Democratic Autonomy
Public Reasoning about the Ends of Policy
Henry S. Richardson
Reviews and Awards
2006 Herbert A. Simon Award and the David Easton Award of the American Political Science Association
"Richardson's book, a philosophical account of a particular vision of deliberative democracy, may well become a standard reference work in this genre. It gives a thoughtful account of the main normative traditions that an ideal of democratic autonomy can draw on, and it provides an original answer to a question much recent work has concentrated on: how stable agreement on conflictual matters can be brought about in societies characterized by deep disagreements."--Constellations
"Richardson's discussion of deliberative practical reasoning brings to the fore a much-neglected issue - our reliance on administrative agencies...[Democratic Autonomy] takes democratic theory into new and interesting terrain...Richardson proposes tackling the issue of bureaucratic domination by developing an interpretation of democracy that unifies liberal and republican ideas with populist and rationalist ideas. His conception of democracy is one that maintains that we must reason together if we are to rule ourselves...[an] invaluable contribution that help[s] make the ideal of deliberative democracy a more practical political ideal."--European Journal of Political Theory
"Democratic Autonomy offers a sophisticated, closely argued account of democratic reasoning, both as a norm and as institutional practice. Richardson shows that we can hope to bridge even deep disagreements over ends through a process of principled compromise. He rebuts the naive view that legislatures delegate only narrow technical questions of means to administrative agencies. The author demonstrates that if we are serious about democracy, we must find ways of extending effective citizen participation into arenas now dominated by bureaucratic rule-making. This book is a must for all readers interested in the theory and practice of modern democracy."--William A. Galston, Director, Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy, University of Maryland
"Democratic Autonomy is an achievement not only in the scope and sophistication of its arguments but in the intellectual project that it opens as well."--Ethics
"In Democratic Autonomy Richardson applies his important work about deliberative practical reasoning and the "specification of ends" to a major problem in democratic theory and practice: How can a modern society that must depend on the expertise of administrative agencies still be a democracy, characterized by genuine self-rule? Written in a clear and accessible style, the book should be required reading, not only for theorists of democracy and public choice, but also for policy makers and legislators."--Martha Nussbaum, Ernst Freund Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Ethics, University of Chicago
"This wonderful book articulates an ideal of democratic rule grounded in the republican tradition of thought; details the practice of deliberation - incorporating a division of deliberative labour - that this ideal requires; and then illustrates the shape that this practice would dictate for every aspect of government, from the electoral to the bureaucratic. It is a fresh and invigorating contribution to democratic theory and deserves to have a transforming effect on the subject."--Philip Pettit, Princeton University
"This is a stunningly good book. Professor Richardson has enriched Democratic Autonomy with more concrete detail and a better-informed apprehension of how the modern administrative state actually functions, than one finds in most works of political philosophy. It is still philosophy, however, but in the best sense - a finely crafted rigorous argument about deliberation, freedom, and collective decision-procedures. As a result, it offers a more convincing vindication of the idea of popular self-government for modern society than any work of democratic theory published in recent years."-- Jeremy Waldron, Maurice & Hilda Friedman Professor of Law, and Director of the Center for Law and Philosophy, Columbia Law School