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Granholm v. Heald

GRANHOLM v. HEALD

May 16, 2005

JUDGES: KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which SCALIA, SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which O'CONNOR, J., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and STEVENS and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined.

JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.

These consolidated cases present challenges to state laws regulating the sale of wine from out-of-state wineries to consumers in Michigan and New York. The details and mechanics of the two regulatory schemes differ, but the object and effect of the laws are the same: to allow in-state wineries to sell wine directly to consumers in that State but to prohibit out-of-state wineries from  doing so, or, at the least, to make direct sales impractical from an economic standpoint. It is evident that the object and design of the Michigan and New York statutes is to grant in-state wineries a competitive advantage over wineries located beyond the States' borders.

 

We hold that the laws in both States discriminate against interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and that the discrimination is neither authorized nor permitted by the Twenty-first Amendment. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which invalidated the Michigan laws; and we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which upheld the New York laws.

 

I

 

Like many other States, Michigan and New York regulate the sale and importation of alcoholic beverages, including wine, through a three-tier distribution system. Separate licenses are required for producers, wholesalers, and retailers. The three-tier scheme is preserved by a complex set of overlapping state and federal regulations. For example, both state and federal laws limit vertical integration between tiers. We have held previously that States can mandate a three-tier distribution scheme in the exercise of their authority under the Twenty-first Amendment. North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423 (1990). As relevant to today's cases, though, the three-tier system is, in broad terms and with refinements to be discussed, mandated by Michigan and New York only for sales from out-of-state wineries. In-state wineries, by contrast, can obtain a license for direct sales to consumers. The differential treatment between in-state and out-of-state wineries constitutes explicit discrimination against interstate commerce.

 

This discrimination substantially limits the direct sale of wine to consumers, an otherwise emerging and significant business. From 1994 to 1999, consumer spending on direct wine shipments doubled, reaching $ 500 million per year, or three percent of all wine sales. The expansion has been influenced by several related trends. First, the number of small wineries in the United States has significantly increased. By some estimates there are over 3,000 wineries in the country. The increasing winery-to-wholesaler ratio means that many small wineries do not produce enough wine or have sufficient consumer demand for their wine to make it economical for wholesalers to carry their products.  This has led many small wineries to rely on direct shipping to reach new markets.  Technological improvements, in particular the ability of wineries to sell wine over the Internet, have helped make direct shipments an attractive sales channel.

Approximately 26 States allow some direct shipping of wine, with various restrictions. Thirteen of these States have reciprocity laws, which allow direct shipment from wineries outside the State, provided the State of origin affords similar nondiscriminatory treatment. In many parts of the country, however, state laws that prohibit or severely restrict direct shipments deprive consumers of access to the direct market. According to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), "state bans on interstate direct shipping represent the single largest regulatory barrier to expanded e-commerce in wine."

 

The wine producers in the cases before us are small wineries that rely on direct consumer sales as an important part of their businesses. Domaine Alfred, one of the plaintiffs in the Michigan suit, is a small winery located in San Luis Obispo, California. It produces 3,000 cases of wine per year. Domaine Alfred has received requests for its wine from Michigan consumers but cannot fill the orders because of the State's direct-shipment ban. Even if the winery could find a Michigan wholesaler to distribute its wine, the wholesaler's markup would render shipment through the three-tier system economically infeasible.

 

Similarly, Juanita Swedenburg and David Lucas, two of the plaintiffs in the New York suit, operate small wineries in Virginia (the Swedenburg Estate Vineyard) and California (the Lucas Winery). Some of their customers are tourists, from other States, who purchase wine while visiting the wineries. If these customers wish to obtain Swedenburg or Lucas wines after they return home, they will be unable to do so if they reside in a State with restrictive direct-shipment laws. For example, Swedenburg and Lucas are unable to fill orders from New York, the Nation's second-largest wine market, because of the limits that State imposes on direct wine shipments.

 

We consolidated these cases and granted certiorari on the following question: "'Does a State's regulatory scheme that permits in-state wineries directly to ship alcohol to consumers but restricts the ability of out-of-state wineries to do so violate the dormant Commerce Clause in light of § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment?'"

