Causation with a Human Face

Normative Theory and Descriptive Psychology

James Woodward

Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Science

Provides one of the first extended integrated treatments of both the philosophical and psychological literatures on normative and descriptive accounts of causal reasoning
Explores a key ongoing dispute in the philosophical literature--the strengths and limitations of the method of cases--in the context of causal reasoning
Presents methodological assessments of some prominent psychological theories and experiments, including issues raised by ambiguous verbal probes and subject heterogeneity
Relates the methodological issues on intuitions and judgments about cases to both psychologists and philosophers

Causation with a Human Face

Normative Theory and Descriptive Psychology

James Woodward

Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Science

Description

The past few decades have seen an explosion of research on causal reasoning in philosophy, computer science, and statistics, as well as descriptive work in psychology. In Causation with a Human Face, James Woodward integrates these lines of research and argues for an understanding of how each can inform the other: normative ideas can suggest interesting experiments, while descriptive results can suggest important normative concepts. Woodward's overall framework builds on the interventionist treatment of causation that he developed in Making Things Happen. Normative ideas discussed include proposals about the role of invariant or stable relationships in successful causal reasoning and the notion of proportionality. He argues that these normative ideas are reflected in the causal judgments that people actually make as a descriptive matter.

Woodward also discusses the common philosophical practice-particularly salient in philosophical accounts of causation--of appealing to "intuitions" or "judgments about cases" in support of philosophical theses. He explores how, properly understood, such appeals are not different in principle from appeals to results from empirical research, and demonstrates how they may serve as a useful source of information about causal cognition.

Causation with a Human Face

Normative Theory and Descriptive Psychology

James Woodward

Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Science

Contents
Foreword
Chapter 1: The Normative and the Descriptive
Chapter 2: Theories of Causation
Chapter 3: Methods for Investigating Causal Cognition: Armchair Philosophy, X-Phi and Empirical Psychology
Chapter 4: Some Empirical Results Concerning Causal Learning and Representation
Chapter 5: Invariance
Chapter 6: Invariance Applied
Chapter 7: Invariance: Experimental Results from Cheng, Lombrozo and Others
Chapter 8: Proportionality
References

Causation with a Human Face

Normative Theory and Descriptive Psychology

James Woodward

Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Science

Author Information

James Woodward is Distinguished Professor in the Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, and the J.O. and Juliette Koepfli Professor Emeritus at the California Institute of Technology. He is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and served as President of the Philosophy of Science Association from 2010-2012.

Causation with a Human Face

Normative Theory and Descriptive Psychology

James Woodward

Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Science

Reviews and Awards

"For anyone who is interested in how we humans come to understand the causal world as we do, Woodward's astonishingly broad and deep assessment of both the philosophy and cognition literatures will offer a rewarding read. This book will arm you with insights and findings that may completely change how you think about causation and the mind's role in an 'objective' understanding of it." -- Patricia Cheng, Department of Psychology, UCLA

"James Woodward's new book is a compelling synthesis of what is known about human causal judgement, its purposes, and how the norms of causal reasoning serve those ends. Invoking only a minimalist metaphysics of interventions, Woodward weaves many threads into a convincing whole. The book should be a touchstone for those in philosophy, psychology and computer science who think about causality." -- Clark Glymour

"James Woodward revolutionized the philosophical discussion of causation. In his new book he elucidates the deep relationships between the psychology of causal understanding and philosophical questions. The book is lucid, thoughtful, knowledgeable and careful and at the same time brimming over with remarkable new ideas and insights - a must read for both philosophers and cognitive scientists." -- Alison Gopnik, Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley

"James Woodward's 2003 book Making Things Happen about causal explanation was arguably the most important philosophical book about causation to appear in decades. This eagerly awaited new book is an expansive study of causation and causal reasoning that challenges received ideas about the relationship between theoretical and normative, between science and philosophy, and between metaphysics and psychology. Enormous in scope—spanning philosophy, psychology, statistics and machine learning—it will set the agenda for discussions of causation for years to come." -- Jenann Ismael, Department of Philosophy, Columbia University