Corporate Reputation and Social Activism

Strategic Interaction, Firm Behavior, and Social Welfare

Jose Muguel Abito, David Besanko, and Daniel Diermeier

Uses dynamic models to enhance insights into why a corporation cares about it reputation and what they do to enhace it
Examines how corporate behavior is affected by social activism
Explores the welfare consequences of social activism
Provides novel insights into how activists select their corporate targets
Demonstrates rich set of empirical implications of activists campaigns

Corporate Reputation and Social Activism

Strategic Interaction, Firm Behavior, and Social Welfare

Jose Muguel Abito, David Besanko, and Daniel Diermeier

Description

A firm's reputation is an asset that can be built or harmed over time and most companies invest in their good standing. This can be challenged or threatened by activists seeking to change the firm's behavior, especially to reduce negative externalities and other social harms that a company may be creating. The strategic interaction takes place in the realm of private politics and corporate social responsibility-perceptions and actions of the company, activists, and the public audience-rather than that of public policy, including regulation.

In Corporate Reptutation and Social Activism Jose Miguel Abito, David Besanko, and Daniel Diermeier argue that harm to a firm's reputation is one of the strongest and most practical tools of contemporary corporate activism and explains the numerous campaigns as well as the response of companies. Through a straightforward dynamic model focusing on the interaction of the firm and activists, the authors show how both the firm's existing reputation and various activist tactics influence actions and outcomes of both the firm and the activists. Among their insights are that as a firm's reputation grows, it tends to coast on its reputation by reducing its private regulation, or voluntary adoption of internal rules that constrain certain company behavior. Activists can keep the firm from coasting in two ways: the firm acts more responsibly to protect its reputation in anticipation of activist campaigns, and a firm whose reputation is harmed by a campaign engages more responsibly to repair its reputation.

The book explores how activists choose among potential targets and the different tactics activists can use to harm firms' reputations, including criticism, which has a potentially mild impact on the firm's reputation, confrontation, which can cause a reputational crisis in which the firm's reputation can be dramatically impaired, and rewards, which increase a firm's reputation. These can have different effects on firm behavior. The authors also examine whether campaigns by activists advance or harm social welfare. The result is a sweeping overview of an evolving and increasingly important phenomenon that combines rigorous modeling and that generates a rich set of empirical implications that will interest researchers in economics, business and management, sociology, and political science.

Corporate Reputation and Social Activism

Strategic Interaction, Firm Behavior, and Social Welfare

Jose Muguel Abito, David Besanko, and Daniel Diermeier

1 An Introduction to Corporate Campaigns
1.1 Corporate campaigns
1.2 Firm strategies
1.3 The consequences of corporate campaigns
1.4 Private politics and corporate social responsibility
1.5 Overview
2 A Dynamic Model of Corporate Campaigns
2.1 The model
2.2 Equilibrium analysis
2.3 Empirical implications
2.4 Conclusions
2.5 Appendix to Chapter 2
3 Campaign Tactics
3.1 The model
3.2 Equilibrium analysis: preliminaries
3.3 Computational approach
3.4 Equilibrium analysis: characterization of equilibrium
3.5 Rewards as a campaign tactic
3.6 Empirical Implications
3.7 Conclusions
3.8 Appendix to Chapter 3
4 Do Activist Campaigns Bene.t Society?
4.1 The welfare economics of campaigns
4.2 Applications of model insights
4.3 Is passion socially valuable?
4.4 Conclusions
4.5 Appendix to Chapter 4
5 Target Selection by Activists and the Structure of Competition
5.1 Model set-up and preliminary analysis
5.2 Targeting firms in different industries
5.3 Targeting firms in the same industry
5.4 Industry-wide campaigns or firm-speci.c campaigns?
5.5 Empirical Implications
5.6 Appendix to Chapter 5
6 Conclusions: What Have We Learned?
6.1 Summary
6.2 Lessons for scholars and practitioners
6.3 Where do we go from here?

Corporate Reputation and Social Activism

Strategic Interaction, Firm Behavior, and Social Welfare

Jose Muguel Abito, David Besanko, and Daniel Diermeier

Author Information

Jose Muguel Abito, Assistant Professor of Business Economics and Public Policy, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, David Besanko, Alvin Huss Professor of Management and Strategy, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, and Daniel Diermeier, IBM Professor of Regulation and Competitive Practice and Director, Ford Motor Company Center for Global Citizenship, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University

Jose Miguel Abito is Assistant Professor of Business Economics & Public Policy at the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania. David Besanko is IBM Professor of Regulation & Competitive Practices at the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University. His work has appeared in the Econometrica, American Economic Review, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Review of Economic Studies, RAND Journal of Economics, and the Journal of Law and Economics. Daniel Diermeier serves as the thirteenth Provost of the University of Chicago, where he is the David Lee Shillinglaw Distinguished Service Professor at the Harris School Public Policy and the College. He is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the Guggenheim Foundation, and the Canadian Institute of Advanced Research (CIFAR).

Corporate Reputation and Social Activism

Strategic Interaction, Firm Behavior, and Social Welfare

Jose Muguel Abito, David Besanko, and Daniel Diermeier

Reviews and Awards

"Abito, Besanko, and Diermeier have produced a masterful study of firms facing challenges to their reputations by social activists seeking to induce greater corporate social responsibility and self-regulation.The study is based on formal, dynamic theory and computational economics that reveal intriguing insights into firm and activist strategies, including reputation management, campaign intensity, and target selection." - David P. Baron, Stanford University