Exploring Inductive Risk
Case Studies of Values in Science
Edited by Kevin C. Elliott and Ted Richards
Reviews and Awards
"provides an excellent snapshot of current thinking about inductive risk in philosophy of science." -- Zina B. Ward, Journal of Moral Philosophy
"this collection will provide a valuable point of departure for many future debates in the philosophy of cognitive science, and I would highly recommend it to anyone looking to get involved in these debates" -- Joe Dewhurst, University of Edinburgh, BJPS Review of books
"During the last two decades, the various challenges of inductive risk have been addressed by a number of philosophers of science in diverse contexts. Thus, it is fortuitous that there is now a volume available providing an overview of the status of the discussion as well as addressing hitherto unanswered questions. It provides useful reading material to classroom teachers who address all sorts of topics on science and values." -- Anna Leuschner and Anke Bueter, Science & Education
"I think the individual chapters in this volume provide a set of interesting and important case studies of non-epistemic values in science. Scientists or philosophers looking for such case studies or for a general understanding of the roles that values can play in scientific practice can benefit from reading any of the chapters in this volume. Philosophers working specifically on inductive risk and the role of values in science, though, will benefit from considering the volume as a whole. What it implicitly shows, and what Biddle and Kukla explicitly argue, is that philosophers of science talking about inductive risk have not, to this point, had a clear idea of precisely what inductive risk is. This volume can, I think, help to start that conversation." --S. Andrew Schroeder, Metascience