 

For ease of exposition, we refer to the respondents from the Michigan challenge and the petitioners in the New York challenge collectively as the wineries. We refer to their opposing parties -- Michigan, New York, and the wholesalers and retailers -- simply as the States.

 

A

Time and again this Court has held that, in all but the narrowest circumstances, state laws violate the Commerce Clause if they mandate "differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter." This rule is essential to the foundations of the Union. The mere fact of nonresidence should not foreclose a producer in one State from access to markets in other States. States may not enact laws that burden out-of-state producers or shippers simply to give a competitive advantage to in-state businesses. This mandate "reflects a central concern of the Framers that was an immediate reason for calling the Constitutional Convention: the conviction that in order to succeed, the new Union would have to avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies and later among the States under the Articles of Confederation."

The rule prohibiting state discrimination against interstate commerce follows also from the principle that States should not be compelled to negotiate with each other regarding favored or disfavored status for their own citizens. States do not need, and may not attempt, to negotiate with other States regarding their mutual economic interests. Cf. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 10, cl. 3. Rivalries among the States are thus kept to a minimum, and a proliferation of trade zones is prevented.

 

Laws of the type at issue in the instant cases contradict these principles. They deprive citizens of their right to have access to the markets of other States on equal terms. The perceived necessity for reciprocal sale privileges risks generating the trade rivalries and animosities, the alliances and exclusivity, that the Constitution and, in particular, the Commerce Clause were designed to avoid. State laws that protect local wineries have led to the enactment of statutes under which some States condition the right of out-of-state wineries to make direct wine sales to in-state consumers on a reciprocal right in the shipping State. California, for example, passed a reciprocity law in 1986, retreating from the State's previous regime that allowed unfettered direct shipments from out-of-state wineries. Prior to 1986, all but three States prohibited direct-shipments of wine. The obvious aim of the California statute was to open the interstate direct-shipping market for the State's many wineries. The current patchwork of laws -- with some States banning direct shipments altogether, others doing so only for out-of-state wines, and still others requiring reciprocity -- is essentially the product of an ongoing, low-level trade war. Allowing States to discriminate against out-of-state wine "invites a multiplication of preferential trade areas destructive of the very purpose of the Commerce Clause."

We have no difficulty concluding that New York, like Michigan, discriminates  against interstate commerce through its direct-shipping laws.

III

 

State laws that discriminate against interstate commerce face "a virtually per se rule of invalidity."  The Michigan and New York laws by their own terms violate this proscription. The two States, however, contend their statutes are saved by § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment, which provides:

 "The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited."

 

The States' position is inconsistent with our precedents and with the Twenty-first Amendment's history. Section 2 does not allow States to regulate the direct shipment of wine on terms that discriminate in favor of in-state producers.

 

A

 

Before 1919, the temperance movement fought to curb the sale of alcoholic beverages one State at a time. The movement made progress, and many States passed laws restricting or prohibiting the sale of alcohol. This Court upheld state laws banning the production and sale of alcoholic beverages, but was less solicitous of laws aimed at imports. In a series of cases before ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment the Court, relying on the Commerce Clause, invalidated a number of state liquor regulations.

 

These cases advanced two distinct principles. First, the Court held that the Commerce Clause prevented States from discriminating against imported liquor. The Court held that States were not free to pass laws burdening only out-of-state products:

 

Second, the Court held that the Commerce Clause prevented States from passing facially neutral laws that placed an impermissible burden on interstate commerce. . . .

 

Congress enact[ed] the Webb-Kenyon Act in 1913, entitled "An Act Divesting intoxicating liquors of their interstate character in certain cases," provides:

 

 "That the shipment or transportation . . . of any spirituous, vinous, malted,   fermented, or other intoxicating liquor of any kind, from one State . . . into   any other State . . . which said spirituous, vinous, malted, fermented, or   other intoxicating liquor is intended, by any person interested therein, to be received, possessed, sold, or in any manner used, either in the original package or otherwise, in violation of any law of such State . . . is hereby   prohibited."

