'This book is a tour de force.' --Kevin Meeker, Mind

"Epistemologists commonly say that knowledge excludes luck. But few of us pause to explain what this common saying amounts to, or what truth it contains. Pritchard has paused to do just that, and the result is this fascinating and enjoyable book. In attempting to explain the sense in which knowledge excludes luck, Pritchard both offers a clear and comprehensive survey of much contemporary literature in the theory of knowledge, and also advances the dialectic considerably. If you work in the theory of knowledge, you cannot afford to ignore this book." --Ram Neta, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

"In this beautifully written book, Duncan Pritchard provides a distinctive defense of a neo-Moorean safety response to skepticism. At the heart of the book is a sensitive and subtle discussion of the intuition that knowledge excludes luck. He distinguishes two central kinds of luck which are epistemologically relevant and uses them to provide an insightful critique of contemporary virtue epistemology. He defends his own preferred safety-based view by arguing that it best accommodates the idea that knowledge excludes what he calls 'veritic luck'. However, he acknowledges that knowledge is ineliminably infected with a further kind of luck, 'reflective luck', which provides a perpetual source of skeptical doubt. Pritchard's admirably clear prose will provide students with an overview of debates at the heart of contemporary epistemology while also making substantial contribution to those debates." --Jessica Brown, University of Bristol

"Epistemic Luck is a rich, engaging, and ground-breaking work. It is a fine example of the kind of original and exciting work being done at the frontier of epistemology today." Jason Baehr, Metaphilosophy