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Cover

Antitrust Economics

Second Edition

Roger D. Blair and David L. Kaserman

Publication Date - March 2008

ISBN: 9780195135350

496 pages
Hardcover
7-1/2 x 9-1/4 inches

In Stock

Retail Price to Students: $92.95

The second edition of Antitrust Economics provides a thorough treatment of the economic theory that both motivates (and to varying degrees) guides the design and enforcement of the antitrust laws of the United States.

Description

The second edition of Antitrust Economics provides a thorough treatment of the economic theory that both motivates (and to varying degrees) guides the design and enforcement of the antitrust laws of the United States. Citing relevant legislation and landmark court cases, the text offers a comprehensive analysis of both horizontal and vertical antitrust issues and uses economic theory to evaluate antitrust policy throughout.

The clear, accessible prose in Antitrust Economics explains the theory/policy cycle and provides thorough analysis of market structure and business conduct as they relate to antitrust policy. The text moves fluidly from theory to real world court cases to public policy, making it ideal for upper-level economics majors or law school courses in antitrust law.

About the Author(s)

ROGER D. BLAIR is the Huber Hurst Professor of Economics at the University of Florida. His teaching and research centers mainly on issues in antitrust economics. He has published several books and many articles in economics journals and law reviews. In addition, he has provided consulting services to the Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, and many private parties.

DAVID L. KASERMAN is Torchmark Professor of Economics at Auburn University. He has over 25 years of experience as a professional economist and has been employed both in government agencies and academic institutions. His research interests are primarily in the fields of applied microeconmics and industrial organization

Previous Publication Date(s)

March 1985

Table of Contents

    Antitrust in a Market Economy
    The Case for Competition
    The Case Against Monopoly
    Antitrust Response to Monopoly
    Private Enforcement
    Antitrust Building Blocks: Market Definition and Market Power
    The Law of Monopolization
    Exclusionary Practices
    Collusion: Horizontal Price Fixing
    Alternative Forms of Horizontal Collusion
    Oligopoly and Tacit Collusion
    Horizontal Mergers
    Price Discrimination
    The Theory of Vertical Integration
    Vertical Merger Policy
    Maximum Resale Price Fixing
    Resale Price Maintenance
    Tying Arrangements
    Reciprocity
    Exclusive Dealing
    Territorial and Customer Restrictions