 

[The Court approved the Act.] States were now empowered to forbid shipments of alcohol to consumers for personal use, provided that the States treated in-state and out-of-state liquor on the same terms. The Court understood that the Webb-Kenyon Act's . . . purpose "was to prevent the immunity characteristic of interstate commerce from being used to permit the receipt of liquor through such commerce in States contrary to their laws, and thus in effect afford a means by subterfuge and indirection to set such laws at naught." The Court thus recognized that the Act was an attempt to eliminate the regulatory advantage, i.e. its immunity characteristic, afforded imported liquor [under earlier decisions].

 

Michigan and New York now argue the Webb-Kenyon Act went even further and removed any barrier to discriminatory state liquor regulations. We do not agree. First, this reading of the Webb-Kenyon Act conflicts with that given the statute in Clark Distilling. Clark Distilling recognized that the Webb-Kenyon Act extended the Wilson Act to allow the States to intercept liquor shipments before those shipments reached the consignee. The States' contention that the Webb-Kenyon Act also reversed the Wilson Act's prohibition on discriminatory treatment of out-of-state liquors cannot be reconciled with Clark Distilling's description of the Webb-Kenyon Act's purpose.

 

Last, and most importantly, the Webb-Kenyon Act did not purport to repeal the [earlier] Wilson Act, which expressly precludes States from discriminating. If Congress' aim in passing the Webb-Kenyon Act was to authorize States to discriminate against out-of-state goods then its first step would have been to repeal the Wilson Act. It did not do so. There is no inconsistency between the Wilson Act and the Webb-Kenyon Act sufficient to warrant an inference that the latter repealed the former. Indeed, this Court has twice noted that the Wilson Act remains in effect today.

 

The Wilson Act reaffirmed, and the Webb-Kenyon Act did not displace, the Court's line of Commerce Clause cases striking down state laws that discriminated against liquor produced out of state.

 

 

 

B

 

The ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment in 1919 provided a brief respite from the legal battles over the validity of state liquor regulations. With the ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment 14 years later, however, nationwide Prohibition came to an end. Section 1 of the Twenty-first Amendment repealed the Eighteenth Amendment. Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment is at issue here.

 

Michigan and New York say the provision grants to the States the authority to discriminate against out-of-state goods. The history we have recited does not support this position. To the contrary, it provides strong support for the view that § 2 restored to the States the powers they had under the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts. "The wording of § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment closely follows the Webb-Kenyon and Wilson Acts, expressing the framers' clear intention of constitutionalizing the Commerce Clause framework established under those statutes."

 

The aim of the Twenty-first Amendment was to allow States to maintain an effective and uniform system for controlling liquor by regulating its transportation, importation, and use. The Amendment did not give States the authority to pass nonuniform laws in order to discriminate against out-of-state goods, a privilege they had not enjoyed at any earlier time.. . . Our more recent cases confirm that the Twenty-first Amendment does not supersede other provisions of the Constitution and, in particular, does not displace the rule that States may not give a discriminatory preference to their own producers.

C

The modern § 2 cases fall into three categories.

First, the Court has held that state laws that violate other provisions of the Constitution are not saved by the Twenty-first Amendment. Second, the Court has held that § 2 does not abrogate Congress' Commerce Clause powers with regard to liquor. Finally, and most relevant to the issue at hand, the Court has held that state regulation of alcohol is limited by the nondiscrimination principle of the Commerce Clause.

 

The States argue that any decision invalidating their direct-shipment laws would call into question the constitutionality of the three-tier system. This does not follow from our holding. "The Twenty-first Amendment grants the States virtually complete control over whether to permit importation or sale of liquor and how to structure the liquor distribution system." A State which chooses to ban the sale and consumption of alcohol altogether could bar its importation; and, as our history shows, it would have to do so to make its laws effective. States may also assume direct control of liquor distribution through state-run outlets or funnel sales through the three-tier system. We have previously recognized that the three-tier system itself is unquestionably legitimate." State policies are protected under the Twenty-first Amendment when they treat liquor produced out of state the same as its domestic equivalent. The instant cases, in contrast, involve straightforward attempts to discriminate in favor of local producers. The discrimination  is contrary to the Commerce Clause and is not saved by the Twenty-first Amendment.

