view about the nature and limits of philosophy itself. So this book will be of interest, not just to Hume scholars, but to anyone who is attracted to thinking about such meta-philosophical topics in a broadly Humean way. It seems to me a must-read for anyone interested in Hume's scepticism--or, indeed, Hume's philosophy more generally." -- Australasian Journal of Philosophy

"Ainslie's book is of tremendous scholarly worth, being valuable both in its own right as a novel and well-defended thesis, and also more instrumentally in offering a sustained and excellent analysis of the winding pathways of Book 1 Part 4." -- British Journal for the History of Philosophy

"This brief review cannot do justice to the book's richness and breadth. For any puzzle or ambiguity or seeming inconsistency in the seven sections of 1.4, Ainslie has a suggested interpretation of how to make sense of it or solve it. His analyses push us to think about a wide range of interpretive puzzles and seriously consider his way of addressing them. Some of the questions are ones rarely posed or thought of, thus revealing the complexity of Hume's ideas. Especially for those scholars immersed in Hume's texts, it is good to be reminded that even the most seemingly simple of Hume's claims are often ambiguous or overstated." -- Journal of the History of Philosophy