Access Points

An Institutional Theory of Policy Bias and Policy Complexity

Sean D. Ehrlich

Introduces a new, general theory of the role of political institutions on policymaking
Access point theory has the potential to explain policy outcomes beyond those covered in the book and should increase our understanding of the formation of policy in democracies around the world
Includes new results explaining policymaking in a number of important issue areas, such as trade policy, tax policy, banking regulations, and environmental policy

Access Points

An Institutional Theory of Policy Bias and Policy Complexity

Sean D. Ehrlich

Description

Access Points develops a new theory about how democratic institutions influence policy outcomes. Access Point Theory argues that the more points of access that institutions provide to interest groups, the cheaper lobbying will be, and, thus, the more lobbying will occur. This will lead to more complex policy, as policymakers insert specific provisions to benefit special interests, and, if one side of the debate has a lobbying advantage, to more biased policy, as the advantaged side is able to better take advantage of the cheaper lobbying. This book then uses Access Point Theory to explain why some countries have more protectionist and more complex trade policies than other; why some countries have stronger environmental and banking regulations than others; and why some countries have more complicated tax codes than others. In policy area after policy area, this book finds that more access points lead to more biased and more complex policy. Access Points provides scholars with a powerful tool to explain how political institutions matter and why countries implement the policies they do.

Access Points

An Institutional Theory of Policy Bias and Policy Complexity

Sean D. Ehrlich

Preface

Part I: Access Point Theory
Chapter 1. Political Institutions, Policy Bias, and Policy Complexity
Chapter 2. What are Access Points and What are their Effects?
Appendix to Chapter 2. Measuring Access Points

Part II: Policy Bias
Chapter 3. Access Points and Bias in Trade Policy
Chapter 4. How Much Environmental Regulation Will a Country Have?
Chapter 5. Regulating Banks: Capital-Friendly or Consumer-Friendly Rules?

Part III: Policy Complexity
Chapter 6. Complexity and the Tariff Schedule
Chapter 7. Access Points and Tax Code Complexity
Chapter 8. Conclusion

Access Points

An Institutional Theory of Policy Bias and Policy Complexity

Sean D. Ehrlich

Author Information

Sean D. Ehrlich is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Florida State University. His research focuses on international and comparative political economy, particularly how the preferences of the public and of policymakers interact to determine economic policymaking.