IV

Our determination that the Michigan and New York direct-shipment laws are not authorized by the Twenty-first Amendment does not end the inquiry. We still must consider whether either State regime "advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives." The States offer two primary justifications for restricting direct shipments from out-of-state wineries: keeping alcohol out of the hands of minors and facilitating tax collection. We consider each in turn.

 

The States, aided by several amici, claim that allowing direct shipment from out-of-state wineries undermines their ability to police underage drinking. Minors, the States argue, have easy access to credit cards and the Internet and are likely to take advantage of direct wine shipments as a means of obtaining alcohol illegally.

 

The States provide little evidence that the purchase of wine over the Internet by minors is a problem. Indeed, there is some evidence to the contrary. A recent study by the staff of the FTC found that the 26 States currently allowing direct shipments report no problems with minors' increased access to wine. This is not surprising for several reasons. First, minors are less likely to consume wine, as opposed to beer, wine coolers, and hard liquor. Second, minors who decide to disobey the law have more direct means of doing so. Third, direct shipping is an imperfect avenue of obtaining alcohol for minors who, in the words of the past president of the National Conference of State Liquor Administrators, "'want instant gratification.'" Without concrete evidence that direct shipping of wine is likely to increase alcohol consumption by minors, we are left with the States' unsupported assertions. Under our precedents, which require the "clearest showing" to justify discriminatory state regulation, this is not enough.

Even were we to credit the States' largely unsupported claim that direct shipping of wine increases the risk of underage drinking, this would not justify regulations limiting only out-of-state direct shipments. As the wineries point out, minors are just as likely to order wine from in-state producers as from out-of-state ones. . . .

 

The States' tax-collection justification is also insufficient. Increased direct shipping, whether originating in state or out of state, brings with it the potential for tax evasion. With regard to Michigan, however, the tax-collection argument is a diversion. That is because Michigan, unlike many other States, does not rely on wholesalers to collect taxes on wines imported from out-of-state. Instead, Michigan collects taxes directly from out-of-state wineries on all wine shipped to in-state wholesalers. If licensing and self-reporting provide adequate safeguards for wine distributed through the three-tier system, there is no reason to believe they will not suffice for direct shipments. . . .

In summary, the States provide little concrete evidence for the sweeping assertion that they cannot police direct shipments by out-of-state wineries. Our Commerce Clause cases demand more than mere speculation to support discrimination against out-of-state goods. The "burden is on the State to show that 'the discrimination is demonstrably justified.'" The Court has upheld state regulations that discriminate against interstate commerce only after finding, based on concrete record evidence, that a State's nondiscriminatory alternatives will prove unworkable. Michigan and New York have not satisfied this exacting standard.

V

States have broad power to regulate liquor under § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment. This power, however, does not allow States to ban, or severely limit, the direct shipment of out-of-state wine while simultaneously authorizing direct shipment by in-state producers. If a State chooses to allow direct shipment of wine, it must do so on evenhanded terms. Without demonstrating the need for discrimination, New York and Michigan have enacted regulations that disadvantage out-of-state wine producers. Under our Commerce Clause jurisprudence, these regulations cannot stand.

 

JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE O'CONNOR joins, dissenting.

. . . Today many Americans, particularly those members of the younger generations who make policy decisions, regard alcohol as an ordinary article of commerce, subject to substantially the same market and legal controls as other consumer products. That was definitely not the view of the generations that made policy in 1919 when the Eighteenth Amendment was ratified or in 1933 when it was repealed by the Twenty-first Amendment. On the contrary, the moral condemnation of the use of alcohol as a beverage represented not merely the convictions of our religious leaders, but the views of a sufficiently large majority of the population to warrant the rare exercise of the power to amend the Constitution on two occasions. The Eighteenth Amendment entirely prohibited commerce in "intoxicating liquors" for beverage purposes throughout the United States and the territories subject to its jurisdiction. While § 1 of the Twenty-first Amendment repealed the nationwide prohibition, § 2 gave the States the option to maintain equally comprehensive prohibitions in their respective jurisdictions.

In the years following the ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment, States adopted manifold laws regulating commerce in alcohol, and many of these laws were discriminatory. So-called "dry states" entirely prohibited such commerce; others prohibited the sale of alcohol on Sundays; others permitted the sale of beer and wine but not hard liquor; most created either state monopolies or distribution systems that gave discriminatory preferences to local retailers and distributors. The notion that discriminatory state laws violated the unwritten prohibition against balkanizing the American economy -- while persuasive in contemporary times when alcohol is viewed as an ordinary article of commerce -- would have seemed strange indeed to the millions of Americans who condemned the use of the "demon rum" in the 1920's and 1930's. Indeed, they expressly authorized the "balkanization" that today's decision condemns. Today's decision may represent sound economic policy and may be consistent with the policy choices of the contemporaries of Adam Smith who drafted our original Constitution; it is not, however, consistent with the policy choices made by those who amended our Constitution in1919 and 1933.

My understanding (and recollection) of the historical context reinforces my conviction that the text of § 2 should be "broadly and colloquially interpreted." Indeed, the fact that the Twenty-first Amendment was the only Amendment in our history to have been ratified by the people in state conventions, rather than by state legislatures, provides further reason to give its terms their ordinary meaning. Because the New York and Michigan laws regulate the "transportation or importation" of "intoxicating liquors" for "delivery or use therein," they are exempt from dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny. As JUSTICE THOMAS has demonstrated, the text of the Twenty-first Amendment is a far more reliable guide to its meaning than the unwritten rules that the majority enforces today. I therefore join his persuasive and comprehensive dissenting opinion.

JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE STEVENS, and JUSTICE O'CONNOR join, dissenting.

A century ago, this Court repeatedly invalidated, as inconsistent with the negative Commerce Clause, state liquor legislation that prevented out-of-state businesses from shipping liquor directly to a State's residents. The Webb-Kenyon Act and the Twenty-first Amendment cut off this intrusive review, as their text and history make clear and as this Court's early cases on the Twenty-first Amendment recognized. The Court today seizes back this power, based primarily on a historical argument that this Court decisively rejected long ago. Because I would follow the language of both the statute that Congress enacted and the Amendment that the Nation ratified, rather than the Court's questionable reading of history and the "negative implications" of the Commerce Clause, I respectfully dissent.

I

The Court devotes much attention to the Twenty-first Amendment, yet little to the terms of the Webb-Kenyon Act. This is a mistake, because that Act's language displaces any negative Commerce Clause barrier to state regulation of liquor sales to in-state consumers.

[Justice THOMAS then went into an extensive review of the language of Webb-Kenyon, arguing that it was still valid and therefore negated any dormant Commerce Clause concerns.]

There is no need to interpret the Twenty-first Amendment, because the Webb-Kenyon Act resolves these cases. However, the state laws the Court strikes down are lawful under the plain meaning of § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment, as this Court's case law in the wake of the Amendment and the contemporaneous practice of the States reinforce.

Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment provides: "The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited." As the Court notes, this language tracked the Webb-Kenyon Act by authorizing state regulation that would otherwise conflict with the negative Commerce Clause. To remove any doubt regarding its broad scope, the Amendment simplified the language of the Webb-Kenyon Act and made clear that States could regulate importation destined for in-state delivery free of negative Commerce Clause restraints. Though the Twenty-first Amendment mirrors the basic terminology of the Webb-Kenyon Act, its language is broader, authorizing States to regulate all "transportation or importation" that runs afoul of state law. The broader language even more naturally encompasses discriminatory state laws. Its terms suggest, for example, that a State may ban imports entirely while leaving in-state liquor unregulated, for they do not condition the State's ability to prohibit imports on the manner in which state law treats domestic products.

The state laws at issue in these cases fall within § 2's broad terms. They prohibit wine manufacturers from "transporting or importing" wine directly to consumers in New York and Michigan "for delivery or use therein." Michigan law does so by requiring all out-of-state wine manufacturers to distribute wine through licensed in-state wholesalers. New York law does so by prohibiting out-of-state wineries from shipping wine directly to consumers unless they establish an in-state physical presence, something that in-state wineries naturally have. The Twenty-first Amendment prohibits out-of-state wineries from shipping wine into Michigan and New York in violation of these laws. In holding that the Constitution prohibits Michigan's and New York's laws, the majority turns the Amendment's text on its head.

The widespread, unquestioned acceptance of the three-tier system of liquor regulation, and the contemporaneous practice of the States following the ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment confirm that the Amendment freed the States from negative Commerce Clause restraints on discriminatory regulation. Like the Webb-Kenyon Act, the Twenty-first Amendment was designed to remove any doubt regarding whether state monopoly and licensing schemes violated the Commerce Clause, as the majority properly acknowledges. Accordingly, in response to the end of Prohibition, States that made liquor legal imposed either state monopoly systems, or licensing schemes strictly circumscribing the ability of private interests to sell and distribute liquor within state borders.

 

These liquor regulation schemes discriminated against out-of-state economic interests, just as Michigan's and New York's direct-shipment laws do. State monopolies that did not permit direct shipments to consumers, for example, were thought to discriminate against out-of-state wholesalers and retailers by favoring in-state products. Private licensing schemes discriminated as well, often by requiring in-state residency or physical presence as a condition of obtaining licenses. Even today, the requirement that liquor pass through a licensed in-state wholesaler is a core component of the three-tier system. As the Court concedes, each of these schemes is within the ambit of the Twenty-first Amendment, even though each discriminates against out-of-state interests.

Rather than credit the lay consensus this state practice reflects, the Court relies instead on scattered academic and judicial commentary arguing that the Twenty-first Amendment did not permit States to enact discriminatory liquor legislation. Most of the commentators and judges the Court cites did not adopt the construction of the Amendment the Court embraces. For example, some argued that the Twenty-first Amendment  only allowed States to enact nondiscriminatory prohibition laws -- i.e., to allow "dry states to remain dry." The Court, by contrast, concedes that a State could have a discriminatory licensing or monopoly scheme. The Court must concede this, given that state practice shows that the Twenty-first Amendment authorized such practices, and given that the Webb-Kenyon Act allowed States to enforce their own licensing laws, even if they did not prohibit the use and consumption of liquor entirely. Others apparently defended the position that the Twenty-first Amendment did no more than prevent Congress from permitting the direct importation of liquor into a State, leaving the Constitution untouched. Still others did not state a clear view on the scope of the Twenty-first Amendment. Instead of following this confused mishmash of elite opinion -- the same sort of elite opinion that drove the expansive interpretation of the negative Commerce Clause that prompted the Twenty-first Amendment -- I would credit the uniform practice of the States whose people ratified the Twenty-first Amendment.

III

Though the majority dismisses this Court's early Twenty-first Amendment case law, it relies on the reasoning, if not the holdings, of our more recent Twenty-first Amendment cases. But the Court's later cases do not require the result the majority reaches. Moreover, I would resolve any conflict in this Court's precedents in favor of those cases most contemporaneous with the ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment.

IV

The Court begins its opinion by detailing the evils of state laws that restrict the direct shipment   of wine. It stresses, for example, the Federal Trade Commission's opinion that allowing the direct shipment of wine would enhance consumer welfare. The Court's focus on these effects suggests that it believes that its decision serves this Nation well. I am sure that the judges who repeatedly invalidated state liquor legislation, even in the face of clear congressional direction to the contrary, thought the same. The Twenty-first Amendment and the Webb-Kenyon Act took those policy choices away from judges and returned them to the States. Whatever the wisdom of that choice, the Court does this Nation no service by ignoring the textual commands of the Constitution and Acts of Congress. The Twenty-first Amendment and the Webb-Kenyon Act displaced the negative Commerce Clause as applied to regulation of liquor imports into a State. They require sustaining the constitutionality of Michigan's and New York's direct-shipment laws.

I respectfully dissent.



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